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ABSTRACT
When planning in the U.S.A. shifted from a design activity to a technocratic 
process after World War II, it sought a scientific basis for its new professional 
approach. The academic climate in the United States at that time would permit 
no other concept of social science than that inspired by positivism, along with 
the ontological and epistemological presuppositions that it carried with it from 
the natural sciences. Subsequent developments, both inside and outside 
academia, have raised doubts about how sufficient positivism is for 
comprehending society in all its complexity, especially to the extent that it differs 
from nature in important respects. This is not to say that positive social science 
should be abandoned in any sense of the word, but rather that there are 
important additional dimensions of society that cannot be understood from such 
a perspective. Thus, borrowing a term from Thomas Kuhn, an attempt is made 
here to explore the limitations and potential of not only positivism, but also of two 
other ‘paradigms’, phenomenology and structuralism, in the hopes that a more 
comprehensive social scientific basis for planning could be articulated.
Phenomenology addresses important dimensions of society missing in nature, 
such as consciousness and intention, and attempts to formulate a paradigmatic 
or meta-theoretical framework for understanding human behavior as not just a 
succession of facts and events, but as the outcome of thought and purpose. 
This immediately poses the question as to how consciousness and intention 
come into being in the absence of a biogenetic program, assuming that human 
behavior is characterized by the absence of such ultimate determination. Here 
important social processes, such as habitualization or routinization of behavior, 
leading to its typification and ultimate institutionalization, come into play, all in a 
social context that directs this process without determining it in any causal 
sense. Of importance here is the dialectical relationship that characterizes the 
association between the individual and the collectivity. The collectivity socializes 
the individual into its rules and roles, while the individual always may select 
which of these to accept, which to oppose, and which to doubt, all with potential 
effects back on that collectivity. There is, therefore, an ambiguity to the social 
order that postmodernists have observed (and often exaggerated for their own 
reasons). This gives an uncertainty to many of the positivist explanations of 
social phenomena, which cannot be washed away with reservations having to 
do with probability, etc.
The chapter on structuralism explores other dimensions of the social whole, 
suggesting forms of regulation that also cannot be reduced to mechanistic 
causal formulations. Here concepts of wholeness (the totality more that a mere 
sum of the parts), self- regulation and transformation are discussed. When 
these concepts are formulated in more than static and descriptive terms, they 
once again raise the question of the dialectic: How is the whole constituted?
i
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How do self-regulation and transformation take place? Etc. All the authors 
discussed here place emphasis upon the structuring process rather than upon 
structures, as such. That there are isomorphisms, topological, and other 
mathematical features of structures, etc., is less important than how they have 
come into being. Piaget bases his discussion on the formation of psychological 
and intellectual structures. Giddens emphasizes institutionalizing processes, 
very much like those described by the phenomenologists. Burke finds 
explanation in the narrative, and more specifically dramatic form, as the master 
metaphor for understanding how humans create and maintain (or change) social 
structure.
By placing emphasis on communication as the ‘cause’ of social structuring, we 
can begin to extend the traditional engineering concept of planning to 
encompass new insights into its actual role in society. Planning is an 
intervention in society, as is all social science in a less formal way. Engineers 
see as their role to control and manipulate. Is this the proper role of planning? 
If so, in whose interests is society (or nature) to be manipulated and controlled? 
Can planning simply relax and assume that ‘political processes’ will ensure a 
democratic formulation of priorities? All scientists and engineers have been 
under a form of ‘ house arrest’ since the time of Galileo, to a large extent self- 
imposed (perhaps to avoid the fate of Copernicus). They have made historic 
compromises, first with the church and now with the hegemonic bourgeoisie, to 
insure their social benefits and (circumscribed) freedom to pursue their 
intellectual interests. This ‘attitude toward history (society)’ is self-imposed 
because it has become institutionalized, i.e., taken for granted. In short, this is 
a socially constructed form of imprisonment. However, (communicative) 
planning actions which seek to overstep the bounds of this institutionalized order 
can be ‘dangerous’; there is security in political apathy.
Thus, planning as a scientific activity faces a double challenge. First, it must 
understand its social reality (as differentiated from the reality of nature). 
Second, it must understand its own role in constituting that socially constructed 
reality, which is also its object of study. This is not an easy challenge, and it 
carries planning well beyond its traditionally defined role, both as an academic 
as well as a professional activity. These boundaries were transgressed briefly in 
the 1960’s, so there is a glimpse of what could be done. But planning would 
have to sharpen its understanding, not only of the society into which it is 
intervening, but also of its own rhetorical resources for intervening in socially 
and politically responsible ways. The latter will be the concern of the second 
part of this book.
II
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PART ONE
SOCIAL SCIENCE: META THEORY AND RESEARCH
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Part One - Prologue
The story of this book begins in the mid 1950’s when I entered the graduate 
program in city and regional planning at the University of Chicago. Positivism 
was in its heyday in the social sciences at that time, and, as planning was 
seeking to distinguish itself from architectural design, we were given the benefit 
of all the latest in this from of scientific thinking. There was a serious disjuncture 
between the accomplishments in the classroom and those of the profession in 
the City of Chicago, as I was to learn from my subsequent employment there, 
but this did not seem to trouble the academic program very much. Since then I 
have worked in other practical planning situations, first with a large international 
consulting firm, Doxiadis Associates, where I researched the planning problems 
of cities in Africa, Asia and North America, and, subsequently, with the City of 
Athens, Greece.
In the meantime, I continued my academic training in the doctoral program in 
city and regional planning at the University of North Carolina, which was an 
excellent all around program in its own right. Here, however, I was challenged by 
a chance enrollment in a course in the philosophy of social science, where I was 
introduced to phenomenology. Marxist urban theory subsequently introduced 
me to structuralism, and to a different set of epistemological and ontological 
presuppositions, which were as distinct from positivism as were those of 
phenomenology. Finally, academic teaching helped me to clarify the role of 
communication in every aspect of human existence, and encouraged me to 
become familiar with language and its sociodramatic uses, as an invaluable 
dimension of planning theory.
I would like to thank Maria Vantali for her untiring efforts to bring this book into 
its final form. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to my wife, Mary, who has 
discussed every phase of the book, both in form and in content, and kept me 
within the confines of common sense. I am, of course, responsible for its final 
outcome.
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CHAPTER 1
POSITIVISM AND ITS ‘DISCONTENT’
The central idea of the consilience world view is that all tangible 
phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, 
are based upon material processes that are ultimately reducible, however 
long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics...
I admit that the confidence of natural scientists often seems overweening.
E.O. Wilson, Consilience
He's a scientist. He does not think of defending his actions. He is not 
weakened with a conscience.... Christianity he regards as no more than 
a poetic conceit. He doesn’t even bother to criticize it, or to mock it or to 
disavow it.
E.L.Doctorow, The Waterworks
The authority of scientific planning is based on its association with positive 
science. That is, it will generate and/or use knowledge according to the 
accepted principles of the scientific method. It will thus also accept the 
ontological and epistemological presuppositions of positive science, irrespective 
of whether they are applied to natural or social phenomena. Indifference to this 
distinction has, as I shall hope to demonstrate, important implications for the 
definition of planning as a social and professional activity.
Positivism
The characteristics of positive science are well known. They include an 
assumption that only those phenomena that can be observed will constitute the 
proper subject matter of science. Closely associated with this is the imperative 
that all observations be reduced to operational, hence measurable form, which 
then allows their manipulation in mathematical terms. It is further assumed that 
those things that are to be observed exist apart from the scientist and 
independent from her or his volition or action. In addition, intuition is not a 
proper form of scientific knowledge, and, in fact, ideas generally are suspect 
until placed within a proper theoretical framework and tested empirically through 
rigorous controlled experimentation. Knowledge is thus defined as inductive or 
deductive thought about objects and events that has been subjected to empirical 
testing. The scientist is privileged to stand outside (and usually above) reality 
and hence to be able to manipulate the observed phenomena so as to test 
suspected relationships among them. This ‘objectivity’ gives the ’certainty’ to 
knowledge and to the ‘bureaucratic rationality’ that is associated with science.
3
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Reality (whether natural or social) is viewed as a mechanism, operating 
essentially without intention or purpose. Objects and events are believed to exist 
in linear (and multi-linear) causal relationships and are thus determined by the 
natural laws that govern their motion. These relationships, which give rise to 
and are determined by the mechanism, are assumed to be timeless (even when 
the mechanism is an evolutionary one), and thus allow for prediction of future 
states that might derive from manipulation of the variables within the known 
relationships. Engineering of nature (and society) is both possible and likely, 
once the laws governing the mechanism are uncovered.
It must be remembered, of course, that positive science was invented to 
transcend the dogmatism and mysticism of religion and to overcome the 
limitations of ’lived praxis’ (Gellner 1984, pp. 576 ff). Positive science is seen to 
work within a carefully articulated framework of abstract logic, posing 
hypotheses that are tested (and testable) under precisely controlled and 
replicable experimental conditions. It is by nature a critical and public activity 
with conclusions that can always be validated (or invalidated) by other scientists. 
It is intercultural, using the universal language of mathematics to communicate 
with anyone willing and able to undergo the difficult and extended training that 
gives access to this language and its attendant specialized concepts.
Positive science is seen as progressive and cumulative, and has in any case 
extended human control over nature to a degree unknown or unthinkable prior 
to the nineteenth century. The growth of scientific knowledge has now, in fact, 
far exceeded the ability of ordinary human beings to comprehend, let alone 
exercise any democratic control over it. Even fellow scientists are restricted to 
only general understanding because of the high degree of specialization that 
characterizes modern scientific research. As a result, for every intelligent 
technological advance based in science there is a mindless incremental 
increase in the means of destruction, ranging from (inadvertent) chemical 
pollution to laser-guided ‘smart’ bombs.
One might well ask whether a positive social science could not better direct or 
give intelligence that would allow only ‘positive’ use of scientific knowledge. It is, 
indeed, within such a framework that positivism was introduced into the social 
sciences. Halfpenny (1982), whose excellent survey of the evolving meanings 
of positivism in social science over the past two centuries, provides the basis for 
the discussion that follows. He identifies twelve different stages or meanings for 
the term positivism in the social sciences. He begins with Aguste Comte, who 
claimed that positivism could provide 1) a theory of historical development, 2) a 
theory of knowledge, and 3) a unity of science. Comte meant to overcome the 
mysticism of religion and metaphysics which were unchecked and 
unsubstantiated by empirical evidence. He sought to improve society by 
replacing the authority of the church with a moral order based in the predictive 
wisdom of a positive social science. As a fourth meaning, positive science would
4
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thus provide a “religion of humanity” (Halfpenny 1982, p. 20), with scientist- 
priests administering this new temple of wisdom (a not unseemly portent of the 
self-appointed social status of a large number of 20th century positivist 
scientists). Thus, there was a clear moral purpose in these early formulations of 
positivism directed toward a conscious improvement in the human condition.
Influenced by Darwin and Spencer a fifth conception of positive social science 
took an evolutionary form based upon the idea of the survival of the fittest 
among competing individuals, subsequently to be embodied in a semi-normative 
form as social Darwinism. This form of positivism was discredited in sociology 
by the end of the nineteenth century because it was clearly not attaining its goal 
of improving society. It has, however, continued to maintain its status in neo­
classical economics (and in popular prejudice) under the banner of the so-called 
‘free-market system’, because of its normative importance to capitalism. It was 
also revived in sociology once the restriction was lifted that science be directed 
to the improvement of society, as in the logical positivist form discussed below 
(Runciman 1997, 1998, also Rustin 1999 and Runciman 1999)
Positivism next took an empirical quantitative turn in its sixth form under the 
influence of Emile Durkheim, and came to be associated with the "...collection 
and statistical analysis of quantitative data about society” (Halfpenny 1982, pp. 
24-26). An attempt was to be made to establish (natural) social laws through 
this analysis, based largely on probability theory. Three kinds of statistical 
analysis were developed to further this goal: 1) a descriptive statistics which are 
used to summarize distributions of social phenomena as well as their measures 
of central tendency: mean, mode, median, etc.; 2) inferential or inductive 
statistics which are used to extrapolate quantitative data about a population 
based upon a (mathematically) random sample drawn from it; and 3) 
multivariate statistics which are used to establish (causal) relations among 
social phenomena (variables) based upon concomitant variation in the social or 
spatial occurrence of these phenomena, usually as an extension of the 
inferential statistics mentioned above.
In the early twentieth century positivism took on a logical deductive form under 
the influence of the Vienna Circle philosophers. Not that it abandoned its 
empirical or naturalistic perspective; it was rather that this form of logical 
positivism or logical empiricism sought to develop a formal language for the 
sciences that would allow systematic and precise translation of theoretical 
statements into verifiable or testable propositions. In other words, the raw data 
of observation, the sensations, would have to be translated into a common 
formal or operational language that would allow all science to be unified within a 
logical mathematical form. It was at this time that positivism as a philosophical 
system also became separated from social philosophy, separated from any 
normative visions or declarations about what society ought to be. By the 1930’s 
this perspective had become the conventional view of science generally, and
5
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
especially of the social sciences, as they struggled to attain the status of the 
natural sciences. Thus, also, was positive science permanently alienated from 
any moral or political concerns, and this as the result of a normative rule of its 
own making. Any such moral thoughts, or actions flowing there from by 
scientists, would have to be viewed as taking place within their role as private 
citizens; true science was no longer to be contaminated by such ’subjective’ 
influences. It was in this ‘value free’ context that social science was reduced to 
behavioralism, and theory presented as a form of ‘social physics’ in the 
language borrowed from the natural sciences.
At this point mid-twentieth century positivism sought to develop into its ninth 
form as a . deductive nomological epistemology ... in which science 
consists of a corpus of interrelated, true, simple, precise and wide-ranging 
universal laws that are central to explanation and prediction. . .” (Halfpenny 
1982, p.64) and then into its tenth form as a set of ’causal laws’ that would 
explain and predict social phenomena. Cause, unfortunately, as it turns out, has 
proved to be a quite ambiguous term, and much effort has been spent in 
attempts to define it, and especially to separate it out from ’accidental 
generalizations’ and ’spurious correlations’ (Halfpenny 1982, pp. 73-74). One 
course around this dilemma has been to infer cause through temporal priority: 
measured variables that precede others in time may be given causal priority in 
correlation analysis. Another course has been to give theoretical priority based 
upon previously accepted causal relationships or laws. Halfpenny (1982, pp. 83- 
86) anticipates my discussion below by suggesting two alternatives to causal 
explanation: phenomenology and structuralism. In the former, cause is
attributed to human intention or purpose, and in the latter to the overall structure 
of relationships that generate behavior in any socio-economic formation. 
Needless to say, neither of these alternatives is acceptable to positivists who 
insist instead on concentrating on ”. . . establishing regularities between 
observables”, though the certainty that this would lead to trouble-free, objective 
science ”. . . has faded under the searching analysis to which empiricism has 
been subject, not least by the logical positivists themselves” (Halfpenny 1982, p. 
91).
Ultimately, therefore, positive social science has had to confront the issue of the 
status of empirical evidence and of theory, or laws, as well as the relationships 
among them. In addressing this issue one emphasis has given priority to 
induction as an eleventh form of positivism. Here laws are inferred from 
empirical evidence, and in the final analysis, if necessary, unencumbered by 
theory at all. Nor has this approach been trouble free, as a result of which 
certain assumptions and limiting conditions have had to be granted. For 
example, it has been necessary to assume that laws are timeless and that there 
is a uniformity between the past and the future that would make the empirically 
discovered laws valid in the future; or that strict verifiability would have to be
6
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
relaxed by formulating laws as probability statements; or in the final analysis by 
just accepting regularities pragmatically as evidence of underlying order.
The other emphasis gives primacy to deduction in this twelfth form of positivism. 
Here hypotheses are generated by (deduced from) theory (or thought) and 
tested rigorously for their empirical validity. Hypotheses that survive the test of 
verifiability can then be combined into sets of laws governing society. To guard 
against bias, verified hypotheses are conditionally accepted until further 
evidence causes them to be discarded. Ultimately, few hypotheses survive the 
test of falsification and success in this most commonly accepted current form of 
positive social science has had to depend upon granting some hypotheses and 
even operational definitions the status of conventions, thus undermining the 
claim to objective certainty. In spite of Popper’s attempts to argue against 
conventionalism as a basis for building theory through the hypothetical- 
deductive approach - by suggesting that corroboration would ultimately fill this 
gap - he has not been able to provide a logic that would tie unfalsified 
hypotheses together to form a coherent whole (Halfpenny 1982, p. 105). 
Popper (1959) did, however, provide a useful corrective to the overall 
conception of positive science by suggesting that scientific effort should be 
directed to falsifying hypotheses rather than confirming them, since the tendency 
would always be to select confirming evidence from the myriad of tests that 
could be formulated for any hypothesis. Like most efforts to create an ideal 
positive science, Popper (1945) carried this effort to its literal extreme evolving it 
into his own worldview with general applications to society, as well.
As it turns out even natural scientists do not always proceed strictly according to 
these positivist prescriptions, as numerous studies in the sociology of science 
now demonstrate, probably because scientific progress has had more human 
content than would be admitted by this unending search for objectivity and 
certainty outside of religion and metaphysics (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkey 1983). 
Thus, positivist social science in the late twentieth century either drifted towards 
a gradual acceptance of the idea of conventionalism (based, perhaps, upon the 
ineluctable inter-subjectivity of scientific communities) as the ultimate source of 
(un)certainty in science, or simply avoided the philosophical issues of relating 
theory and evidence by assuming that there is an underlying order that social 
science will ultimately discover if it is careful and conscientious enough in its 
empirical work. Rather than deaf with the often-troubling relationship between 
theory and evidence, these realists simply assume that cause and effect exist in 
society and that this will in time eliminate any untoward scientific conclusions.
Meanwhile, the actual search, however tentative, for a system of logically 
interrelated propositions or a set of laws governing reality has been manifestly 
more successful in the natural than the social sciences. The usual response to 
this observation by positivist social scientists is that social science is in a much 
more primitive state than natural science, comparable to the time prior even to
7
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Copernicus, Newton or Kepler, and that given time social science will also 
realize accomplishments similar to the natural sciences. Other responses to 
criticisms of the positivist approach to social science may be related to this main 
argument. Criticisms about the impossibility of a positivist social science such 
as the difficulty of carrying on experimental research in large scale societies, or 
the fact that social phenomena are influenced by culture or the time and place in 
which they occur, or that the researcher influences the objects of his or her 
study even to the extent that publication of research results changes the 
behavior of those under study, or that behavior cannot be understood without 
the purposes and goals that govern it, or that there are strong social influences 
and constraints on what social scientists may study such that values are ever 
present in social research, etc., can all be met by the argument that similar 
difficulties had to be overcome in the natural sciences and/or that in time all 
these obstacles will be overcome as a result of the accumulation of experience 
in doing positive research (Bernstein 1978, pp. 32-42).
At the same time, there is one essential distinction between the natural and 
social sciences that must be emphasized. The social position of the social 
scientist is qualitatively different because the relationship between natural 
science and engineering is not the same as that between social science and 
planning. While there may be social influences on natural science, there is no 
moral concern about nature, per se, except insofar as it may be thought to be 
rendered uninhabitable by humans as a result of scientifically inspired 
technological interventions, but then nature doesn’t care about this. The idea of 
a ’good’ or ‘evil’ nature is obviously not relevant, except as stated above, which, 
in any case, is an issue in society not in nature. Social science applications, 
however, always carry moral implications, even though this has often been 
denied by positive social science as it has evolved in the twentieth century.
Thus, there is a rhetorical dimension to social science that is muted in the 
natural sciences, where it appears mainly as an attempt to persuade fellow 
scientists (or grant administrators) about the appropriateness of a given 
scientific paradigm, and then mainly during times of paradigm crisis (see the 
discussion of Kuhn below). The social science community constitutes an' 
intellectual (and political) elite whose theoretical pronouncements have 
rhetorical impact as . . an opium for the people, as well as an identity- 
bestowing myth for its members” (Weigert 1970, p. 112). Weigert believes that 
when social scientists accept their status as positive scientists, as those who 
produce knowledge that is ”. . .ahistorically lawful, methodologically guaranteed 
against error, and free of status-group limitations”, then their rhetoric is immoral, 
even though they may on occasion grant that such knowledge is sociologically 
relative. Weigert (1970 p. 116-7) reviews the various ritualistic and
conventionalist uses of tests of validity, reliability, significance, etc., in social 
science as examples of the "magical rhetoric of methodology”. He also 
characterizes the various machinations that social scientists go through to get
8
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published or to gain access to research funds as the "soteriological rhetoric of 
science”. These and the many other criticisms of positivist social science are 
directed not so much at the idea of such a science, with all the difficulties that 
might be encountered, as they are at the arrogance and general air of certainty 
that surrounds positivist epistemology. As Weigert (1970, p. 118) says, if 
positive (social) scientists . . seek certitude, they will not find it within science; 
this is the proper problem of metaphysics”.
The translation of social science knowledge into social policy is particularly 
vulnerable to this blindness. For the certainty extends not only to the belief that 
positive science is ‘untroubled’ if not infallible, but also to the presumption that 
there are no moral implications to what science pronounces as fact, even if it 
restricts itself to probability statements about what will happen to ’y’ if we do ‘x’. 
The latter, it must be noted, is the framework within which planning theory has 
evolved. In other words, early scientific planning theory, like the positivist model 
on which it depended, assumed that if we are aware of our value axioms, if we 
are logically consistent in following them through, and we base our planning 
decisions on an empirical understanding of what consequences will flow from 
our actions, then we will fulfil the requirements for making rational decisions, 
and our planning will be scientific (Bernstein 1978, p. 48).
The problem with the application of science to planning must then focus on the 
issue of certainty. Particularly in social science, as we have seen above, there 
are a great many places where uncertainty can arise. If planning is the 
application of scientific findings to create a more desirable future state in society 
and those findings themselves are fraught with uncertainty, how can planning be 
confident that things will be ’better’ as a result of its actions? And this is not 
even the weakest link in planning theory, for a much more serious problem has 
to do with the way in which planning goals are established in the first place. 
Positive social science has little to offer except to assume goals that serve its 
own purposes, e.g., the assumption by neo-classical economics that all 
individuals are utility - maximizing and informed consumers in the free market 
system. In planning theory the conventional response to this issue is to assume 
that ’goals are determined democratically in the political sphere’. But critical 
social science research on the political sphere does not seem to be very 
’positive’ that there is much democracy operating in the way in which social 
values are articulated into planning goals. Indeed, there is little certainty that the 
political systems devised in large scale, urban societies have much to do with 
what went on in the ancient agora, which is the inspiration for the idea that goals 
will be rationally or at least democratically articulated in the first place. The 
question is, would a different kind of social science be more helpful in this 
respect, and how could there be a ’different kind’ of social science in any case?
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Relativism (and Postmodernism)
All speculation that goes at all deep becomes metaphysics by its very 
nature; we knock up against the invisible wall, which bounds the prism of 
our knowledge. It is only when a man has been round that wall on his 
hands and knees, when he is certain that there is no way out, that he is 
driven upon himself for a solution.
Then for you, Count, ’ says Theodore, ‘the hard and fast structure of the 
sciences yields nothing more than a set of comparative myths, some with 
and some without charm?’
7 would like to pose the problem from another angle. There is 
morphology of forms in which our conceptual apparatus works, and there 
is a censor - which is our conditioned attitude. He is the person whom I 
would reject, because he prevents me choosing and arranging knowledge 
according to my sensibility. ’
Lawrence Durrell, 
Prospero's Cell
To reject the relevance of the logical empiricist scheme does not mean 
to reject the goal of achieving valid general laws; it means that there are 
other goals as well and that generality is a matter of degree. . . Truth 
does not have to be timeless. Logical empiricists have a derogatory 
name for such changing truths (relativism); but such truths are real, while 
the absolute, fully axiomatized truth is imaginary.
Paul Diesing, How Does Social Science Work
The arrogance of positivist epistemology has been under attack almost from the 
beginning. Even after religious leaders grudgingly accepted the new authority of 
science, writers and artists were troubled by its inhumanity. Philosophers, too, 
were critical. Hegel and early Marx renewed interest in the social dialectic, 
inspired by the writings of Heraclitus, Dimocritus and Epicurus. But perhaps the 
most forceful critique in the nineteenth century was mounted by Frederich 
Nietzche. Indeed, he, along with Heidegger, has offered the main inspiration for 
the late twentieth century philosophical and literary movement called 
postmodernism, the most energetic and sustained attack on scientific certainty 
to date. But even prior to this latter movement social philosophers from the 
Frankfurt School were warning against the excesses of positive science 
(Horkheimer 1947, Adorno 1984) in a tradition that extends from the pre- and 
post-World War II period (Fromm 1941, Marcuse 1964) up to the present 
(Habermas 1971, 1984).
The critique of positive science became much more widespread and popular 
during the 1960s, inspired in large part by popular movements against the 
Vietnam War, but also in support of human rights and democracy, movements 
that climaxed in 1968 in places as distant as China, Czechoslovakia, France, 
the USA, and elsewhere. A series of books by academics and others became 
popular reading in the sixties and early seventies, for example, Theodor
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Roszak’s, The Making of a Counterculture (1968), E.F.Schumacher’s, Small Is 
Beautiful (1973), Herbert Marcuse’s, One Dimensional Man (1964), Brian 
Easlea’s, Liberation and the Aims of Science (1973), Jacques Ellul’s, The 
Technological Society (1964), etc.
Within the academy there were also a number of developments serving to 
undermine the certainty of positivist epistemology. Evidence was accumulating 
from hundreds of field studies in anthropology that culture was a powerful force 
in conditioning human thought about what exists (ontology) and what one can 
know about it (epistemology). One academic conflict in this respect pitted a 
psychologist against an anthropologist, resulting in a federally funded research 
project to see if culture could influence perception. The study established 
beyond a doubt that even the perception of geometric shapes was influenced by 
culture (Segal, et al 1964)
Once it was accepted that other, even less urban cultures were not inferior - or 
lower down on the evolutionary scale, as was popularly believed during the 16th 
to 19th century, thus giving license to the slaughter or enslavement of millions of 
fellow humans in the Americas and Africa -- anthropologists began to contrast 
other cultures as successfully functioning alternate systems of thought and 
behavior, with considerable success in accommodating themselves to their 
respective environments. Thus, cultural relativity preceded the idea of scientific 
relativity by several decades at least.
The idea of scientific relativity was introduced, perhaps inadvertently, by Thomas 
Kuhn in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). Kuhn 
described the conventional view of science as incremental, linear, and 
cumulative, as governed by strict epistemological and methodological rules, and 
as seeking to uncover ahistorical, universal laws governing the relationships and 
formation of all things in nature. To this he contrasted his own view, developed 
through historical research, of science as divided into normal and extraordinary 
periods. Normal periods are characterized by research as a form of puzzle­
solving, i.e., routine research where the answers are more or less known in 
advance, leaving to the scientist the (not insignificant) task of proving how and 
why this is true. Extraordinary periods are those characterized by crisis and 
discovery. What is at stake here is what Kuhn called the paradigm. A paradigm 
is a basic set of (especially ontological) presuppositions that constitute the 
disciplinary matrix within which the relevant scientific community works during 
periods of normal science. It consists of shared symbolic generalizations, 
shared models, shared values and shared examples of successful research. It 
determines the activity of scientists, their methods, their problem field and their 
standards of solution. The paradigm gives order and meaning to observation. 
Science, in other words, is more than method, according to Kuhn; empiricism 
and pragmatism are not sufficient, as random observation is pointless. Also, 
nature is too complex and varied; something like a map, i.e., a paradigm, is
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essential to direct all phases of scientific activity. The paradigm, however, is not 
theory; it is meta-theoretical. Its principles are often unknown or rather assumed 
by the community of scientists. It is learned, i.e., students of science are 
socialized, through examples (problem solving), not through explicit discussion. 
Furthermore, its presuppositions cannot be proven either with scientific logic or 
with scientific methods.
According to Kuhn, normal science activity proceeds through observation and 
experiment under an accepted paradigm until the articulation of the paradigm is 
exhausted. In the process, anomalies — unanticipated experimental outcomes 
or observations that do not fit into the accepted paradigm - arise and 
accumulate until there is a crisis in belief and presupposition, at which time more 
and more ad hoc explanations are offered, and conflict arises in the scientific 
community about the accepted standards of explanation. At this time there is a 
fragmentation of effort into competing groups or schools and a general 
breakdown in communication. Scientists talk through each other, their 
arguments become increasingly tautological or circular and there is no 
agreement on standards of proof. This period of unrest continues until a new, 
more inclusive paradigm is proposed and ultimately gains the allegiance of a 
critical mass of the (at first younger) members of the scientific community. 
What Kuhn emphasizes is that the transition to the new paradigm is likened to a 
gestalt shift or a sudden flash of insight that changes one’s total view of the 
universe subsumed under the paradigm. While rhetoric or persuasive 
argumentation intensifies during such periods, the cognitive process whereby 
this shift occurs is not fully understood according to Kuhn, except that it appears 
to occur outside the logic of science. The criteria that seem to account for the 
shift range from the ‘elegance’ of the new paradigm, to its ability to explain the 
anomalies of the old paradigm, to its prediction of unsuspected phenomena, and 
ultimately to a simple matter of faith.
Ironically enough, positive science seems to be little concerned, let alone 
influenced by Kuhn or others who have subsequently joined this attack on 
positivist epistemology. Nor, according to Kuhn, do they need to be; normal and 
revolutionary science may proceed without any philosophical awareness by the 
scientists that such things are happening. Nor does Kuhn see anything to be 
gained by their becoming more aware. Indeed, as he illustrates historically, 
scientific textbooks are simply rewritten to blot out the revolutionary periods and 
make science reappear as the linear, cumulative, and incremental process that 
it was always believed to be within the community of scientists. Another reason 
may be that science does not work according to the strict positivist ideal in any 
case. The sociology of science has shown that the actual work of scientists is 
much more relaxed than the positivist paradigm would suggest (Diesing 1981). 
Hypotheses are much more loosely constructed and tested than suggested by 
the logical empiricist model, conforming more readily to Popper’s ideal of 
piecemeal refutation and corroboration.
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Outside of the culture of positive science the effect of Kuhn’s book has been 
much more substantial. His concept has been attacked in dozens of locations 
for its imprecision and incoherence and its ‘disabling’ effects on the whole 
scientific project (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, Shapere 1974), while others 
have seized the opportunity to push the idea of the relativity of scientific 
knowledge to the extreme (Feyeraband 1975, 1978, 1985). Even before Kuhn, 
W.V.O. Quine had confronted the issue in his essay, "Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” (1953), and subsequently in several other books (Quine 1960, 
1981, Quine and Ullian 1970). Christopher Norris has covered this issue of 
relativism and the conflict surrounding it in an excellent article entitled, "Truth, 
Science and the Growth of Knowledge” (1999). He carries the discussion of 
relativism from its earliest appearance in Quine through all of the intervening 
period up to and including its literary and artistic expression in postmodernism, 
where nothing is certain and all is metaphor (Foucault 1972, Derrida 1981, 
Morretti 1987). Norris contrasts this with the work of the realist philosophers 
(Norris p.116ff) who argue that there are regularities in nature quite apart from 
how they might be described by scientists linguistically or deductively; that there 
are things that we know now and we did not know in the past; and that science 
has accumulated a body of knowledge that allows us to better approximate and 
understand nature. If this does not allow a claim for Truth, per se, it does permit 
a belief in partial truths that can be usefully employed in the human project. 
Perhaps some of the arrogance is missing in this more modest positivist claim; if 
so, the dialectic corrective of the relativists will not have been in vain.
Meanwhile, relativism has taken on an arrogance of its own in its postmodern 
form. The notions of ambiguity and uncertainty have become a fetish in many, if 
not most philosophical, literary, and artistic expressions (Moretti 1987). The 
simple truth that all representations hide or suppress some meanings while 
expressing others has been expanded into a philosophy of doubt that can have 
no other effect than to pre-empt action -- hence the importance of ‘silence’ in 
postmodern rhetoric. A noble intent to expose the hidden repression in forms of 
modern discourse has been carried to extremes that make the critique easily 
ignored, if not exploited by the true centres of authority in modern society. For 
example, a recent book on this problem is subtitled “postmodern philosophers’ 
abuse of science”, and, indeed, the authors have no difficulty in exposing these 
abuses (Sokal and Bricmont 1998). In the process, they also provide an 
excellent summary of how natural science actually works, showing the 
importance of the middle way between the extreme objectivism of Popper and 
the Vienna School, on the one hand, and the extreme subjectivism or 
‘unreasonable scepticism’ fostered by the postmodernists, on the other hand 
(Sokal and Bricmont 1998, Ch. 4).
Indeed, for Sokal and Bricmont (1998, p. 54) “...the scientific method is not 
radically different from the rational attitude in everyday life or in other domains of
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human knowledge. Historians, detectives and plumbers - indeed, all human 
beings - use the same basic methods of induction, deduction and assessment 
of evidence as do physicists or biochemists”. One should perhaps qualify this 
by saying ‘all human beings influenced by the western tradition dating back to 
the ancient Greeks’, for as Hanson and Heath (1998) illustrate so clearly, it is 
this tradition that differentiates the West from other cultures around the world. It 
is the consciousness, the self-critique, the idea of open and free discussion 
among equals free from religious and political interference, the rational search 
for knowledge for its own sake, on which the scientific tradition, itself, is based. 
But as Hanson and Heath (1998, p.41) illustrate, that tradition is a great deal 
more than scientific rationalism, and postmodernism may be nothing more than 
a reaction to “...the Enlightenment’s absolute and haughty confidence in the 
salvation of man through pure reason devoid of custom, tradition, religion and 
the allowance for the inexplicable ...” In other words, scientific rationalism, 
however more flexible in practice it may actually be than the ideal outlined by the 
‘hard-line’ positivists, is still only a part of the ethos that characterizes the 
western tradition. It is, in addition, the whole set of institutions that allowed 
scientific rationalism to arise and flourish in the first place, and to flourish again 
even after so many centuries of suppression. It is the importance of “. . . (1) 
seeing the world in more abstract terms; (2) understanding the bleak, tragic 
nature of human existence; (3) seeking harmony between word and deed; and 
(4) having no illusions about the role culture plays in human history” (Hanson 
and Heath 1998, pp. 36-37). It is a no-nonsense ‘brutally existentialist’ view of 
the world and its imperfect human inhabitants, undeceived by appearances, 
sceptical but not ultimately cynical because of an acceptance of the tragedy of 
human existence. It is a world in which the theatre, the library and the agora 
must complement scientific rationality, if the multidimensional reality of that 
existence is to be understood. Hence Theodosius’ dictum that “all that (theatre, 
library and agora) must be torn down” if the obscurantism of Eastern religion 
were to assume control of the minds and bodies of the faithful (Koutsoula, 1998, 
Simopoulou 1993, Zographou 1983).
Thus, missing from Sokal and Bricmont’s indictment of the postmodern 
impostures is any appreciation of why these scholars should feel impelled to 
express their arguments (so foolishly) in natural scientific terms in the first place. 
Could it be that without such language they would not be taken seriously in 
academia and the larger society? Is it that positivism has . . reigned as 
implicit official state religion during the 20th century, as Comte had envisioned”, 
and that only . . natural scientists, technocrats, and neo-classical economists 
participate as professions in public decision-making because they have more 
readily accepted these publicly dominant epistemologies and metaphysical 
beliefs and reinforced them through their mode of participation” (Norgaard 1994, 
p. 68-69 my emphasis).
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But if social science adopts the ontological and epistemological presuppositions 
of positive (natural) science, it will treat society as if it were ‘natural’ in the same 
sense that nature is ‘natural’. That is, it will not be able to ask itself the question, 
‘should society be organized differently?’ Natural science methodologies 
applied to social reality will thus seek regularities, and explanations of those 
regularities as if they were ‘natural’. The very system of thought precludes 
questions about the appropriateness of those regularities. Social science theory 
within this framework will not permit questions about whether these regularities 
are good or bad, just or unjust, etc. This does not mean that social scientists 
will not raise and examine such questions, but that these questions will likely be 
distorted or censored as long as natural science is the main inspiration for the 
research.
Positive social science fits nicely, therefore, with the ways in which (political) 
power is exercized in modern society. Even though corporate control of 
research is increasing, particularly in the American university, any attempt to 
control the free flow of scientific information will sooner or later inhibit the 
rational process whereby natural science creates new knowledge. The issue 
here is not whether this process is more subjective than was presented by the 
ideology of science during the period prior to the 1960’s. It has to do with the 
western tradition of exposing findings to the widespread criticism of other 
scientists in an open and uninhibited discussion that can test, and then reject or 
accept these findings. Positive social science carries on this tradition, but it 
does not question the ‘naturalness’ of the social order. Other forms of social 
science and social thought, generally, are more problematic to political authority; 
they run the danger of questioning the legitimacy of the existing social order 
and, of course, the hierarchies of power and authority associated with that order. 
Thus, the closer social science - and the arts and humanities - approximate 
the paradigmatic presuppositions of positive (natural) science the more 
acceptable they will be within and without academia. For natural scientists this is 
not a question of power but of epistemology. Criteria of success imposed by 
academic administrators, large numbers of whom are drawn from the natural 
sciences (at least in American Universities) and/or their attendant professional 
schools, would ‘naturally’ reflect certain standards, i.e., many publications, early 
on, and explicit in their use of positive methodologies. Neo-classical economics 
would have a high status in this academic constellation and the further social 
scientists distance themselves from this ideal, the lower would be their status, all 
other things being equal. Academic administration converges nicely with 
political power here, but for quite different reasons and without the necessity of 
any unpleasant arm-twisting.
Sokol and Bricmont attack, and rightly so, the misuse and abuse of natural 
science and mathematics by postmodernists. One would wish that they had 
extended this critique to all uses of natural science and mathematics in the 
social sciences in particular, but also in philosophy and the humanities,
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wherever they occur. This might help to liberate these branches of knowledge 
from the spell of natural science. But this, perhaps, would carry their analyses 
into dangerous waters, for at some point they would have to confront the 
reasons for this enchantment. Here they would discover that the use and abuse 
of natural science concepts is part of a long 20th century tradition, and since 
postmodernism often tends to border on the absurd, it is not surprising that they 
should carry this same tradition so far.
In this same framework the efforts by some social scientists to create a ‘strong 
program’ of explanation of natural science, i.e., to explain not only the activities 
of these scientists in sociological terms, but also the actual content of their 
theories, may be seen as a desperate effort to liberate social science from the 
grip of natural science. This they would accomplish by ‘proving’ that all 
knowledge is socially relative, and, of course, that social scientists would then 
be the ultimate arbiters of ‘true’ knowledge. This pretension is also easily 
defeated by Sokol and Bricmont, leaving natural science, as does most of their 
argument, in its supreme (social) position. Thus a companion study should 
document the abuses of society (and social science) by natural scientists acting 
in their positions of authority within and outside of academia. But natural 
scientist are largely unaware and, even more distressingly, uninterested in the 
social effects of the natural science approach to human affairs, even though 
there is a long tradition of analysis and documentation of these abuses in 
literature, philosophy, history and even social science dating back at least to the 
19th century, but especially dominant in the turbulent 1960’s. Furthermore, there 
is an apparent contradiction between positive science’s claim to the classical 
tradition in rational thought with free, open inquiry and the empirical testing of 
ideas, on the one hand, and its disinterest in the cultural roots of this tradition, 
on the other. How many 20th century scientists have studied the classics? How 
many are conversant with Greek theatre and Greek philosophy? How many are 
even aware of the indispensable connections between their scientific tradition 
and the Greek understanding of politics, art, and literature?
In this sense extreme relativism, such as that expressed by postmodernism, 
may well result from the fact that reality is drifting further and further away from 
the conditions that gave rise to the Greek standard. Small- scale society has all 
but disappeared in the West, and increasingly in the rest of the urbanizing and 
industrializing world. Democracy has been transmuted into ‘representative’ 
democracy, which is increasingly a euphemism for ‘representative oligarchy’, as 
one American journalist has characterized it. In academia, C.P. Snow’s ‘two 
worlds’ are increasingly separated. The natural sciences and their professional 
schools occupy center stage, while the humanities and arts are viewed as an 
interesting sideshow, not part of the serious business of mature capitalism. The 
social sciences confront the dilemma of aligning themselves with one or the 
other sides of this dichotomy and reap the rewards or punishments of their 
choices accordingly. In the larger society people are vaguely aware of the
16
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
classical Greek standard that should govern western society, but their educatic 
gives them little intellectual preparation for addressing the human condition 
any meaningful way, and the marketplace is an overbearing moral force in ai 
case. What is missing, of course, is that which was indispensable to Gree 
‘social science’, the theatre. When Hanson and Heath wish to illustrate thi 
Greek standard they use Antigone. “The play is the thing wherein we wouk 
catch the conscience of the king”, as Shakespeare would observe in the sam< 
tradition some 2000 years later. In the banal and commercialized media of 
today moral and political issues are trivialized beyond recognition. The 
overpowering force of mature capitalism colonizes mind and body in a mental 
and military repression that could easily lead to the conclusion that nothing 
matters and that anything goes.
But this is not true in any sense of the word, and the intellectual resources for 
explaining the current condition are in force in many domains, for those who 
wish to find them. Social science and its planning applications are in a 
particularly favorable position to bring about a synthesis between the ‘two 
worlds’ and to re-establish the dialogue that is our heritage from the Greek polis. 
But it cannot do this by hiding from ambiguity in an oversimplified application of 
positivist methodology or by glorifying it in a romantic application of postmodern 
gibberish. The tools already exist within the literature (or literatures) of social 
science. By looking both to the arts and humanities, on the one hand, and to 
positive science, on the other, and by exploiting the considerable intellectual 
resources that have developed over the past century within both these 
frameworks, social science can seek to heal the schism that has developed 
between the ‘two worlds’.
It is perhaps in this sense that one must judge Kuhn’s effort to carry the 
paradigm concept beyond natural science when he describes revolutionary 
periods in social history in the same terms as those in the history of science. 
Thus he suggests that crisis periods in social history are marked by the same 
tensions. Existing institutions are seen, often by a minority at first, to be unable 
to solve the problems posed by an environment they have in part created, while 
at the same time political institutions prohibit the changes recommended by the 
revolutionaries. This transition period sees a breakdown of major institutions, 
e.g., the community is weakened by an increase in crime, the family by an 
increase in divorce, the school by its own set of crises, etc., resulting in a 
general increase in what sociologists call social pathology: crime, drug
addiction, suicide, socially transmitted disease, etc. Ultimately, the crisis 
weakens the hold of the institutions themselves, people become estranged from 
political life, and their behavior becomes more and more eccentric.
As the crisis deepens people look to other concrete proposals for the 
reconstruction of society in a new institutional framework. Here the ordinary 
forms of conflict resolution fail since there can be no agreement on the
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institutional framework within which political change is to be achieved and 
evaluated. Thus parties in the conflict resort to techniques of mass persuasion, 
including force, and while there may be appeals to higher authority - 
metaphysical, religious, or even scientific -- it is the people themselves who 
ultimately decide whether a change is to be made (often accompanied by great 
suffering and loss of life, as past revolutions have illustrated). Fortunately the 
conflict in scientific communities is carried on in symbolic terms, though loss of 
status or even employment may sometimes be involved. In any case, as Kuhn 
emphasizes, it is not the logic or method of science that determine the paradigm 
shift; it is the scientists themselves: "There is no higher authority than the 
community of scientists”. For those scientists and philosophers of science who 
have attended to Kuhn, it is the latter conclusion that is the most troubling, 
because of the threat it poses to the certainty of positivism within the temple of 
science itself. It opens the door to the whole question of the sociology of 
knowledge: of how knowledge is created and accepted socially, of how
communication and socialization processes work and, ultimately, of whether and 
how reality is socially constructed.
All of these questions are of utmost importance to social science and its 
philosophy, insofar as it differs from natural science. The social sciences are in 
an intermediate position between the natural sciences and larger society in 
Kuhn’s explication above, though actually Kuhn believes that social science is 
only pre-scientific, since it has few of the characteristics of natural science as he 
understands it. Nevertheless, if society is seen by him to contain something like 
paradigms there is every reason to assume that the social sciences could also 
be characterized in this way. If so, then social science paradigms will contain 
some elements characteristically found in both natural science and society. 
Furthermore, these paradigms must also account for the fact that human 
societies, themselves, embody something like paradigms, or worldviews, that 
accompany institutionalized behavior. Thus the ontological presuppositions of 
social science will be qualitatively different from those of natural sciene: they 
must account for the fact that societies with more accurate paradigms, i.e., more 
closely attuned to their own evolving social and physical environment, will be 
more likely to survive. Kuhn offers the example of the likely deleterious effects 
of not being able to recognize the difference between a dog and a wolf, but one 
could also cite the example of Marie Antoinette’s inability to recognize the 
difference between ‘bread’ and ‘cake’!
Meanwhile, if Kuhn suggests that paradigm awareness is not essential for 
natural science this may also be true to some extent for society. The history of 
science proceeds without such awareness except somewhat during periods of 
crisis. Even then the conversion experience of shifting paradigms does not 
necessitate paradigm awareness, as such, but only content awareness. Also 
human history has proceeded without worldview (social paradigm) awareness, 
at least until now. A crisis in institutions may lead to a revolution, but
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conversion, again, is sufficient to account for the shift; the form of self-reflection 
necessary for paradigm awareness is simply a rare thing in society.
Ultimately, then the social scientist has a qualitatively different responsibility with 
respect to paradigm awareness, first, because the object of study - human 
society and human beings -- embodies paradigms. Ignorance of the social 
paradigm or worldview, or what may be called subjective reality, is ignorance of 
a key aspect of human existence; full understanding and explanation requires 
such knowledge on the part of the social scientist. Second, social science 
impacts on society in qualitatively different ways from how natural science 
impacts on nature; social science enters the dialectic between subjective and 
objective reality, between thinking and acting, between consciousness and 
being. Verification in social science is not something happening in the privacy of 
the laboratory or the office of the scientist, it is social history; it is people acting 
out paradigm principles, including those propagated by social science. Thus, the 
concept of paradigm may be a usefully extended into social science, identifying 
other approaches that might offer solutions to some of the many criticisms of 
positivism listed above. Positivism, itself, could thus be defined as only one of 
several paradigms in social science. At this meta-theoretical level there would 
appear to be at least two other broad areas of theory and research in social 
science that would qualify as candidates for such a characterization, areas with 
quite different ontological and epistemological presuppositions: phenomenology 
and structuralism.
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CHAPTER 2
PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS
To achieve their exquisitely detailed knowledge of the world around the 
human beings living in non-mediated environments had to use all their abiliti 
to observe themselves, the planet, and the things that grow from it. They mic, 
not have even considered the planet to be something that was actually outsii 
them since their senses told them that it was also inside them. Their world wi 
organized along flow lines, not in separate boxes.
Knowledge results from personal experience and direct observation - seeing, 
hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. There is instinct, for example, 
gathered by innumerable previous generations and carried forth in the ceils. 
There is intuition, what Eastern religions call 'knowing without seeing’. In 
addition there are feelings, which may have been informed by previous 
experience. All of these - the five senses plus instinct, intuition, feeling and 
thought - combine to produce conscious awareness, the ability to perceive and 
describe the way the world is organized.
Jerry Mander, Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television
An important ontological presupposition of phenomenology is that all things have 
an essence, which can be known. Based upon this, Edmund Husserl, the 
philosophical father of phenomenology, argued that the human mind was a 
deeper essence than science, since the latter was a product of that mind. Thus 
positive science, whose purpose is to discover the essence of nature (and 
society), can only be a second order essence, derived as it is, from individual 
and collective thought. The opposite view, that what science seeks to discover 
is ontologically prior and merely waiting to be discovered, is contested as an 
idealization, if not outright reification, i.e., or the treating of an abstraction or idea 
as if it had concrete material existence.
What positive science is doing is taking for granted the life-world (Lebenswelt) 
within which scientists act, and that it is this life-world, which a radically empirical 
philosophy of science should be explicating. In fact, phenomenology does not 
take even this life-world for granted, but treats it as an object, in many respects 
the object, subjecting it to the ‘bracketing’ operation through which its essence 
can be known. Bracketing refers to the suspension of all beliefs about the 
object of study, including the belief that it exists at all. Only thus can all 
subjective biases, paradigm-induced and otherwise, be examined and their 
effects on the understanding of the object of study be fully appreciated. In this 
respect, one might suggest that Thomas Kuhn has introduced an important
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phenomenological aspect of positive science, one that, as pursued in the 
sociology of science, leads to a better overall understanding of science itself.
Phenomenology holds that what exists is that which is known, not just observed 
or available to the senses, but also that which is felt and intuited. Like any other 
scientific perception, these intuitions and feelings should be replicable, thus 
giving them the same empirical status as positivist sensate observations, 
whether or not they are reduced to operational and/or measurable terms. It is 
further postulated by phenomenology that scientific thought is ‘inter-subjective’,
i.e., is generated socially, is dependent upon communication, and is constituted 
by meanings that are shared across the relevant scientific community. Not only 
science, but all of human existence is characterized by this inter-subjectivity, 
which makes it an ontological essence in its own right.
Phenomenological epistemology is tied, as stated above, to a radically empirical 
suspension of belief. It is directed to an investigation of essences that are 
revealed by an intense search, which includes not only observation, but thought 
and reflective abstraction. Objective knowledge is sought, therefore, in full 
consciousness of the known existential obstacles to such an endeavor. In fact, 
it is these ‘obstacles’, insofar as they are constituted by the subjective and inter- 
subjective nature of the life-world, that represent one major focus of 
phenomenologically based social science. Nor are they seen necessarily as 
obstacles to a more ‘objective’, hence pure science, but rather as features of 
being human and out of which all human projects, including science are created. 
The essence of social being is thus sought in the dialectical relationship 
between consciousness and being, between thought and action.
The method whereby phenomenological analysis proceeds is quite the opposite 
of positivism. Rather than seeking to remain outside, aloof and, all too often, 
above reality, the phenomenologist seeks complete immersion in the object 
under investigation. Observation is thus based upon intimate contact, or (what 
generations of social scientists have mistranslated from the Greek as) empathy, 
or deep understanding, even identification with the object of study. This 
empathy will, in time, produce a sense of order in any given situation, an order 
that is based upon a system of typifications consisting of types of thought and 
action that are characteristic of a given social group. These insights on 
typification are then available for confirmation or refutation by other researchers 
and even one’s self as research evolves over time.
Another major ontological presupposition of phenomenology is that all thought 
and action are directed at something; they are intentional. Thus behavior cannot 
be simply mechanically recorded and analyzed in a search for causation through 
concomitant variation. All events and objects are to be understood via the 
intentions of those who produced them; explanation is sought in an 
understanding of the ‘social construction of reality’ (Berger and Luckmann
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1966). In other words, behavior, including collective behavior, is intended and 
hence depends upon consciousness. Intended behavior is learned and is 
consistent with the expectations of the social group within which meanings and 
intentions are developed for the individual.
In order to give further insight on how and why this is true it will be necessary to 
further elaborate on the basic concepts of sociological phenomenology as 
developed by Alfred Schutz (1962a, 1964, 1966). This section draws upon the 
summary by Helmut R. Wagner found in the Introduction to Alfred Schutz, On 
Phenomenology and Social Relations (1970). Schutz claims that if shared or 
inter-subjective consciousness is the essence of social life, and consciousness 
is always directed at something, then the bracketing operation must be directed 
at knowing this essence; overt action can only be understood within such a 
context. Furthermore, a conscious or deliberate refusal to act, often unrecorded 
by any behavioral approach, would constitute a form of action within a 
phenomenological analysis, explainable by the meaning that such inactivity has 
for the actor. Such meanings and actions cannot be ‘observed’ in the positivist 
sense of the word but only understood by suspending belief in what is obvious. 
(Positivist observation could be directed at trying to flush out such meanings, of 
course, if the inactivity were suspected for other reasons as being important, but 
the researcher would have to engage in a form of phenomenological approach 
to find out such things in the first place.) Max Weber, who used the term 
verstehen to describe it, also identified this process of seeking to understand 
and interpret the subjective meaning of conduct by human beings. Thus for 
Weber, "No causal laws of human conduct can be established; a sociologist 
deals at best with ‘typical chances’ that certain factual constellations, accessible 
to observation, will lead to certain courses of social action (Schutz 1970, p.9). It 
is important to emphasize here, as both Schutz and Weber did, that such 
interpretive understanding is not some mystical operation, but something 
engaged in by everyday people all the time; we are always trying to interpret and 
understand the subjective meanings and motives of our fellow human beings, 
and we learn to do this from the earliest moments of our lives. Social scientists 
are merely asked to refine and systematize this procedure, first by bracketing in 
order to filter out their own possible subjective meanings, and then by sharing 
their understandings with other social scientists that engage in the same 
operation, thereby further controlling their collective understanding.
The phenomenological study of any given aspect of social reality at any given 
moment must thus account for the subjective reality of that aspect as it is 
created through the inter-subjective processes of communication, including 
especially face-to-face communication, the prototypical form whereby humans 
create and share meanings. It must account for the hierarchical structure of 
meanings by establishing the systems of relevance whereby individuals and 
groups know things in greater or lesser detail according to their importance to 
those individuals or groups. The effect of such a hierarchy of meanings is the
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tendency of all humans to create a system of typifications with more or less 
elaborated and detailed information, ranging from the most intimate and 
‘atypical’ knowledge about a few things and/or people to the most generalized 
and ’stereotypical’ knowledge about things distanced by degrees of ‘irrelevance’. 
A further effect of this is that different people know different things according to 
their system of relevances; there is, in other words, a social distribution of 
knowledge. Thus, the objective appearance of structure in society is 
accompanied by an inter-subjective structure of relevances and meanings. The 
latter can be known to the social scientist, just as it must be known by ordinary 
people in order to carry on their everyday lives, filled as they are by individual 
and collective projects and plans.
Yet the scientific approach to phenomena is only one way of transcending the 
realities of everyday life. It is within the human capacity to create realities and 
symbol systems to represent them, such that art, science, religion, and even 
dreams can be known without assuming any metaphysical or mystical powers. 
Nor is there a requirement that symbols represent reality truthfully. In fact, there 
are innumerable examples of attempts to disguise and distort reality by naming it 
falsely. Euphemisms, sycophancy, defamation, etc., are cases in point. This 
purposeful distortion of reality is not just a problem for social science but for 
everyday people as well. If communication is directed in one way only, as it is in 
rigidly hierarchical systems, or in societies depending upon the mass media, the 
ability to distort reality is an important prerequisite for controlling consciousness. 
Social scientists must be able not only to uncover such deceptions empirically, 
but should exhibit a moral responsibility to share these insights with the people 
who suffer from them, hardly possible from within the ’value-free’ stance 
required by the positivist approach. It is in this sense that social science is 
qualitatively different from natural science. Nature would not be affected at all 
by revelations about the differences between what is and what is made to 
appear to be. How social science develops its research, the topics it chooses to 
study, the way it explains objective reality, and the manner in which its 
conclusions are communicated are of direct importance to the on-going social 
construction of reality.
Social scientists ‘enter’ the aspect of social reality under study as ‘strangers’. 
They must fathom the behavior of the members of that reality as a product of 
the meanings and goals that direct that behavior. They must understand the 
manner in which the outcomes of such behavior are anticipated by deliberative 
planning and projecting as a form of rehearsing such behavior. They must 
discover how individual consciousness and being are combined into an inter- 
subjective or shared worldview. They must understand the language or symbol 
system used to create and sustain this reality and its worldview, and further to 
probe the background of meanings that are not expressed at all, but merely 
taken for granted within the life-world of this reality.
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When discussing behavior, Schutz (1970, pp. 25-26) identified a dichotomy c 
motives, consisting of because and in-order-to motives, to explain huma 
action. The former refer to the background of action, the reasons for acting the 
are based upon past experiences and influences, often unknown to the actor: 
themselves unless they reflect upon them, but accessible to the researcher it 
part through the methodology of positivist social science. In-order-to motives 
on the other hand, are a product of conscious deliberation, and always result it 
action that is intended, however skillful actors may be in realizing such actior. 
and/or in anticipating its outcome. Schutz (1970 p.22) is careful to define such 
deliberative action as reasonable rather than rational, as assumed by neo­
classical economics, for example. To give an example of because and in-order- 
to motives one might attempt to explain the presence of students in the 
university. In-order-to motives are seen as the conscious intention on the part of 
the students to seek higher education for all the rewards and satisfaction that 
they anticipate will result from this education. Because motives refer to the 
factors in their background or their past, factors such as how much higher 
education is valued culturally, or by their parents individually, the quality of 
previous education, their parents level of education and/or income, even such 
things as race, religion or ethnic background, insofar as these things vary 
throughout the population and correlate with attendance at the university.
It is also possible to see in this context how one person’s in-order-to motives 
may become another’s because motives in the reciprocal relationships whereby 
social reality is constituted. In order for this reciprocity of behavior to operate 
there must also be a reciprocity of perspectives. Individuals interacting with 
others must be able to imagine themselves in the other’s position with sufficient 
accuracy to allow cooperative projects to proceed. How is this possible? 
According to Schutz (1970, p. 35) there are several ways in which this happens: 
actors may transpose themselves by imagining themselves into the roles of the 
interacting partners; they may draw upon their experience with similar situations 
and recall the typifications they have created to understand the motives of the 
other; or they may simply infer motives from the actions of the other, often again 
based upon past experience. Each actor has a repertoire of typifications and 
inferences, which depend upon the social distribution of knowledge related to 
the system of relevances. Thus some interaction will be highly personal and 
well informed by repeated exposure to the partner, while other more formal 
interaction will draw upon shared typifications built up over time in the social 
group. The structure of society is then a reflection of the social distribution of 
knowledge along with the concomitant systems of intention and meaning based 
upon spheres of relevance.
To appreciate how this structuring occurs from a phenomenological standpoint, I 
will draw upon the application of Schutz’ ideas presented in the important study 
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality 
(1966). The authors begin with the postulate, in contrast to positivism, that
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human existence is characterized by ‘world openness’. There are no biological 
or metaphysical plans, no laws of nature that determine human behavior. This 
leaves as a major ontological problem for social scientists the question of how to 
explain the obvious order and organization of society. Such an effort should 
also, as a by-product, be able to explain why positivist scientists could believe 
on the contrary that there are such laws and such (pre)determination.
As an introductory answer to such a question Berger and Luckmann suggest the 
social order is simply there, it pre-exists us. We are born into a world that is 
already ordered, and if we don’t suspend (bracket) our belief in the naturalness 
of it we are inclined to believe that there must be, therefore, some preordained 
reason for it (God, nature, etc.). As a further postulate, they argue that the 
inherent instability of the human organism that results from the lack of a 
predetermined order, the fact that behavior is not genetically programmed as in 
other forms of life, creates an overwhelming need for order and for stability. As 
we shall see, then, both the capacity and the need for order are existent in the 
biology of the human organism, but the manner and the form that this order 
takes is not determined biologically but socially. How is this so?
The social order is created by way of a process called institutionalization. 
Institutions are formed through a progression of stages that includes the 
following:
Habitualization ~> Typification --> Reciprocal Typification --> Institutionalization
Habitualization refers to the human tendency to repeat actions in a similar way 
once a successful path through a task has been established. Habitualization 
can range from such simple operations as brushing teeth and using a fork and 
knife, to more complex operations like driving a car, flying a plane, and to even 
more complex operations like those found in courtship, diplomatic encounters, 
or labor negotiations, etc. The sole purpose of such habitualization is to 
eliminate the intellectual effort required to deliberate and plan such actions so 
that full attention can be given to the complex and unexpected in any given 
situation.
All actions that are habitualized become predictable - to ourselves and to 
others. Once our actions are predictable, they may become essentialized as 
‘types’ and therefore become part of the stock of knowledge for those who find 
our behavior relevant to them. The behavior of others can be similarly ‘typified’ 
and this system of now ‘reciprocal typifications’ allows behavior in typical 
situations to proceed more or less smoothly and predictably. In this way 
complex institutions can be built up and maintained over time. Insofar as they 
precede us and we accept the social order that is represented by them, as well 
as the behavior imposed upon us by them, then the institutional order seems 
"natural” to us even though it is entirely a human creation. This process is so
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subtle that it is usually not questioned at all, and no further control mechanisms 
are required to maintain the institutionalized social order. Thus, for example, th< 
television program (game?!), ‘Big Brother’, may prepare us for the tota 
monitoring of our (even private) behavior that Orwell describes in his book 
1984. In fact, the appearance of explicit control mechanisms is actually a sigr 
of incomplete institutionalization.
The character of institutionalization becomes more formal and defined as it is 
passed along to succeeding generations, such that the original spontaneity of 
the progression of habitualization, typification and reciprocal typification is lost in 
the myriad of roles and scenarios that mark the orientation of succeeding 
generations into the already established institutional order. Nevertheless, the 
institutional order is never a fixed or finalized structure. Each individual who 
participates in this order stands in a dialectical relationship to it and may choose 
at any given moment to maintain that order, to doubt it, or to work to change it. 
This dialectic is working in the same way among all the people who go to make 
up the social order, thus making the dialectic a generalized characteristic of the 
entire social world. Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 61) summarize this dialectic 
in three moments: externalization, whereby actors speak, act and otherwise 
project themselves into the life world with observable behavior; objectivation, 
whereby these externalizations take on a being apart from their authors, existing 
in time and space even after the authors leave the scene; and internalization, 
whereby these objectivations are incorporated into consciousness by other 
actors, particularly during processes of socialization. Various processes of 
legitimation facilitate the incorporation of objective reality into subjective 
consciousness. Legitimation gives moral and intellectual justification to the 
social order, whereby it is explained and justified for its participants. In fact, in 
its strongest form legitimation will insist that departure from the institutionalized 
order is a departure from reality itself.
How is legitimation realized? In the first and most subtle instance language 
itself creates and legitimizes the social order. Thus each language creates its 
own reality, its own institutional order, simply by naming, classifying and 
organizing reality for its participants. Beyond this there are proverbs and 
sayings, theories and ideologies and, ultimately, an entire symbolic universe or 
social paradigm which structures collective consciousness with most of the 
same implications that were described by Kuhn for scientific communities, 
though with nothing like the precision or coherence that characterizes science. 
Nor is there any guarantee that (inter)subjective consciousness and objective 
reality will be identical across a population. Indeed, Marxist analysis shows that 
alienation and false consciousness are common aspects of modern complex 
societies as much as, though in totally different ways, they may be for pre­
modern societies.
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Because of these potential gaps between objective and (inter)subjective reality 
there is always a need for mechanisms of social control beyond the basic 
instance of institutionalization. This control begins with the initiation of 
neophytes into the rules and roles that characterize any participation in the 
social world. If all the world is a stage, as Shakespeare said, then acting upon it 
requires that we know how and when to enter and leave, what to say and how to 
act generally, according to who we are, once upon that stage, etc. More 
formally there are the various social rituals of mystification and victimage used to 
maintain the social order (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 87; Burke 1965, pp. 
274-294; Duncan 1969, pp. 258-276). Mystery, according to Burke, arises from 
difference, and, particularly in the social order, from hierarchical difference. 
Such mystery can be emphasized and exploited through all manner of dress, 
habit and speech, in short through the use of symbols of authority designed to 
separate those in elevated positions from those below. These symbols may 
range from the medical doctor’s white coat and the priest’s frock to grand 
ceremonial performances complete with music and pageantry, all designed to 
distance and impress those ‘below’, while imposing authority over them.
While mystification is designed to separate, victimage is designed to 
incorporate, to incorporate via public demonstrations of sacrifice, actual or 
metaphorical, in which opponents to the social order are punished for their 
transgressions. Such rituals, which may range from a simple rebuke to 
elaborate ceremonies of ’crucifixion’, must be public if they are to sen/e their 
cathartic purpose for all those members of the social order who might have 
imagined themselves with the same thoughts and intentions as the victim. Such 
guilty thoughts and intentions are thus ’purged’ from the onlookers who view the 
degradation and feel its full sociodramatic effect. In its newly cleansed state the 
audience feels united in its support of the (re)established ’order of things’.
Relativity presents an extended example of the need for control. As the Kuhnian 
tradition presents this dilemma for science, postmodernism suggests a similar 
circumstance for the arts and humanities and, insofar as literature and art enter 
the life-world as symbolic representations, they incorporate all of society in this 
‘vertigo of uncertainty’ (Moretti 1987; Gutenschwager 1996; Lentricchia 1983). 
Thus confronting other realities and other symbolic universes poses disquieting 
questions about the ultimate legitimacy of one’s own institutionalized life world. 
If the unrest becomes sufficiently widespread in a society there is always the 
danger of fragmentation into chaos at the one extreme or the imposition of 
totalitarian control at the other, as such extensive lapse of control usually 
devolves into an issue of power.
Meanwhile, at the individual level there are various strategies of therapy and 
nihilation (Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp. 112-116) designed to maintain the 
social order. Therapy is well known by social workers and psychologists in the 
modern world and by shamans and witch doctors in the pre-modern world, and
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is used to reincorporate ‘deviant’ individuals into the social order. Therai 
complemented by nihilation, which is designed to denigrate a competing ’c 
reality by assigning it inferior ontological status, and as something, therel 
‘not to be taken seriously’. Finally, if power is exercised to maintain order it r 
be understood that such power is used first and foremost to define reality ar 
establish control over all the important socialization processes. Only as a 
resort is physical force used, because it diminishes the effect of the other me< 
of social control. Every effort is made to establish the legitimacy of 
institutional order through control of consciousness, and it is here that soc 
theory plays such an important role. The highly abstract symbolism of positivis 
social science carries authority because of its association with natural science 
as the most important source of knowledge in modern, industrial (and 
postindustrial) society. What appears as empirical validation of social scientific 
theory is to a large extent social validation: "Theories . . .[are] convincing
because they work [authors’ emphasis] -- work, that is, in the sense of having 
become standard, taken-for-granted knowledge in the society in question” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp. 119-120).
If the first two moments of the dialectic are externalization (acting, speaking, 
etc.) and objectivation (institutionalization and creation of objective reality), then 
the third moment is internalization (the taking into consciousness of the 
objective reality). Internalization (Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp. 129 ff) begins 
at birth and continues throughout life. The early years are marked by primary 
socialization carried out essentially by parents or parent surrogates. Here one’s 
identity is created as objective reality is incorporated into consciousness. As 
this process is a part of the dialectic, all individuals respond to, interpret and 
emphasize different aspects of the outside world as mediated by their 
socializers, and thus create their own understanding of reality. Language is the 
chief instrument of the socialization process. By the time a child has learned the 
mother tongue, a whole world, in fact, the world has been created and the reality 
established. Secondary socialization builds upon these foundations, allowing 
internalization of institutionalized sub-worlds, which prepares individuals for 
participation in the adult world with all the specialized knowledge necessary to 
carry out the roles assumed in that world.
It is important to emphasize that the internalization of objective reality is not a 
simple cognitive process. The factual and conceptual information is also 
normatively and affectively charged. In other words, reality is presented as not 
just a matter-of-fact, one of many realities, but as the only reality, the 
appropriate and legitimate, hence morally acceptable reality. By the same 
token, emotional involvement with the significant others who mediate reality, 
especially during primary socialization, guarantees that there will be a strong 
affective dimension to internalization as well. For these reasons one changes 
his or her subjective reality, once established, at great moral and emotional cost; 
the more profound the change, the greater the cost in this respect.
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It is also in this respect that one can speak of the danger of reification (of 
reality). Reification is a technical term that refers to the danger that the entire 
process described above whereby both objective and subjective reality are 
created and maintained will seem somehow to be outside of human agency. 
This explains the common tendency throughout human history for people to 
believe that some metaphysical force or divine will or, since the rise of positive 
science, some set of natural laws is responsible for social reality, when, in fact, it 
is entirely and inexorably a human creation. To accept this fact and to address it 
properly, one must experience a certain cfe^reification of consciousness. This is 
not to be confused with the conversion process described by Kuhn, for example, 
or as understood by Gestalt psychology. One can shift allegiance from one 
paradigm to another, from one religion to another or even from one culture to 
another without experiencing dereification. Only a realization of how reality is 
socially constructed will allow dereification to occur. And only the experience of 
de-reification in this respect would allow social scientists to comprehend how 
and why social science can-not ultimately be continuous with natural science. 
Social science is itself a socializing force; it enters the objective reality as a 
powerful impetus for interpreting that reality in certain specific ways. Once 
incorporated into the inter-subjective consciousness of the larger society, social 
theory becomes self-fulfilling; it forces its realization, not because it is ‘true’ 
empirically, as that word is defined scientifically, but because people have been 
persuaded to believe in its truth and to act accordingly. When objective rewards 
and punishments are projected in the form of social policies and even laws, 
there is no escaping the force of these reifying agencies of social theory.
If reality is socially constructed then the proper metaphor for capturing its 
essence must be the theater, the text or the narrative, not the mechanism as in 
positive science. Elements in nature move, while human beings act, motion is 
not the same thing as action. This does not mean that there is not a 
mechanistic dimension to society, especially mass society in which behavior is 
institutionalized over vast reaches of time and space, nor that nature does not 
impose limitations on the social order and human behavior, nor even that 
science and technology are not constantly changing the meanings of those 
limitations (Wilson 1998). At the same time, science itself, whether natural or 
social, is also socially constructed. Science is a collective enterprise; its work is 
carried out within communities of fellow scientists with common or shared 
perspectives (paradigms). Science also exists within a larger society, which 
rewards or punishes scientists for the things they say or do (Collins 1989). Thus 
there is a strong rhetorical aspect to science. Within their community scientists 
attempt to persuade each other that their work is important and useful, apart 
from its empirical validity. Fellow scientists are asked to build on each other’s 
knowledge, to respect each other’s work so that the rewards may be shared. 
Scientific rhetoric directed to the larger society is asking that something be done 
(or not done - a special form of doing something) in response to the knowledge
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that is being produced. Often knowledge is produced explicitly for some acti 
that might be useful and/or profitable for those supporting the research. All 
this is hidden from both the scientists and their publics within the normati 
rhetoric of science viewed as a ‘search for truth’.
To understand this and any other social situation requires an act i 
interpretation, interpretation that seeks to understand the various levels of actioi 
and thought that compose the particular aspect of reality under study. As most 
situations contain overt and covert communication, different levels of 
interpretation or hermeneutics will be required: surface hermeneutics for overt 
communication and depth hermeneutics for covert communication (Diesing 
1991, p.107). The search for communicated meanings is a search for the 
actions whereby the socially constructed reality is created and maintained. Thus 
a socially constructed reality is composed of voices, not forces, and these 
voices must be interpreted, not measured. The organization, the structure of 
society that is produced by this dialectic of voices, is closer to a work of art than 
to a mechanism. Nor is interpretation some esoteric, wholly subjective process; 
it is the essence of human existence, separating human from animal life. 
Interpretation, while dependent upon cognitive, hence biological capacities, is 
ultimately a learned skill, and, indeed, a skill that is learned from the first 
moment of life. Thus we are all interpreting communications from our fellow 
human beings all the time. We learn to separate truth from deception, at least in 
our everyday lives, or face the danger of marginalization. Each segment of 
social reality has its specialized tropes or ways of communicating, and entrance 
into that segment requires breaking into the codes that allow members of that 
community to communicate with each other. But just as those codes have been 
constructed and maintained socially, so they can be learned; ‘neophyte’ is 
merely a label attached to those who have not yet learned those codes.
Social research within the phenomenological paradigm is dependent upon 
learning and extending these human skills of interpretation, hence the term 
hermeneutics. Interpretation can be extended over space and time, ranging 
from that required by immediate verbal communication, to that required to 
understand all forms of symbolic representation, including especially the written 
word. Hermeneutics requires immersion in the subject (or object) under study, 
immersion such as that gained by the artist, the playwright or the author. This, 
of course, differentiates phenomenology from positivism, as the latter seeks 
causes, while the former seeks reasons (Diesing 1991, pp. 106-145). Nor is the 
process of interpretation ‘subjective’ or irrational, as some have suggested. The 
same principles of rational procedure govern the phenomenological quest for 
meaning as the positive quest for causation. Hypotheses may be formulated 
and evidence sought, with evidence modifying the original hypothesis, leading to 
further search for evidence, etc., in a ‘hermeneutic circle’ that guides research in 
the same manner as in positive science. The same methodology attains in 
historical research on written texts (Deising 1991, pp. 106-122) or in
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ethnographic or anthropological research on communities. The search is always 
for the inter-subjective meanings that govern the thoughts and actions of the 
members of a given community or society. In this way behavior is ‘explained’ to 
the social scientist in much the same way that it is explained to other members 
of the community or society who share the same language, the same symbols 
and, ultimately, the same reality. The task of the phenomenologist is to 
immerse herself or himself in that reality so as to comprehend it, not only as its 
members do, but also to comprehend the misconceptions and deceptions, and 
the possible unanticipated outcomes of intentional actions, at both the individual 
and collective levels. Training in hermeneutics thus allows the phenomenologist 
to transcend the common-sense reality and to explain it scientifically, not (only) 
as a set of mathematical equations that express (cor)relations amongst non­
reasoning elements, but as a product of the human capacity to reason and act 
intentionally, however successful those humans may be in achieving the 
purposes of those intentions.
Finally, the emancipatory potential of science can only be realized 
phenomenologically. Positive social science, comprehensible only to the 
chosen few, can only alienate unless it is incorporated into phenomenological 
explanation, that is, unless thinking and feeling humans can be shown how their 
individual actions produce (not always intended) collective outcomes, as 
described in the probabilistic and/or mechanistic terms of positivist science. 
Positive social science, including, especially, the technocratic rhetoric of that 
science, is used, often by default, to control and to manipulate fellow human 
beings. This is simply because manipulation and control are the explicit 
purposes of positive natural science, which when adopted as the only ‘true’ 
science, will impose the same purpose onto the study of society. Habermas 
(1971) speaks of a separate emancipatory (or critical) science as one which 
seeks to impart self-knowledge to help individuals understand the ‘causes’ that 
determine their consciousness and behavior. While it is true that certain types 
of science such as psychoanalysis have this as their definitive purpose, any 
science can accomplish this when in the hands of a scientist who seeks 
emancipation as an explicit goal. Of course, a ‘value-free’, amoral positive 
social science will have difficulty perceiving such a goal from within that science, 
quite apart from what any individual scientist does outside that science as a 
private individual (citizen). But to exclude one’s professional being from such an 
endeavor is like joining the struggle with not one but ‘both hands tied behind the 
back’.
But why this concern with the emancipatory potential of science? Because, 
quite simply, to emancipate is to enhance democracy, while to use science for 
manipulation and control is to suppress democracy. The essence of a 
humanistic approach to scientific planning is, of course, democracy: the people 
participating in and deciding on the appropriate programs and plans for their 
future.
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CHAPTER 3
(DIALECTICAL) STRUCTURALISM
Instead of either positivist determinism or a romantic conception of freedom: 
each must be understood in terms of the other. Failure to do so is costly. 
Among positivists this ommision materializes subjectivity into a pure in-itself of 
objective facts; among romantics it idealizes objectivity into for-itself of 
subjective feelings. In contrast to these views but embracing both, we may 
understand subjective awareness and objective conditions as two moments of 
the same historical dialectic. So conceived, freedom is not reduced to 
naturalistic facts as in positivism, or vaporized into innate mental or spiritual 
principles as in absolute idealism. Subjectivity is a product as well as an agent 
of historical processes.
Richard Harvey Brown (1987), p. 62
The relations of the organic individual and its milieu are truly dialectic relations, 
which cannot be compared to those of a physical system and its entourage or 
even understood when the organism is reduced to the mirage, which anatomy 
and the physical sciences give to it.
Merleau-Ponty as quoted in TenHouten etal, (1973), pp. 148-149
Structuralism adds a new and distinctive layer to the philosophical discourse of 
social science, new in the sense that a structure is not the same as a 
mechanism and hence does not lend itself to causal analysis. Nor would it 
seem, at first glance, to be related to a phenomenological search for meaning 
and intention. It constitutes a different approach to social scientific explanation 
(Boudon 1971, p.15), and thus would qualify as a paradigm in its own right. It is 
important to emphasize here that paradigm, as I understand it and as consistent 
with at least one of the multiple meanings of the term as introduced by Kuhn, is 
not the same as a theory. It is a broad meta-theoretical framework within which 
theories may be formulated and tested. It is, as when applied to positivism and 
phenomenology, a set of ontological and epistemological presuppositions that 
would direct the search for certain distinctive aspects of social reality, namely in 
this case pattern “. . .system, coherence, whole, dependence of the parts on the 
whole, set of relationships, whole irreducible to the sum of the parts, etc.” 
(Boudon 1971, p. 2). In its deterministic mode it would be used in the same way 
as mechanism and causal analysis are used under the positivist paradigm. The 
effort here will be to rescue structuralism from this tendency by using the 
insights of phenomenology to describe a dialectical structuralism that would not
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so much benefit the positivist search for certainty as to create a guide for 
understanding human thought and action.
Structuralism is a concept filled with ambiguity, a fact of great concern for 
positivist thinking but indispensable for humanism, for it is within this ambiguity 
that human freedom may be said to exist. One should, of course, attempt to 
clarify what structuralism (or any other concept) means, but one can never 
preclude its metaphorical shift to new meanings in different contexts by different 
authors. For example, structuralism as a term originated in linguistics in the 
work of Saussure (1959) and his followers. Some would claim that the 
conceptual framework of structuralism should not be used at all outside of 
linguistics, at least in the strict scientific sense, as “It fails to produce theory 
because in none of these areas [of art and literature] is there a ‘language’ to be 
found, whether in the sense of a generative grammar or a descriptive 
combination of elements” (Pettit 1975, p. 62); nor in (Levy-Strauss’) structural 
anthropology are there any hypotheses that can be falsified (Pettit, p.88). Pettit 
does, however, allow the use of the concept as a metaphor, as something that 
disrupts our ontology and “. . .challenges the way in which we ordinarily see that 
which it describes and . . .draws us towards an entirely new perspective on the 
subject” (Pettit 1975, p. 103). This, in fact, suggests the manner in which all 
social science theory should be viewed: as something which allows our
perceptions to be (re)organized, hence also our intentions and actions, which 
would then lead to the fulfillment, modification, or falsification of the theory while 
our collective consciousness absorbs the information of the new perspective as 
part of the on-going social construction of reality. But this would require a quite 
different attitude on the part of the scientist vis-a-vis society, namely a move 
from elitist specialization to citizenship that would involve abandonment of the 
quest for certainty and security in science to replace that which was lost in the 
shift from religion (at least for the educated), and a move towards the messy 
reality of the agora, something which is anathema for most positivist scientists 
and social engineers.
Thus, in most social theorizing the question of what happens to social theory or 
explanation after it has been formulated, tested empirically and formalized, 
insofar as this is possible, is left as a residual question. Depending upon how 
conservative social theorists are, politically, i.e., to what extent they are (in) 
sensitive to the ancient Greek belief that ‘science without virtue is a fraud’, so 
they will concern themselves (or not) with what happens to their research results 
in the larger social context in which they will be received. Social theory is a form 
of communication, not just to fellow social scientists but also to all humankind. It 
mediates between the specialized world of the scientist and the other 
specialized worlds of everyday people who compose the world that they and the 
scientist alike inhabit. All social theory is metaphorical in the sense that it is 
always subject to interpretation and application in a process that may always 
transform it. This is the sense in which structuralism will be examined.
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Piaget’s Structuralism
It is probably the case that growing knowledge about the complexity of nature 
and the actually growing complexity of society associated with the 
transformation from a religion-based, small-scale rural society to a science- 
based urban, industrial society has encouraged the view that events and objects 
exist as parts of totalities of internally related parts, that these totalities are in 
some way self-regulating, and that they appear to be capable of transforming 
themselves while still preserving their structures. These, at least, are the 
axiomatic principles that describe structures according to Piaget (1968). The 
idea of totality or wholeness suggests that there are properties associated with 
the whole that are separate from the properties of the individual elements, that 
the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and that a structure is not an 
aggregate. While Piaget believes that laws govern the arrangement of structural 
elements, he believes that these are laws that govern the structuring process 
itself, laws that constitute the “logical procedures or natural processes by which 
the whole is formed” (Piaget 1968, p. 9).
Self-regulation, the second characteristic of structures, is a well-known concept, 
seen in such terms as homeostasis and equilibrium, which are common in both 
the natural and social sciences. For Piaget the common usages in the natural 
sciences call for ‘operational’, usually mathematical formulations. Along side 
these are time-based regulations such as those found in cybernetic systems 
involving the ‘play of anticipation and correction (feedback)’, as well as non­
technical regulation such as the rhythms found in or associated with all living 
beings.
Kenneth Burke, a literary theorist and philosopher (see below), has also 
identified this type of self-regulation. He sees it as embodied in artistic form, 
involving such things as crescendo, contrast, reversal, contraction, expansion, 
magnification, series, and so on (Burke 1968, p. 46). For Burke these variations 
are part of the two major divisions of form, ‘unity and diversity’, the former 
encouraging cooperation and the group, and the latter, competition and the 
individual. This division is well known in social science, which must somehow 
maintain a dialectical balance between the individual and the group as it seeks 
to explain social phenomena. An overemphasis on diversity, in either science or 
art, may reflect or even encourage a tendency to disintegration in its 
representations, i.e., its works will ‘fall apart’ in the absence of any unifying 
principle, with accompanying effects on its social audiences. Thus some kind of 
structuralism is necessary to balance the individualism of ‘atomistic’ positivism, 
on the one hand, and/or the tendency of phenomenology to suggest that only 
intention governs the outcome of one’s actions, on the other. What is needed is 
some concept of the whole that will govern the production of social theory, as
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well as its rhetorical effect on the larger society. ‘Mechanism’, borrowed from 
the natural sciences, provides this balance under the positivist paradigm, while 
‘institutionalization’ serves this purpose under the phenomenological paradigm. 
In the former, self-regulation is perceived as a product of forces or vectors, while 
in the latter it is mainly human communication in its varied forms, including 
especially narrative, theater and artistic form more generally, that accounts for 
self-regulation. More specifically, scientific exposition and technocratic 
formulations about social reality are complemented by artistic forms that 
embody and condition emotional response, thus completing the task of 
regulation in what Burke calls ‘adult education’ or the 'schooling of the masses 
through sociodramatic techniques’ (see below).
Completing Piaget’s set of ontological principles is the concept of 
transformation, which not only provides a dynamic aspect to his structuralism, 
but also directs attention to the circumstances under which social change is 
likely to occur. These will be, namely, structural contradictions that become 
increasingly more difficult to resolve and which lead to a crisis in consciousness 
that will alter social behavior so as to resolve them (see Chapter 5). Diesing 
(1991, p. 69) provides an example of this, drawing upon (Marxian) structuralist 
methodology:
Capital circulates in a Keynesian fashion in an economy, gradually 
accumulating in some locations and draining from others; the conflicting 
interests and varying distribution of power among participants in the circulation 
process express themselves in politics; the different experiences of participants 
express themselves in thought and science; the structures of politics and of 
culture reshape these inputs; and the variable outputs feed back on the 
circulation of capital and redirects it.
Transformation in this sense does not completely discard what existed before 
but preserves important aspects of the pre-existing structure. It is “. . .an 
intelligible change, which does not transform things beyond recognition at one 
stroke, and which always preserves invariance in certain respects” (Piaget 1968,
p. 20).
What distinguishes Piaget’s structuralism throughout its application to living 
structures is his emphasis upon ‘construction’, or what he also refers to as the 
‘functional’ aspect of structuralism ( a quite different meaning from that found in 
mid-20th century ‘structural-functionalism’ popular in anthropological and 
sociological literature at that time). For Piaget structuralism is a “system of 
transformations” which is “continuous with that of construction as continual 
formation” (Piaget 1968, p. 34, author’s emphasis). There are no innate 
structures, such as those posited by Chomsky (1957) as necessary for language 
learning in human beings, nor are structures acquired from the outside; all 
structures are constructed. They are constructed, as Waddington also claims, 
in a dialectic relationship with an environment such that organisms are selected 
by, but also select their environment. This has recently been confirmed by
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research in the Human Genome Project. Life, once thought to be a ‘simple’ 
one-way creation from DNA to genes to RNA and to protein and cells, now 
appears to be a “chaotic network of two-way forces”, with environmental factors 
playing an important role in this process. The interaction between species and 
environment is so important, or rather, species and environment are so 
interwoven that it is difficult to even speak of environment as a “non-biological 
arena” (Shirky).
This issue has also been explored at the socio-biological level as a process of 
co-evolution (Norgaard 1994). For Norgaard (p. 62), modernism, closely linked 
to positive social (and natural) science, “destroys cultural and biological systems 
because of five closely linked metaphysical and epistemological premises . . . 
which are critically important, for they determine the bounds of acceptable 
political discourse as well as the process of public fact gathering, decision­
making, and implementation”. In Diagram 1, he contrasts these philosophical 
premises with alternate premises that summarize and extend much of the 
discussion here about the limitations of the positivist paradigm and the policy 
implications that derive from its application in social research. On the basis of 
this framework Norgaard discusses the disastrous effects of the uncritical use of 
positive science and technology in the 20th century on cultures and 
environments around the world.
The mechanistic worldview assumes, for example, that pesticides and 
herbicides will simply reduce the levels of harmful insects and weeds, allowing 
production to proceed in a new equilibrium. Instead, the combination of these 
chemicals along with increased use of chemical fertilizers has altered the 
biosystem in quite unforeseen ways. The effects range from creating resistant 
breeds of insects to the leaching of nutrients from the soil, and in the long run 
demanding ever-increasing applications of chemicals to maintain production 
within a constantly evolving environmental structure. These chemicals enter the 
environment ‘downstream’ creating polluted rivers, lakes, and ground water, with 
pathological effects on humans and animals alike. The economy of agriculture 
has also changed from extensive to intensive modes, driving out smaller 
farmers and encouraging large scale agribusiness, and so on.
These are well known effects according to Norgaard, as are the disruptive 
cultural effects of other technologies such as telecommunications, television, 
information processing, etc., but there is little appreciation of the role played by 
the paradigmatic presuppositions of positive science and the general 
unwillingness of (especially corporate based) scientists and engineers to 
anticipate and reduce the deleterious effects of these technologies. Humans 
construct and transform the structures that provide the settings for their 
everyday lives; a proper social science should be able to inform them about the 
unforeseen, often unintended effects of these ‘constructions’ and 
transformations.
37
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
Diagram 1.
Dominant and Alternative [Ontological and Epistemological] Premises
Dominant Premises
Atomism: Systems consist of 
unchanging parts and are simply the 
sum of their parts
Mechanism: Relationships between 
parts fixed, systems move smoothly 
from one equilibrium to another, and 
changes are reversible.
Universalism: Diverse, complex 
phenomena are the result of 
underlying universal principles which 
are few in number and unchanging 
over time and space.
Objectivism: We can stand apart 
from what we are trying to 
understand.
Monism: Our separate individual 
ways of understanding complex 
systems are merging into a coherent 
whole.
Alternate Premises
Holism: Parts cannot be understood 
apart from their wholes and wholes 
are different from the sum of their 
parts.
Systems might be mechanical, but 
they might also be deterministic yet 
not predictable or smooth because 
they are chaotic or simply very 
discontinuous. Systems can also 
be evolutionary.
Contextualism: Phenomena are 
contingent upon a large number of 
factors particular to the time and 
place. Similar phenomena might 
well occur in different times and 
places due to widely different 
factors.
Subjectivism: Systems cannot be 
understood apart from us and our 
activities, our values, and how we 
have known and hence acted upon 
systems in the past.
Pluralism: Complex systems can 
only be known through alternate 
patterns of thinking which are 
necessarily simplifications of reality. 
Different patters are inherently 
incongruent.
Source: Richard Norgaard, (1994) Development Betrayed; the End of Progress and a 
Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future, London and New York: Routledge, p. 62
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It is in this sense that Piaget’s emphasis on construction rather than structures, 
per se, is so important. Piaget traces the construction of psychological and 
intellectual structures in the twin processes of assimilation and accommodation. 
The first refers to the “process whereby an action is actively reproduced and 
comes to incorporate new objects into itself (for example, thumb sucking as a 
case of sucking)”, and the second to the “process whereby schemes of 
assimilation themselves become modified in being applied to a diversity of 
objects” (Piaget 1968, p.63). The structuring of human intelligence out of 
sensori-motor development as described by Piaget (1968, p. 63) is the same 
sort of process as the structuring of social institutions out of human behavior, 
namely:
spontaneous movements -> stabilized selections (reflexes) -> reflex- 
complexes acquired habits -> sensori-motor or practical intelligence -> 
representations (thought structures)_________________________________________
as compared to:
habitualization (routinization) -> typification -> reciprocal typification -> 
institutionalization (social structures) (see Chapter 2)________________________
As children develop the ability to represent and to think they engage in the use 
of reflective abstraction which allows the extension of thought to new objects, 
assimilating them into new (thought) structures which accommodate themselves 
to existing structures while transforming the latter to incorporate the new 
meanings, and so on.
Biologically considered, assimilation is the process whereby the organism in 
each of its interactions with the bodies or energies of the environment fits these 
in some manner to the requirements of its own physico-chemical structures 
while at the same time accommodating itself to them. Psychologically 
(behaviorally) considered, assimilation is the process whereby a function, once 
exercised, presses toward repetition and in ‘reproducing’ its own activity 
produces a schema into which the objects propitious to its exercise, whether 
familiar (‘recognitory assimilation’) or new (‘generalizing assimilation'), become 
incorporated. So assimilation - the process or activity common to all forms of 
life, is the source of that continual relating, setting up of correspondences, 
establishing the functional connections, and so on, which characterizes the 
early stages of intelligence. And it is assimilation, again, which finally gives 
rise to those general schemata we called structures. (Piaget 1968, p. 71)
By placing emphasis thus on the structuring process, the construction of 
structures, Piaget not only argues against the idea of ‘structure’ as a simple 
heuristic metaphor, but also outlines the epistemological principle, ‘reflective 
abstraction’, whereby all structures can be uncovered. The mind as a structured 
entity itself can comprehend other structures found in nature and society. It can
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do this by analyzing the processes whereby these structures have been 
constructed, even if these processes are unknown or only vaguely understood 
by the organisms or humans who create them, hence Levy-Strauss’ analysis of 
kinship structures or Marx’ analysis of the ‘deep structures’ of capitalism. Pettit 
(1975, p. 100) believes that the application of the conceptual framework of 
structuralism outside of linguistics will not accomplish science. However, we 
can see here that the broader concept of structuralism is a different sort of 
science, or rather; it constitutes a different paradigmatic framework within 
science. It does not search for universal laws within a hypothetico-deductive 
framework, it does not seek a causal analysis within a mechanistic framework, it 
does not depend upon experimental methodology, etc. But, according to Piaget 
at least, what this ‘structuring of intelligence’ through reflexive abstraction 
identifies in its analysis of society (or nature) are ‘real structures’, like the ‘real 
structures’ constructed by the mind. And this is a social as much as an 
individual process: there is a . .collective intellect [which] is the social
equilibrium resulting from the interplay of the operations that enter into all 
cooperation”, and the mind, like all of nature and society is “...the as yet 
unfinished product of continual self-construction” (Piaget 1968, p. 114).
Within the framework of dialectical structuralism the philosophical problem of 
‘free-will versus determinism’ disappears. Individuals are parts of structures 
(both natural and social) which ‘determine’ and ‘are determined’ by them in an 
on-going process in which “. . .dialectical circles or interactions will always in the 
end replace linear orders of prior and posterior” (Piaget 1968, p. 124). This may 
not be science in the positive sense, nor is this to say that structuralism would 
or should replace positivism. Rather it can complement it, as does 
phenomenology, creating ‘ontological agitation’ that, through reflective 
abstraction, can lead to new insights, which when filtered back into the social 
construction of reality will change not only our knowledge of it but that reality 
itself.
Dialectical structuralism undermines not only the deterministic dream of 
positivist science but also the voluntaristic tendencies often seen in 
phenomenology. Furthermore, dialectical structuralism brings us closer to the 
issues raised by Habermas about what is to be done with knowledge, scientific 
and otherwise. Is it to be ‘applied’ by engineers of one sort or another to 
accomplish ends deemed important by the owners of that knowledge, or is it to 
be used to liberate human beings from their ‘reified structures of thought and 
action’ (Habermas 1971), as they seek to improve their lives? This is not an 
epiphenomenonal issue for science as a human endeavor, especially not for 
social science, which participates in creating its own subject matter. 
Theodorides (1981,35-36) describes the way in which this issue was confronted 
by the Ancient Greeks, keeping in mind that for them philosophy and science 
were one and the same thing:
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Philosophical theories are not independent creations of the minds of 
exceptional people, but are determined by the social conditions of each era. 
Philosophy is politics translated into meanings and thoughts, as poetry is 
translated into images. The philosopher is formed, more or less self­
consciously, within the social struggle. Either philosophers will try to influence 
that struggle or they will allow others to use them for their own purposes ....
In ancient Greece intellectuals were not arm-chair philosophers but important 
social actors who understood their work as a service to all of society ....
Giddens’ Structuration Theory
Anthony Giddens (1984) theory of structuration is quite compatible with Piaget’s 
genetic (or dialectical) structuralism, with a similar emphasis on construction, 
rather than on structures as such. Gidden’s effort is confined solely to social 
science, however, and particularly sociology. He is quite clear about 
distinguishing social theory from the search for universal laws within a 
hypothetico-deductive framework such as one would find in positive social 
science (Giddens 1984, p. xviii). He is also clear about distinguishing between 
the types of generalizations that might derive from social research within the 
structuralist framework. One type refers to knowledge that humans have about 
their daily lives and which social scientists can learn through various 
hermeneutic techniques. The other refers to knowledge available, in the first 
instance at least, to social scientists who seek to uncover the unintended 
consequences of human actions. The first type of knowledge is the concern of 
phenomenology as described in Chapter 2, while the second is of interest to 
both positivism and structuralism.
In the case of positivism the knowledge produced, particularly in its 
mathematical form, is quite mystifying if not alienating to human actors, as is the 
case of structuralism in its deterministic incarnations. In the case of the latter, 
Giddens seeks to overcome this alienation by placing structuration theory in a 
dialectical framework. He does this by emphasizing that social structures and 
the humans who create them constitute a duality, i.e., a unity with two 
interlocking aspects, rather than a dualism of fundamentally separate entities. 
The later concept is tied to the idea of the separation of mind and matter, of the 
spiritual and the physical, of good and evil, and of the subject and the object. It 
is a legacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition (quite alien to ancient Greek thought), 
and has plagued social theorizing almost from the beginning of social science.
Giddens, by emphasizing the duality of social structures, seeks to give equal 
importance to the agents who create them and the forms that result, to the 
intended as well as to the unintended consequences of human action. He 
attends, in some detail, to the question of consciousness, separating discursive 
from practical consciousness, and these from the unconscious. By discursive 
consciousness he means those things that people can talk about and can
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articulate with respect to their everyday activities. Practical consciousness 
refers to those things that people know implicitly, that they take for granted, and 
that constitute background assumptions necessary for everyday behavior 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 57, 152). Only when these background 
assumptions are challenged in some way will people articulate them, insofar as 
they are able to (Giddens 1984, p. 281, Berger and Luckmann 1966, p.155). If 
the challenge becomes sufficiently threatening and persistent, a crisis in 
perception, or subjective reality, could result in a shift in awareness to a different 
explanation of one’s behavior, a different practical consciousness within a 
different perceptual framework. The world thus would become restructured in 
consciousness, as often occurs in relation to a restructuring of the objective 
world without (Berger and Luckmann, p. 158 ff).
Giddens gives special emphasis to the idea of routinization or what Berger and 
Luckmann call habitualization, as the ultimate source of institutionalization and 
hence structuration in society. Routinization gives ontological security, which 
Giddens (1984, p.50) defines as “autonomy of bodily control within predictable 
routines” (author’s emphasis), and is closely linked to the unconsciousness with 
its hidden sources of anxiety. Routinization thus not only leads to social 
structure (via institutionalization), but also encourages psychological well-being 
by maintaining a structural consistency between subjective and objective reality.
Giddens differentiates between social integration, (what Berger and Luckmann 
called ‘reciprocal typification’), as the interaction between actors who are in each 
other’s presence, and system integration where such reciprocity is maintained 
without that presence. Structure is thus given an extension beyond face-to-face 
contact such that its time-space dimension entails a study of the limits of the 
institutionalizing practices that compose it. ‘Society’ thus is fraught with many of 
the same ambiguities as the term ‘region’ in geographical thought. Placing 
boundaries around homogeneous societies and/or regions is much easier than 
bounding nodal societies and regions. That is, core institutional features in the 
latter spread their influence outwards in space (and time) towards lesser and 
lesser intensities, and the boundary is more of a zone than a line. In the same 
way structures extend routinized practices outward from, usually, urban cores to 
peripheries of lesser intensity where their dominance is filtered through more 
traditional forms of institutional behavior. Structures are not only not 
coterminous with political entities - though some obviously are - but they also 
don’t all have the same ‘density’ over space (and time).
As humans are constrained by the structures they participate in creating and 
maintaining (or changing), so structures themselves are constrained by the 
distribution of power and resources within them. Persons with power are able to 
control the practices of others thus seeking to maintain a structural form 
amenable to their particular interests. Resources, themselves, can be used to 
enhance or blunt the effects of power, though we must extend the notion to
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include not only material and organizational resources but also knowledge. 
Giddens (1984, p. 261) refers to the ‘storage’ of resources as . .the retention 
and control of information or knowledge whereby social relations are 
perpetuated across time-space. Storage presumes media of information 
representation, modes of informational retrieval or recall, and as with all power 
resources, modes of dissemination” (author’s emphasis). It is within this nexus 
that social science could play a crucial role in enhancing democracy, rather 
than, through political apathy, enhancing the covert systems of domination that 
storage of resources makes possible. Nor is this simply a matter of writing 
articles and books within the technical language of their disciplines; social 
scientists would have to use their knowledge of how reality is socially 
constructed to enter the flow of communication in ways that would effectively 
alter the ‘storage of resources’ so as to bring knowledge to the disadvantaged 
and to expose the contradictions between intended actions and their unintended 
consequences throughout the social structure.
Rapid social change increases the likelihood of contradictions, which in turn 
tends to generate conflict among opposing interests and classes. Because of a 
global structure that intensifies change as a means to greater profits, the rate of 
change has been increasing continuously over the past 200 years. This change 
has often had unintended consequences, or at least consequences that are not 
the prime concern of those with power and resources, causing an inherent 
instability in all modern social structures. This in turn leads to attempts by the 
disadvantaged to organize movements that will redress at least some of the 
extreme inequities caused by this change.
Giddens (1984, p. 203) rightly observes that social science has given little 
attention to the question of social movements as organized efforts to change 
society almost always as an expression of conflict and usually in response to 
some serious structural contradiction. Much of the language of structuration 
theory, both in Giddens’ book as well as in Berger and Luckmann’s earlier 
version of a ‘socially constructed reality’, (as well as most of the conventional 
research in social science) is directed to a static concept of structure, of 
explaining how the regularities in society have come to pass. In the case of 
social movements, particularly in the early stages, many of the dimensions of 
structure, e.g., hierarchy, roles, and rules, are either missing or are poorly 
defined. If social science is to ‘enter’ history in an intentional way, there would 
seem to be much to be learned about how this could be accomplished by 
studying the reasons why organized efforts to change social structure have 
succeeded when they have, keeping in mind the dialectical nature of 
structuration in the first place, i.e., seeking a balance between deterministic and 
voluntaristic explanations of change (See Chapter 5).
Unfortunately, Giddens’ analysis offers little insight into how structuration theory 
would be helpful in understanding social change. He rightly criticizes the
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metaphors of change borrowed from biology, showing how evolutionism and 
adaptation cannot explain human history. Yet when he turns to an examination 
of change, in his example the formation of the state, his discussion is in terms of 
variables, e.g., demographic factors, irrigation schemes, warfare, etc., that might 
‘cause’ this new structure to come into being (though he does not, of course, 
use the term cause). Nowhere do his concepts ‘discursive’ and ‘practical 
consciousness’, or the ‘unconscious’, appear in his discussion. He rightly 
observes that for the majority of the cases in which state structures have been 
formed there were examples available for inspiration and emulation. Berger and 
Luckmann made the same observation as part of their discussion on how social 
structure appears in the absence of biological determinants. In other words, the 
particular problem of how states are formed (out of nothing) is simply not an 
issue in most cases.
Nevertheless, one would like to have seen some discussion of how 
consciousness and reflective practices become routinized and integrated, or in 
Berger and Luckmann’s terms, reciprocally typified, in the process of creating 
new structures in a new institutional order. Such an analysis has been carried 
out, for example, by Jacques Ellul in his book, The Technological Society, where 
he traces the long progression of minor changes in consciousness and behavior 
leading to an institutional order where the
. . .technical means of production and organization . . .in their sheer 
numerical proliferation and velocity, unavoidably surpassed man’s relatively 
unchanging biological and spiritual capacities to exploit them as means to 
human ends (Ellul 1964, p. xvi).
Another example is David Noble’s America by Design, which demonstrates how 
an educational system was designed in the U.S.A. in the late 19th and early 20th 
century to socialize diverse immigrant groups into appropriate consciousness 
and behavior so that as individuals they would embody and reinforce the 
institutional structure of industrial capitalism in their new routinized (habitualized) 
behavior and thought. Other examples include Stuart Ewen’s Captains of 
Consciousness, which analyzes the subsequent (non-accidental) revolution in 
consciousness and behavior leading to the institutionalization of the consumer 
society to serve late capitalism’s needs, or Hugh D. Duncan’s Culture and 
Democracy, which analyzes the role of turn-of-the-century Chicago architecture 
in establishing a ‘scene’ upon which this new ‘sociodrama’ of consumerism 
could ‘play’ itself out, and so forth.
In all fairness Giddens (1984, p. 327 ff) does invoke the concepts of 
structuration theory in discussing the levels of analysis that would be necessary 
to carry out proper research within the framework of a ‘dialectical structuralism'. 
He does this by identifying four levels of social research:
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1. Hermeneutic elucidation of frames of meaning
2. Investigation of context and form of practical consciousness (the 
unconscious)
3. Identification of bounds of knowledgeability
4. Specification of institutional orders
Hermeneutic elucidation refers to the interpretive understanding of the 
subjective reality of the group, community, or society under study, formulated in 
social science terms and not necessarily comprehensible to the subjects under 
study. Practical consciousness refers to that which the subjects, themselves, 
know and can report to the investigator, e.g., as would informants in participant- 
observation research, and which would be comprehensible to them even when 
expressed in the ‘meta-language’ of social science. The bounds of 
knowledgeability refers to the “unintended consequences and unacknowledged 
conditions of action”, which, along with the institutional order itself, is often the 
object of positivist social science research. Here the information that might be 
gained in the first two levels of research is often taken for granted by 
researchers who are (likely to be) members of the same culture as the subjects 
under study.
Within this context Giddens locates the distinctions between qualitative research 
(Levels 1&2) and quantitative research (Levels 3&4), demonstrating that they 
are complementary rather than conflictual. Quantitative research must depend 
upon the sorts of insights that pertain to the ‘social construction of reality’, even, 
if only when, as mentioned above, the cultural context under study is not exotic 
to the researcher. At the same time it is usually necessary to explore the 
broader implications and extent of cultural phenomena by quantitative 
researchers who seek to place their findings in a larger context.
What happens to social science generalizations once formulated distinguishes it 
from natural science. Natural science has a technological relationship with 
nature; it seeks to control and manipulate it (usually for social ends, one might 
add). Positivist social science seeks the same relationship with society, seeking 
to ‘control and manipulate it’ (again for social ends). However, as Giddens 
(1984, p.334 ff) points out, the relationship between social science and society is 
simply not the same as that between natural science and nature, such that 
attempts to compare the two always claim social science to be inferior in its 
accomplishments. But as Giddens points out, social science knowledge is 
constantly being filtered into society, altering the very subject matter under 
study. Thus social science is in a dialectical relationship with society, something 
which cannot be claimed about natural science and nature (except, perhaps in a 
much longer time frame). Social science, itself, is a . . practical intervention in 
society, a political phenomenon in the broad sense of that term” (Giddens, p. 
340, author’s emphasis). Common sense people, including specialized 
professionals, read social science treatises and alter their behavior accordingly,
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sometimes in the process encouraging additional research to clarify issues 
raised by the initial research (Giddens 1984, p.351). In this context, there is a 
remarkable lack of attention by social science to the ways in which its 
knowledge is incorporated into the social world, to the kinds of actors that 
become informed by that knowledge as well as to the use to which they put it, to 
the forms that scientific communication should take in a democratic society, and 
so forth. If social science is a ‘practical intervention’, then it coincides with 
planning in both practice (and intention), which gives added importance to the 
question of what kind of science (scientific) planning imagines itself to be.
Burke’s Sociodramatic Structuralism
A purely humanistic and quite different perspective on the question of social 
structure may be seen in the work of Kenneth Burke (1959, 1965, 1968a, 1968b, 
1969a, 1969b, 1973), a literary theorist, whose interests also extend to music 
criticism, literary criticism, philosophy, and by extension, especially through the 
work of Hugh D. Duncan (1962, 1968, 1969), to social theory as well. Burke 
began writing in the 1920’s, and his work includes more than a dozen books and 
hundreds of articles, reviews, stories and poems. There have been over 150 
articles and reviews and a number of books devoted to Burke, including an 
excellent anthology edited by William H Rueckert (1969), in addition to the 
theoretical works by Duncan cited above. Almost every student of literature in 
the U.S.A. since the 1930’s will have been exposed to at least some of Burke’s 
writing, and most of the small number of humanistic sociologists will also have 
read about him through the efforts of Duncan. In spite of this Burke is not well 
known outside the U.S. for a variety of reasons, some of them related to 
criticism of him in the U.S. as well. This has primarily to do with the fact that 
Burke is too sociological for the literary theorists and too literary for the 
sociologists, a problem not uncommon for those who choose to work across 
disciplines, especially bridging the humanities and the ‘sciences’.
Burke has a rather flamboyant style, skipping from metaphor to metaphor in a 
seemingly haphazard fashion. He makes generous use of italics and quotation 
marks in an attempt to shift meanings back and forth as a way of emphasizing 
the elasticity of language and meaning, and hence, potentially at least, of 
behavior as well. In his early writings there seemed to be no system to his 
remarks. Gradually, however, there evolved a more or less coherent approach 
to the study of society and of the human behavior that constructs it. He became 
less interested in analyzing or theorizing about the formal aspects of literature, 
and of art more generally, for their own sake, though his respect for the 
technical aspects of artistic creation is substantial, as his own creativity in poetry 
and fiction would testify. Rather over time he became more interested in 
humans as symbol-using beings and in the social order as a primarily language- 
based phenomenon. Thus for him literature, as all art, contains a rhetorical
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dimension which he believes plays an indispensable role in creating and 
maintaining (or changing) the structure of society.
One of the most serious problems with using language as a theoretical basis for 
social structure from the standpoint of science is that it is filled with ambiguity, 
as Burke would declare many decades before postmodernism appeared on the 
scene (as it were). But whereas postmodernism merely celebrates ambiguity, 
Burke was intent on mining it in a search for resources that could be used to 
soften the conflict that automatically arises because of it. In other words, social 
reality is created through the use of symbols, primarily language, and, as we 
saw in the discussion of phenomenology, those symbols are charged not only 
with meaning but with emotion and moral value as well. Here Burke explores 
the exhortatory negative, a thing not being what it is supposed to be, as an 
exclusively human meaning deriving from the manner in which social reality - as 
opposed to nature - is created or constructed in the first place. Things ‘not 
being what they are supposed to be’ creates collective emotional, as well as 
moral, tension, leading to conflict, as the collectivity seeks to (re)establish the 
‘proper’ order. When one collectivity’s ‘no’ is another’s ‘yes’, conflict is bound to 
ensue, and that conflict may range from verbal disagreements to ‘holy wars’, 
depending upon how ‘sacred’ are the symbols being violated. It is in this sense 
that Burke sought to humanize conflict by showing its linguistic origins. Not that 
he would suggest that there were some more substantial reality behind the 
ordering symbols, rather, as the phenomenologists would also argue, reality with 
all its ‘vested interests’ is created through the symbols, which are constitutive of 
that reality.
Burke’s effort is to explore the dramatistic forms whereby reality is created and 
maintained, especially when contradictions are encountered. He would classify 
speech according to its ‘attitude’ towards its object, and its ‘history’ or social 
context. He would say that “. . .approximately the epic, tragedy, and comedy 
gravitate towards the positive side [in their attitude], whereas elegy, satire and 
burlesque stress the negative”, while adding two other modes, the grotesque 
which “focuses in mysticism”, and the didactic which “today is usually called 
propaganda” (Burke 1959, p. 57). These collective poetic categories Burke 
(1959, p. 99) calls “major psychological devices whereby the mind equips itself 
to name and confront its situation”. Insofar as it is possible, power (hegemony) 
will be used in society to control these devices, leaning in favor of the positive 
devices of tragedy, comedy and epic, with elegy, satire and burlesque left as 
residual categories tolerated as an escape valve for the draining of negative 
emotions.
Artists are in charge of a good many of the technical aspects of these forms, 
and have a certain ‘liberty’ to experiment so long as their devices are not too 
critical (revolutionary). For example, when social realism in the already turbulent 
1930’s in the United States threatened to undermine the already somewhat
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tenuous legitimacy of capitalism, the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
stepped in to support the apolitical abstract expressionist artists with funding, 
gallery exposures, and so forth (Shapiro and Shapiro 1977), while denying the 
same exposure to the social realists. The Hollywood Ten expulsions in the 
1950’s is another example of political control over art, as was the McCarthy 
witch-hunt in general, insofar as it affected artists and actors.
Conflict is not just between opposing symbol systems and their socially 
(linguistically) constructed realities, however. An equally common conflict is 
between a symbol system and its own corresponding social structure. Here 
Burke (1959, p. 225) coined the phrase ‘bureaucratization of the imaginative’ as 
a way of expressing the tendency for all ‘good ideas’, often utopian in the first 
instance, to ‘harden’ as they are “embodied in the realities of a social texture, in 
all the complexity of language and habits, in the property relationships, the 
methods of government, production and distribution, and in the development of 
rituals that reinforce the same emphasis”, in short during their routinization and 
institutionalization. Here even positivist social science may constitute a negation 
of the existing social order as it exposes the unintended consequences of 
collective human, ‘bureaucratized’, action, especially if the research findings 
work their alienating effects on the larger society (as they disclose 
contradictions). In anticipation of postmodern discourse several decades later - 
Attitudes Toward History was first published in 1937 - Burke refers to Andre 
Gide as saying somewhere that he . .distrusts the carrying out of one 
possibility because it necessarily restricts other possibilities”. But people do not 
change allegiance easily for “. . .obedience to the reigning symbols of authority 
is natural and wholesome. The need to reject them is painful and bewildering” 
(Burke 1959, p. 220). Furthermore, those in hegemonic positions will seek to 
control the rhetoric or the poetic devices presented to the people by controlling 
the ‘priests’, not only in the pulpit but in the schools, the mass media and the 
arts generally, ultimately calling for ‘bridging devices’ that will either seek to 
legitimize the (contradictory) status quo or seek, metaphorically at least, to find a 
way to transcend that reality towards something better in the future (including 
the after life!). Burke’s linguistic solution to such impasses is to formulate a 
“perspective by incongruity” by “bureaucratizing the mass production of 
perspectives”, i.e., by “democratizing them”, thus making . . a resource once 
confined to a choice few of our most ‘royal’ thinkers” available to all, in spite of 
any ensuing “deterioration in quality” that this would entail. To be gained by this 
“democratization of incongruity” would be a “corresponding improvement in the 
quality of popular satisfaction” (Burke 1959, p. 229).
Today even more than in the 1930’s human kind suffers from rapid change 
linked to an ‘over-production’ of scientific information and a corresponding 
(technological) compression of space and time (Harvey, 1989). The resulting 
‘under-consumption’ of this knowledge and its social meaning has led to an 
increase in ‘incongruities’. One challenge for social science in this context
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would be to make people at home rather than ‘bewildered’ by the ‘complexities 
of relativism’, and this to be accomplished by increasing and improving our 
‘perspectives by incongruity’. Burke (1959, p.229 ff) discusses the various ways 
in which this has been accomplished historically, that is by “stretching” meanings 
across oppositions, by the “stealing back and forth of symbols of authority”, by 
“symbolic mergers”, etc. One may thus use the same hegemonic symbols for 
different purposes. He points to John Dewey’s theoretical distinction between 
“education as a function of society” and “society as a function of education”, the 
former referring to circumstances where society is running smoothly with little 
alienation and few contradictions between the symbolic universe and every day 
life, and the latter when the opposite seems to hold true and where education 
must play a role in “constructing a better world” (Burke 1959, p.331).
Burke wishes to confront ‘incongruity’, the disjuncture between intention and 
outcome, in a comic frame of mind: humans are mistaken not (necessarily) 
sinful (or as the Ancient Greeks said ‘oudeis ekon kakos' - nobody willingly does 
evil). They, or rather we, as he refers to all humans, including himself, are to be 
laughed at, not crucified. Within this comic frame we can observe ourselves 
‘while acting’. This should lead to ‘maximum consciousness’, not ‘passiveness’. 
“One would ‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles. He would provide a 
rational for locating the irrational and non-rational” (Burke 1959, p. 171). By 
avoiding the tragic frame we can avoid the burden of guilt that might inhibit our 
own self-consciousness and allow those who are different from us to live, both 
metaphorically and literally.
The progress of human enlightenment can go no further than in picturing 
people not as vicious, but as mistaken. When you add that people are 
necessarily mistaken, that all people are exposed to situations in which they 
must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness, 
you complete the comic circle, returning again to the lesson of humility that 
underlies great tragedy. The audience from its vantage point, sees the 
operation of errors that the characters of the play cannot see; thus seeing from 
two angles at once, it is chastened by dramatic irony; it is admonished to 
remember that when intelligence means wisdom (in contrast with the modem 
tendency to look upon intelligence as merely a coefficient of power, for 
heightening our ability to get things, be they good things or bad), it requires 
fear, resignation, the sense of limits, as an important ingredient (Burke 1959, 
pp. 41-42, author’s emphasis).
As Frank Lentricchia (1982, p.129) notes in connection with the same quotation, 
“what the comedic historian [social scientist] knows, what he [or she] takes to be 
the single truth of. . . history. . . [is that] there is no truth but only fools of truth”.
In his Grammar of Motives (1969a) and Rhetoric of Motives (1969b), written in 
the late 1940’s, Burke anticipates both the subsequent development of scientific 
structuralism and its post-structuralist critique. His structuralism is based on 
theatre as the master metaphor or framework (or phenomenological essence) 
for his analysis of history, theater both as a living process and as a commentary
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on that process. He analyzes history as text, as any sort of text: “metaphysical 
structures, . . . legal judgments,. . . poetry and fiction,. . . political and scientific 
works ,. . . news,. . . and bits of gossip offered at random” (Burke 1969a, p.xv). 
Then he ‘deconstructs’ the text by way of his dramatist pentad: act, scene, 
agent, agency and purpose. The act “names what took place in thought or 
deed”; scene “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred” (in 
positivism, the environment, mechanism or system; in Schutz’ 
phenomenological framework, the ‘because-motives’); agent, the “person or 
kind of person who performed the act”; agency, “the means or instruments 
used; and the purpose, (in Schutz’ framework, the Ίη-order-to-motives’; and in 
hermeneutics, the ‘intention’).
Following Lentricchia’s excellent summary of Burke’s theory (1982, p. 133 ff), 
we note his reference to Burke’s use of ‘positive’ and ‘dialectical’ terms, the 
“former being terms that do not require an opposite to define, the latter being 
terms that do require an opposite” (Lentricchia 1983, p.133; quoting Burke 1973, 
p. 109 n), which would be roughly equivalent to the distinction between natural 
science and its positivist extensions into social science, on the one hand, and 
the humanities and their humanistic extensions into social science, on the other. 
As Lentricchia says (1983, p.134):
The further Burke can manage to move his key terms, and the temporarily 
frozen model they imply, toward the dialectical or differential status, the closer 
he engages the inherent synchrony of his grammatical project with a fluid 
diachrony of historical process.
In other words, Burke addresses the inherent static quality of most social 
science formulations, including those of phenomenological social science and 
scientific structuralism. The transformative quality of dialectical terms disrupts 
not only the mechanisms and systems of positive science but also the idea of 
‘institutions’ based in habitualization and institutionalization. Thus, these terms 
“. . . preservfe] forces of change internal to the totality (that untotalize, 
unsynchronize it)” (Lentricchia 1983, p. 134).
While institutionalization, whether in Berger and Luckmann’s “social construction 
of reality’ or Gidden’s ‘structuration theory’, portrays a human process, the 
human agents are left more or less passive in this process. What Burke’s 
dramatism does is to activate the human agent, particularly in the adult world, 
since rhetoric, and the ability to exploit the dialectical resources of language, is 
available to all of us and is inherent in every speech act. Burke’s outline of 
these resources and their capacity for persuasion in the Rhetoric of Motives 
emphasizes the extent to which “Man, qua man, is a symbol user. In this 
respect, every aspect of his ‘reality’ is likely to be seen through a ‘fog of symbols’ 
(Burke 1969b, p.136). But, most importantly, these linguistic symbols are 
available to all who use a language, and may be used to support the existing 
social order or to change it (or to bring doubt to bear upon its legitimacy). This
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gives dynamism to Burke’s structuralism (as well as to the social structures he 
examines), a dynamism that leads both to the structuring but also to the 
potential for re-structuring the social order (as well as to the theories that seek to 
explain it).
To better appreciate the relationship of Burke’s literary theory to social science, 
it will be necessary to review briefly its application in the work of Hugh D. 
Duncan. Duncan gives sociological form to Burke’s categories. For example, 
the dramatist pentad is defined by Duncan (1968, p.19) as:
... the scene as a social stage; the act as the basic social contexts of action 
we find in social institutions, such as the family, government, economics, 
defense, education, entertainment, sociability, health, religion, art and science; 
the actor as the various social rotes enacted in these basic social institutions; 
agency as the medium in which communication takes place; and the purpose 
as the struggle to achieve the consensus necessary to integration in social 
action.
For Duncan, social integration (structure) is achieved through naming (Duncan 
1968, p. 21). Names are ‘goads’ to action; by naming we define rhetorically and 
socially (as well as scientifically) what is appropriate, ’good’, or proper, on the 
one hand, and what is improper or ‘evil’, on the other. Through this 
symbolization, this naming, we organize and structure the behavior of our fellow 
humans and ourselves in our social settings. “The sociological function of the 
dramatic structure of action is, therefore, an act of organization” (Duncan 1968, 
p. 22). The act of organization requires not only an intellectual understanding 
but also, mainly, an emotional and moral identification with the principles of 
social order embodied in the symbols. We identify with heroes in their struggle 
against villains who are the personification of these principles of good and evil.
In the great drama of the Cold (and frequently ‘Hot’) War that occupied the mind 
of the world for most of the 20th century, democratic heroes (rarely named 
capitalist for obvious symbolic reasons) struggled against ‘communist’ villains, 
who had to be purged (sacrificed) from the world stage so that people could be 
‘free’. This struggle took place in the cinema, on television, in the newspapers 
and in all the bits and pieces of casual conversation whereby the social order is 
maintained. Not surprisingly, the Cold War was indispensable to the United 
States, the military-industrial complex being the cornerstone of its economy. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower warned about the dangers of this dependence as early as 
the 1950’s, and the incestuous relationship between the Pentagon, the 
Congress and the military industry has been well-known ever since (The Iron 
Triangle). The military and all its related expenses regularly account for more 
than 50% of the U.S. national budget. This information is hidden by the inclusion 
of the Social Security budget in the spending totals given to the public, when in 
fact Social Security is a totally separate account with its own income and 
expenditures. The military-industrial complex absorbs nearly $500 billion 
annually; could this be possible without an enemy, a sociodramatic villain?
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Indeed, the eclipse of the Cold War at the end of the 1980’s found the U.S. 
scrambling to find new villains on the domestic and international scene, villains 
who could serve the symbolic purpose of justifying the continuation of ‘military 
welfare’, with the colossal waste of human and natural resources that this 
entails.
In the other great drama of the 20th century, consumerism, the struggle was 
carried out by symbolic heroes, the consumer goods, themselves aided by ‘great 
consumers’, the ‘rich and the famous’, against the great abstract villains of 
under-consumption and the thousand forms of dirt, ugliness and psychological 
impotence that must be vanquished for the consumer-hero to live the good life. 
(Ewen 1976). Duncan’s first book (1965) was a study of the architectural 
‘stage’ upon which this great drama first unfolded in Chicago at the turn of the 
last century. Chicago in 1900 and throughout most of the 20th century was the 
home of the distinctive American architectural style. Louis Sullivan, in particular, 
helped create a ‘home’ for consumerism in the famous Merchandise Mart and 
the first great department stores that were to revolutionize shopping, first in the 
U.S. and subsequently throughout the world. Since 60% of the Chicago 
population did not spaek in English in 1900, the shift from a thrifty, conservative 
mentality to a wasteful consumerist mentality had to be staged and played out 
visually. Here architecture played a major role, as did the pictorial sections of 
the newspapers, to be joined subsequently by the mail order catalogues shipped 
from Chicago to homes throughout the country. With the advent of radio and 
television, advertising combined the talents of artists, psychologists and 
merchandisers to produce the greatest selling drama ever known to humankind 
- with no end in sight! Thus, the organization of today’s global system is pure 
(economic) theatre, just as the feudal order of the middle ages was pure 
(religious) theatre. Third World extensions of this modern theater confront 
audiences who attend to the television and movie fictions, but who could care 
less about the clumsy acting and trite emotions that are portrayed. They are 
consuming images of the ‘good life’, embodied in the automobiles, the houses, 
the clothing, and, unfortunately, the values of the heroes and heroines who 
clutter their screens.
It is inconceivable that globalization could proceed without this sociodrama, 
without the values and rhetoric embodied in this theatre. Capitalism could never 
have survived the 20th century without confronting its endemic contradiction of 
overproduction - under-consumption in this symbol-driven manner. Sociodrama 
is a . .drama of order, ... a drama of legitimation, the attempt to legitimize 
authority by persuading those involved that such order is ‘necessary’ to the 
survival of the community” (Duncan 1968, p.49). Nor is this sociodrama an 
epiphenomenonon on a material base (scene); it is constitutive of that base and 
its forms are the means by which that base is constructed. In short, the 
instrumental and the symbolic are merely conceptually different aspects of a 
single reality, a reality constructed simultaneously through instrumental,
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emotional and ethical means. It is a reality constructed by actors, pursuing 
intentions or purposes, through actions, and using various means (agencies), 
against a backdrop (scene), which, collectively, these actions, themselves, 
compose. Any scientific attempt to short circuit this dialectical process will 
necessarily lead to distortions. Any search for certainty in the form of ‘natural 
laws’ or ‘human nature’, or ‘economic forces’, or ‘divine will’, may apparently 
relieve the psychological tension of this dialectic, but will not make it disappear; 
it is inherent in the human condition.
Does this leave Burke with a ‘master paradigm’, or perspective, that would avoid 
all ideological or ‘bureaucratizing’ effects? I think not, for he includes himself in 
his ‘comic’ attitude toward history, seeking through his exegesis to illustrate how 
any perspective runs the danger of overemphasizing one or another dimension 
or ‘ratio of dimensions’. In so doing, he describes not only the everyday human 
being, but the theorist (and philosopher) as well. In fact, much of the second 
section of his Grammar of Motives (1969b, ppl 27-320) is taken up with an 
exploration of various philosophical schools and their tendencies to focus upon 
one or two aspects of the pentad with a resulting abbreviation of the dialectic 
and a corresponding set of over-emphases or misrepresentations of the nature 
of human existence.
Burke’s humanism contrasts with the determinisms inherent in nearly all social 
theorizing, but is not at the same time a surrender to ‘free will’ or to idealism, 
because “. . . it is seen as having a constraining context, which is precisely what 
humanism can never admit about itself” (Lentricchia 1982, p. 134). 
Furthermore, by identifying the tendency to determinism in all theoretical or 
‘systematic’ thinking, Burke also points to and seeks to undermine the ‘will to 
power’ inherent in such intellectual activity. He identifies philosophical schools 
according to their use of ‘ancestral terms’ that would give a ‘paternal’ sanction to 
one particular emphasis, but terms that, in their isolation or overemphasis, 
would tend to distort reality away from its true dialectical nature. Thus for Burke, 
an emphasis on scene would correspond to the terminology found in 
materialism·, an emphasis on agent would correspond to idealism·, an emphasis 
on agency to pragmatism·, an emphasis on purpose to mysticism; and an 
emphasis on act to realism. While the intention of these emphases is 
theoretical and philosophical, their effect is rhetorical; they are asking us to think 
and act in certain ways. While they seek eternal truth, they are in fact historical 
(social); they are born in history . . for the purpose of generating the history 
[society]. . . [their authors] want” (Lentricchia 1983, p.12).
Deconstruction, and postmodernism generally, have sought to ‘unmask’ the 
epistemic and cognitive deceptions inherent in these theories and philosophies, 
and in every use of symbols to represent or explain reality, or, indeed in the 
futility of ever attempting a ‘true’ representation of anything. But they ignore the 
rhetorical or political use of symbols, whose use does not depend upon
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epistemic accuracy, real or illusory, but upon the ability to exhort, to move to 
action, with all the socio-political consequences that result (Lentricchia 1983, pp. 
50-51). Furthermore, the postmodern emphasis on ambiguity and uncertainty to 
the point of paralysis (silence) is itself a master metaphor, and, as an extension 
of the nihilism inherent in modernism, its rhetoric is a plea for /naction and hence 
acceptance of the status quo.
Science and Society
Burke explodes the myth of ‘disinterest’ in modernism and postmodernism alike 
by demonstrating that artistic expression is not a thing apart from the world but a 
(potentially) disruptive voice aimed at undermining any one rigid scheme of 
living, any one paradigm. Thus, you can theorize about the autonomous nature 
of art (and science), but such . . theorizing is itself a form of action. . . So the 
question that Burke asks us is not what social structure might become if 
autonomous art [and science] were to prevail (he does not believe in any such 
thing) but what social structure is implied by a certain type of modernist 
theorizing about art [and science] “ (Lentricchia 1983, p. 89).
Burke and Lentricchia’s critical attitude parallels that of the Frankfurt School, 
which has sought to develop a critical social theory and philosophy. Their effort 
has been to return science theory and understanding to its original (ancient 
Greek) purpose, which was to inspire and inform life, and to improve human 
existence. This would require that we confront the fact that a science separated 
(in its value-free attitude) from society is a “subtle form of ideology” and that 
when joined with technology has become a “. . . powerful and invidious tool for 
manipulation, repression, and domination, rather than the way to enlightenment 
and freedom” (Bernstein 1978, p. 176). In the same passage, Bernstein points 
out that the reaction to this ‘ominous state of affairs ranges from ‘pessimistic 
despair’ on the one hand, to ‘romantic protest’, on the other. The need is for a 
social theory that will not separate theory and practice, not categorize and 
separate science, art and politics and the various subdivisions that characterize 
the modern pursuit of knowledge. It would be a theory that would not allow 
social scientists to separate their theoretical work from their work as ‘citizens’, 
however the latter is defined.
Unfortunately, the early Frankfurt School theorists directed their critical intent 
over time more and more to ideology rather than to political economy, and it 
wasn’t until the postwar period that Jurgen Habermas (1971, 1984) turned back 
to their original Marxist intent. Returning to the ancient Greek idea of politeia he 
challenged the epistemological foundations of the distinction between 
descriptive and prescriptive theory, as well as between theory and praxis. In 
other words, social reality is socially constructed and is always subject to 
symbolically legitimizing social processes, including those deriving from social
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theory, which impose a self-fulfilling definition of that reality unless unmasked 
within the skeptical framework of critical theory. Positivism and empiricism pre­
empt this critical intent because of their ideological predispositions about the 
nature of the relationship between theory and practice: either they are 
functionally separated and the value free theorist has no traffic with the political 
activist, or the latter is a deterministic extension of the former, and political 
action is reduced to social engineering.
Thus, it is true that adequate knowledge must be produced within a community 
of scholars as Kuhn described, and must be subject to all the empirical tests 
and critical discussion that one expects within the scientific endeavor. 
Nevertheless, one must still address the question of what happens to that 
knowledge in the larger society. If one rejects the social engineering approach, 
to say nothing of its aloof alternative found in the ‘ivory tower’ mentality, then one 
must still search for a way to use scientific knowledge, socially. Habermas 
(1984) proposes that such knowledge be used for the purpose of enlightenment, 
which he defines as a communicative act that extends this knowledge into the 
social world to incorporate those affected by it. The purpose is to set into 
motion a process of reflection and self-understanding that will “dissolve the 
reified power relations and resistances” that inhibit freedom in thought and 
action. His critical knowledge seeks ‘authentic insights’ in anticipation of the 
collective praxis that will follow.
Enlightenment broadens the responsibility of the critical theorist to include those 
beyond the community of scholars. The critical intent of theorizing requires that 
the scientist seek out those to whom the theory applies in an effort to free them 
from a ‘naturalistic’ or fatalistic attitude about the social reality that they inhabit. 
The ‘natural’ or common sense view is a reified perception of reality, one that 
forgets the human authorship, not only of the social world itself, but of the 
explanations of that world that constitute common sense. Enlightenment is, 
therefore, a political act, seeking as it does to uncover the power relations and 
the reified symbolic explanations that legitimize that power and, hence, largely 
determine behavior in society. It is also a moral act, as it seeks to raise 
consciousness about the appropriateness and the worth of a society so 
constructed.
Proceeding from theory to practice poses a complex communications problem. 
Change, if necessary, usually confronts social and psychological obstacles. 
People prefer the familiar. Furthermore, information about the effects, 
especially the unintended effects of one’s actions are often difficult to establish, 
and the complexity of social (and natural) systems further confuses the efforts. 
How, therefore, should planning interventions, as an extension of social science, 
proceed. First, as I have tried to demonstrate, we must have an adequate social 
science, one that is sensitive to all the mechanistic and humanistic dimensions 
of social reality. We must be well informed about the technical aspects of the
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problems that we are trying to solve, knowing all of their abstract and theoretical 
dimensions, and be able to judge the, sometimes conflicting, theorems being 
formulated.
Second, we must identify the audience to be enlightened about the problems, 
particularly those least able to defend themselves against the effects of any 
planning intervention (or lack of intervention). We must organize the information 
so as to be understood by those audiences. This usually entails a good deal of 
‘translation’ of technical information into terms that are closer to the experience 
of the audience and understandable by them. We must also give special 
attention to the ‘reified power relations and resistances’ that are likely to be 
encountered.
Finally, we must develop, with those affected, a political (and technical) strategy 
to solve the problems. This assumes that any change will meet resistance, 
especially from those who benefit from the status quo. It also assumes that 
there will be political and economic risks for those involved in the struggle for 
change. The scientific planner should not impose a strategy, technocratic or 
otherwise; those affected must join in making ‘prudent’ judgments about what 
they are willing and able to do.
The next three chapters will serve to illustrate how research could be carried out 
under the three paradigms that have been discussed above, as well as the kinds 
of analysis and results that might be expected from each. This will then lead to 
a discussion of how scientific planners could proceed in their professional work 
within a more humanistic definition of their responsibilities.
56
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
CHAPTER 4
POSITIVIST RESEARCH ON THE USE OF TIME1
Introduction
Among the criteria for evaluating cities and regions and the plans for changing 
them, economic benefits and costs have long enjoyed premier status in 
industrial societies. Critics of economic rationalism have not been able to offer 
alternative quantitative criteria that would extend the narrow definition of benefit 
and cost to include the social or human dimension. Yet this dimension appears 
to be growing in importance as the deleterious human and social effects of 
technological growth are better understood in the western world (Ellul 1964, 
Marcuse 1964, and Habermas 1970).
The time budget-activity systems approach may in part broaden the perspective 
on planning problems by researching urban and regional patterns in terms of the 
time used and ‘traded-off to create them. Thus, added to the understanding of 
individual and system opportunities and stresses based on financial resources is 
an understanding based on time resources. Furthermore, the relationship 
between these two resource bases can be explored and the extent to which one 
is exploited to maximize the other assessed. The time budget perspective does 
not escape the bias inherent in quantification, of course, but it does permit 
systematic attention to otherwise somewhat neglected aspects of the urban 
scene.
The Time Budget Perspective
The time budget is ostensibly a behavioral approach to social and planning 
research: the intentions and evaluations of activities are difficult though not 
impossible to ascertain. The time budget statement is an average or typical 
account of aggregated individual activity systems. It is, at first, a record of all 
activities (except private ones) that transpire during a 24-hour period for a set of 
randomly selected individuals. The input for the ‘budget’ or system is time, which 
is constant at 1440 minutes, and the output is the use of time in various 
activities. The 24-hour input is universal for all members of the population and 
the output choice of activities represents a combination of preferences and
1 Reprinted in part from Gerald Gutenschwager (1973) “The Time Budget - Activity Systems 
Perspective in Urban research and Planning”. Journal of American Institute of Planning, Vol.39, 
No.6 (November), pp.378-387, and from Gerald Gutenschwager and Mary Gutenschwager (1978), 
“Research on the Use of Time”, Review of Sociological Research, Athens Centre of Social 
research, Vol.33-34, pp.335-348 (in Greek).
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constraints within the population. Sorting out the two - preferences and 
constraints - is, of course, the essence of the analytical effort, since public policy 
must be informed about this distinction.
The population to be studied is sampled randomly, and if location and 
movement are important analytical considerations the sample must be 
randomized both geographically and demographically, the effect of which is to 
restrict somewhat the degree (and economy) with which the sample can be 
clustered. Generally, a large sample is required because of the degree of 
variation in time use across certain characteristics such as sex, employment 
status, stage in the life cycle, etc., and the immediate stratifications that such 
variation entails. Thus, the number of observations for any given analytical cell 
diminishes rapidly when further cross-classifications are carried out in search of 
‘explanation’ for less commonly understood variation in activity patterns.
Usually, all days of the week are sampled, as equally as possible, although 
distinctions may be made between weekdays and weekends during the analysis, 
if this is deemed important. Since seasonal variation is more difficult to work 
with, the (same) sample is usually restricted to a ‘typical’ time of year for the 
range of climatic and other seasonal variation of the particular location. Thus 
summer in temperate climates, for example, is treated as a special condition 
requiring a separate sample if there is interest in the activity patterns and time 
use during that season.
The survey technique, itself, while fraught with methodological complexities, is 
conceptually very simple. The respondents merely record all their activities and 
the time spent in them for the 24-hour period from midnight to midnight for the 
day preceding the actual interview. The interviewer transfers this record onto a 
pre-structured form designed to facilitate coding. This is followed by transferring 
the coded information into the computer, where it is available for analysis. The 
day of respondent recording itself is generally preceded by a visit from the 
interviewer who explains the technique and leaves instructions and a simplified 
form for the respondent’s use on the following day. This latter convention on the 
prior visit by the interviewer varies somewhat, although there seems to be an 
increase in the number of activities recorded by the respondents if they have 
been contacted in advance. This, of course, has to be balanced against the 
possible bias arising from this contact.
The methodological problems arise from the considerable need for the 
interpretation by respondent, interviewer and coder as to what precisely 
constitutes an activity, how it should be named, which is primary when more 
than one occurs at the same time (which is often the case), when the activity 
begins and ends, how long a time period must be covered, e.g., 30 seconds, a 
minute, five minutes, a quarter of an hour, etc., before an activity should be 
recorded, etc. Yet, notwithstanding these problems, there has already been 
considerable effort to carry out and use time budget research (Szalai 1966a,
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1966b, 1966c, 1972, UNESCO 1966, Converse 1966, 1968, Anderson 1970a, 
1970b).
Time use analysis treats individual and averaged budgets as activity systems,
i.e., as coherent patterns of time and space use. Classification of time users by 
stage in the life cycle, sex, socio-occupational class, employment status, 
location of residence, etc., permits averages to be expressed for each of these 
types. Activities are analysed by amount of time devoted to them, by sequences, 
by location, by frequency, by others present, etc. While the time use inventory is 
purely descriptive in itself, its cross-classification with other variables permits 
more analytical behavioral understanding and potentially suggestive inferences 
about causation. Different types or classes of people thus show different 
patterns expressed as proportions, sequences, locations, etc., of activity, which 
in sum constitute the total behavioral system. What is unique is that individuals 
are treated as totalities as far as their activities for the sampled time span are 
concerned, their behavioral integrity is preserved and the entire system of 
pattern and activities is analyzed and not just isolated parts. This does not mean 
necessarily that the patterns or systems are fully explained as intended or 
understood by the individuals who create them, but at least the totality is there 
for examination.
Meanwhile, additional methodological problems arise during the analysis, and 
should be explicitly stated (Wilson 1968). The initial problem of activity definition 
and classification is compounded by the need for comparability during 
manipulation. Furthermore, there is no measure of the importance of activities to 
the individuals who perform them or of their intention or motivation in performing 
them as stated above. Additional questions about the activities and the total time 
budget may in part correct this omission but a total exploration of meaning in 
this respect would obviously be a too cumbersome. Techniques oriented to 
“verstehen” such as depth interviews, participant-observation, etc., could also be 
used to supplement the behavioral data.
There is a need to understand the functional relationships between activities - 
their dependencies, so to speak, in time, space, and content - which demand 
proximity (or separation) over the span of daily activities. There are activity 
substitutions within or among groups, such as television viewing in place of 
movie going, which bear upon comparisons between time use patterns. 
Additional or supplementary information on such things as percent of population 
engaged in activities or variations in status or ownership - you cannot watch TV 
or drive a car if you do not own one - are often necessary to interpret 
adequately and compare time use patterns. Thus, in all behavioral research, a 
good deal of understanding of and experience with the socio-cultural system is 
implicit in the interpretation of the data.
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Professor T. Hagerstrand presented an interesting set of theoretical 
considerations relating to space-time patterns in his presidential address to the 
European Regional Science Association in Copenhagen, 1969 (reported in 
Anderson, 1970). Hagerstrand first stressed the need for space-time 
coordinates of behavior in order to understand the relationship between 
“ . . . biography and aggregate statistics”. The life-path (or ’day-path’) is 
constrained by a set of physiological and physical factors, arising in part from 
the social and/or private network of decisions and actions surrounding the 
individual. Three interacting groups constitute these constraints.
1. Capability constraints, being those physiological needs which regulate 
behavior, on the one hand, and distance restraints or areas within each in 
the time available, on the other. (See also Hightower’s ‘index of distance 
sensitivity’ reported in Chapin and Hightower 1966);
2. Coupling constraints, being those movement paths within the capability 
constraints, the timing and synchronization of activities, and the bundles of 
converging paths facilitated by telecommunications;
3. Authority constraints, being time-space entities under the control of 
particular individuals or groups, (e.g., patterns of ownership and 
jurisdiction); the hierarchy of domains and the resulting limits on 
accessibility imposed by those in control.
The individual is thus seen by Hagerstrand to operate within this complex of 
constraints which together constitute a “ . . . highly institutionalized power- and 
activity-system “, which he feels at this stage most recommends a simulation 
approach.
Less detailed though better known propositions have arisen from other sources, 
e.g. Lewis Mumford’s postulate and critique on the regimentation of time during 
and since the industrial revolution, or the equally common and apparently more 
vulnerable assumption that leisure time has increased as a result of 
industrialization and so-called ‘labor-saving’ technology (deGrazia 1962, and 
Linder 1970). Meier (1962) also offers general propositions about the 
relationship between time use and social change, leaving for others, however, 
the formidable tasks of operationalizing and measuring his concepts. Likewise, 
Gary Becker (1965) offers an economic theory of time allocation, relatively free 
of spatial constraints however. Finally, Chapin’s work on activity systems (1968) 
and Hagerstrand’s work (cited above) offer some theoretical background for 
time budget work in regional urban planning. Nevertheless, most of the research 
up to 1972 was exploratory in nature, although the rewards were not necessarily 
any the less for it.
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The Time Budget Perspective in Relation to Other Urban and regional 
Research Efforts
The time budget perspective, it would appear, is complementary to other urban 
research frameworks. Most of the latter treat individuals as members of 
institutions, organizations or specialized systems, such as transportation, land 
use, education, industry, the neighborhood, etc. The time budget generally 
ignores the detail of those other systems; work, for example, is treated as a 
simple ‘uncomplicated’ activity, as is time spent in other institutional settings. 
This does not, of course, preclude closer examination of specialized systems if 
selected for particular attention in the overall time budget research effort. The 
transportation or communications systems can be studied through more detailed 
reporting and coding of those activities, as can the family or household system, 
etc. The advantage is, of course, that those systemic patterns are directly 
comparable with others in the daily rhythm of activities and their quantitative 
importance - as far as time is concerned - can be gauged with respect to the 
total set of activities and time devoted to them. Ultimately, the behavioral effect 
of those systems - as well as of the total organization of the city or region - on 
the individuals can best be seen through a time budget analysis, which shows 
the relationship with the daily and weekly patterns of activities. Longer cycles 
could be studied in seasonal or annual budgets and longitudinal time use 
studies could show long-term patterns.
In fact, the ideal use of the time budget technique is likely to be found in the 
latter application. Recurrent inventories of time use patterns may be the only 
way, ultimately, to assess the effects of public policy on behavioral patterns in 
time and space. Many policies, particularly those involving extended or large- 
scale capital investments (such as transportation networks) may take many 
years to reach fruition. The effects on the population may take even longer to be 
discerned. This is surely one of the reasons that the Hungarian National Statistic 
Service instituted a time budget survey as a part of its dicennial census of 
population; that is, a sample of the population completed a time budget 
schedule along with the census form, itself, every ten years. Thus, the 
Hungarian census surveyed not only the ‘residue of past activities’ in the form of 
traditional census data but collected a dynamic and detailed record of current 
activities in the form of typical and representative time budgets from the total 
population, as well. Not only can the general long-term trends in the national 
activity patterns be assessed in this way, but also specific populations directly 
affected by public policies can be singled out for special analyses. The results 
can provide a necessary and useful sociological balance to the usual economic 
biases of national and regional accounting systems (Meier 1962, p.54).
A special case for time budget analysis is that found in the social change 
dimensions of urbanization. The highly industrialized countries, which are for the
61
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
most part fully urbanized, find such change problematic as a change in degree, 
e.g. increasing stress from the need to maximize activities in relation to time, 
etc., while currently urbanizing countries must understand and accommodate 
the dramatic changes in lifestyle that accompany rural-urban migration, 
particularly since it is now becoming clear that different cultures respond in 
different ways to this transition. This is also a matter of present urbanization 
taking place at a faster pace and under much more severe constraints, as well 
as a question of preserving traditions that are essential to social cohesion in the 
wake of often dehumanizing industrialization. The “Chicago School” research 
and the subsequent literature is full of hypotheses about the changes in activity 
patterns that modernization, urbanization and industrialization are likely to bring: 
increased leisure, increased use of the mass media, a knowledge explosion and 
concomitant increases in time devoted to educational activities, increasing travel 
times and traffic congestion costs, increase in voluntary associations and 
secondary contracts, weakening kinship relations, lessening of place-bound 
(neighbourhood) interaction, heterogeneity of contacts, etc. Almost every one of 
these hypotheses is open to examination and (at least) further interpretation 
under more recent conditions of urbanization.
The time budget can be used not only to examine the above hypotheses but 
may be instrumental in improving understanding of changes that have not 
otherwise been so comprehensively studied cross-culturally, such as changing 
roles in the family, effects of increasing hours of employment and/or time spent 
away from the home, unexpected decreases in time availability after ‘labor- 
saving’ technological change, etc.
There are several ways in which the time budget approach can be used to 
examine these issues or modernization either cross- or intra-culturally. Perhaps 
the most common is to classify an urban population (sample) synchronically by 
scaling into more or less modern groups and to make time use and activity 
pattern comparisons between them (see below - Athens study). Another is the 
diachronic or longitudinal study of the same urban population (as described 
above). A third possibility, a variation of the synchronic method, would be to 
compare the time and activity patterns of urban population by size of place, i.e. 
along the hierarchy of towns and cities within the same socio-cultural system. In 
this way trends in pattern change, which vary by size of place, could be 
extrapolated for those urban populations in the future, assuming that those 
trends were sufficiently linear and/or regular. One obvious tie-in for this 
approach would be with the central place theory used by geographers to explain 
the urban (central place) hierarchy. General urban policy and planning 
implications would also seem to be considerable, as, for example, in 
transportation scheduling and planning, planning for recreation and leisure 
activities, and even general land use planning as it relates to shifts in activity 
patterns as size of place increases.
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As part of an Athens (Greece) Plan Section research effort, I carried out a pilot 
time budget investigation in the Athens Metropolitan Area (Gutenschwager 
1969, pp.163-189). The effort in that study was to relate time use patterns to the 
modernization of the individual Greek. A modernity scale, based upon 
awareness,2 was developed for the Athenian pilot sample and was used to 
classify individual time budgets. The differences between modern and traditional 
men and women were about as one might expect: more modern Greek men 
were seen to spend less time in work-related and sleep activities and more time 
in family care, especially child care, and educational activities than their more 
traditional counterparts. For more modern women, the opposite was in part true: 
they spent more time in work, and less time in family care, especially 
housework, than their traditional counterparts, although, like more modern men 
they spent more time in education and less time in sleep than more traditional 
women.
Location of activities also showed this contrasting pattern for modernizing 
versus traditional men and women: more modern men spent more time at 
home, while the more modern women spent less time at home than the more 
traditional. As to contacts, modern men spent less time alone and more time 
with their families than traditional males, while modern women spent more time 
alone and less time with their families than traditional women. For both modern 
men and women impersonal contacts accounted for more time use than with 
traditional men and women.
The sample for this study was small, but the time budget results were 
predictable enough to encourage confidence in the findings and to inspire 
further research into time use and activity patterns in Greece, one of the few so- 
called developing countries where the technique has been applied.
Time Budget Research and Public Policy
The ultimate value of the time budget perspective to urban and regional planning 
research is its applicability to public policy, hence, the question of how and in 
what ways it can be organized to provide evaluation of these policies. There are 
two issues here requiring a distinction that is sometimes overlooked in applied 
social science research. One is the ability of the time budget perspective to
2The scale defined awareness of self, other and society in more rational or functional, rather than 
tradition-bound, terms as the measure of modern; for example, recognizing one’s opportunities and 
planning for the future rather than accepting one’s ‘station in life’ would constitute a modern 
awareness of self; recognizing the various functional roles in the urban society and when and how 
to use them rather than seeking functional and professional help exclusively from friends and 
relatives would constitute a modern awareness of others; and recognizing the demands, problems 
and potential of the national and even international system as a totality beyond the self and family 
rather than treating one’s own interests as the ultimate would constitute a modern awareness of 
society.
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predict the outcome of various policy decisions and/or trends resulting from past 
decisions on the activity patterns of the urban society. The other has to do with 
evaluation or judgement about which patterns are better or more compatible with 
the values of that society, a judgement that enters at every stage of the research 
effort. The ultimate judgement about better or worse is made by the people, of 
course, but public policy narrows the options in degree almost in proportion to 
the size of the capital investment that accompanies the policy. Thus, for 
example, the preference for the automobile today is in part the outcome of a 
long history of public policy decisions favoring its use, a history which is not 
totally unrelated to systemic pressure by the petroleum and rubber industries 
and the subsequent gigantic automobile industry itself (though the automobile 
was and is obviously preferred for other reasons as well). Thus it is that so- 
called ‘pure social science prediction’ is, itself, biased by nomative decisions 
from the past, which merely emphasizes further the need for being explicit about 
the criteria and techniques used for evaluating patterns and policy 
recommendations growing out of current research.
Several of the time budget researchers have made explicit efforts to deal with 
the problems of evaluation or judgement in relation to time budget research. As 
stated above, Meier (1961) sees a useful balance against purely economic 
policy considerations in the time budget technique. W. H. Wilson (1968) 
concurs, seeing the time budget as a social benefit-cost technique that could 
balance purely financial considerations. He recommends evaluating the actual 
versus a possible situation for a population by comparing two actual populations 
or the same population at different times. He feels that specific policy areas 
such as health, transportation, etc., could best be examined and evaluated 
through the analysis of time use.
Chapin (Chapin and Hightower, 1966) has developed a time use game, which 
he has used in survey research to measure the potential increment in demand 
for various kinds of activities and their related urban facilities and services, 
particularly in relation to possible increases in leisure time. As he points out, 
public policy and planning recommendations can, thus, derive from a 
comparison of activities which are chosen in the game versus actual activity 
patterns in the population, which may be different, rather than waiting for future 
“market demand” to express itself. He lists five variables as having been found 
important in explaining choice and location of activities: (1) socio-economic 
status as defined by occupation, income and education; (2) life style as defined 
by preferences for discretionary activities found in the actual schedules; (3) 
spatial accessibility as defined by ‘facilities’ potential in relation to the household, 
which is a measure of ‘average distance’ of facilities from the household; (4) 
temporal accessibility as defined by freedom in the scheduling of activities; and 
(5) social accessibility as defined by the congruence between the status of the 
individual and the status of the facility to be used, the latter being defined by 
location and/or group using that facility.
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The time budget approach can be used in the ways outlined above because of 
the detailed information on the population that is generated. When policy 
recommendations are at stake, however, there is a further need for questions 
that examine the effect and motivation, as well as need, for special care to avoid 
biases that may result from the unusually high rate of interview refusals. 
Location and movement questions are especially important for urban policy, as 
are hypothetical questions that suggest changes in public facility use patterns. 
Again, it is important to emphasize the need for recurrent surveys in this respect 
because of the ways in which longitudinal studies can help to monitor and 
evaluate changes in time use in relation to public policy and investment.
Richard Meier (1962) has developed a somewhat different argument for 
predicting and evaluating time use patterns. Meier postulated that in essence 
the city is a communications system and that increments in total communication 
among the parts of the system are for the good of the system. Thus, he looked 
for time budget patterns with rather more than less emphasis on communication 
activities and sought to relate net increases in such activities over the entire 
population to modernization and economic development. His argument states 
that economic growth is preceded by cultural growth, which derives from more 
persons having more purposeful relationships with more people and 
participating in a greater variety of institutions. More explicitly, economic growth 
proceeds from increased efficiency in the use of resources such a land, labor, 
energy, capital, etc. Increased efficiency in the use of these resources is traced 
to innovations, and innovations result from cross-cultural contact, inter- and 
intra-professional and occupational contact, and careful study of natural 
processes. Insofar as evidence for economic gain from increased time in 
communication can be substantiated in time budget research and related to 
public policy, this would appear to be a useful evaluative criterion. However, 
since Meier’s position on encouraging increase in communication is far more 
complex than presented here, public policies based upon it should be informed 
on the entire argument, including especially his analysis of the problems of 
communication overload and of the ways to control it (Meier, 1962).
Thus, reviewing the ways in which time budget research can be related to public 
policy, at least three approaches seem possible: (1) direct search of sampled 
population for attitudes about their past, present and potential future patterns of 
activity choice and time use, as well as how they would relate these patterns to 
public policy, if possible; (2) analysis of trends in activity and time choice and 
their locational implications based upon either (a) longitudinal studies of the 
same population, (b) synchronous studies of different ‘types’, e.g. modern- 
traditional, etc., in the same population, or (c) comparative studies of different 
populations, e.g., those living in different size cities, or in more versus less 
industrialized cities of the same size, etc.; (3) empirical tests, to the extent 
possible, of theoretical and normative statements in the academic literature, 
such as Meier’s argument (above), or those by deGrazia (1962) and Linder
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(1970) that technological development has not produced more leisure but has in 
fact restricted and regimented populations as claimed by recent social critics, 
etc. By following some or all of these three strategies, the descriptive and 
analytical results of time budget research can more readily and explicitly 
contribute to meaningful policy decisions affecting the urban scene.
In addition, time budget research can also contribute to social theory as in the 
cross-cultural studies of Szalai (1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1972) and others in the 
multinational project, to quality of life or social indicator research usually carried 
on at the national level (Patrushev,1970) and to understanding of micro 
environments such as buildings or urban spaces. Though time budget work has 
been largely descriptive, the potential for policy applications at the regional level 
would seem to be considerable as more and more experience accumulates at 
this scale.
Time Budget Research in Athens
In Athens in 1972-1973 the Athens Plan Section of the Ministry of Public Works 
organized a time budget research project. Some 1733 completed interviews 
were obtained from the 2000 plus sample and these constitute the basis for the 
portion of the results reported below. The 13% refusal rate was rather high but 
not unusual in a study of this nature where several hours of respondents’ time 
on two different interview occasions were demanded, along with the more or 
less continuous effort required to record activities during the intervening 24-hour 
period.
Specifically, the interviewers visited the respondents, they explained the 
procedures of the research, and then left a simplified form for recording 
activities. The respondent was asked to record all activities during the 24-hour 
period from midnight to midnight of the following day. The next day the 
interviewer returned to collect general socio-economic and demographic data 
and to transfer the time use data to a more elaborate and pre-coded form. The 
data were then transferred to the computer for tabulation and analysis.
Method of Analysis
One common means of discussing the use of time by a population is to examine 
the average time spent in various activities. When computed over a fairly 
homogeneous population these averages may be expected to reflect more or 
less typical actors from that population. Even where the averages are drawn 
from more heterogeneous populations they summarize tendencies; and when 
informed by more detailed analysis of the variations around this mean, may be 
safely used to represent those populations.
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Experience with time budget studies, as well as common sense, indicates that 
time use is extremely sensitive to certain variables. Two of the most important in 
this respect are gender and employment status, and most of the averages 
presented below refer to populations that have been filtered by these two 
variables. A third significant variable is age: one would expect that average time 
spent in various activities would vary according to age, as, indeed, was shown to 
be the case. This variable is complicated by the presence of children in the 
household, however, and a third concept, stage in the life cycle, is a more 
appropriate summary of the two combined. Four stages are defined:
1. 18 -24
2. 25 - 39
3. Any age with children under age 18 present in the household.
4. 40 - 65
The first stage represents youth, the second early maturity, the third parenthood, 
and the fourth late maturity. In spite of the importance of this variable it was 
examined separately and then dropped because the sample itself would have to 
have been at least three to four times larger in order to support a division into so 
many classes with numbers remaining for variation in relation to other actors.
In essence, therefore, three basic and more or less homogeneous population 
groups were used to examine other variables thought to be significant in terms 
of time use. These three groups were:
1. Employed Males
2. Employed Females
3. Unemployed Females
In 1973 employed males represented nearly 90% of the male population, the 
remainder being mostly students and retired persons. There were also some 
students among the unemployed females, but the majority were housewives. 
Other variables examined were income, education, occupation, the presence of 
‘modern’ conveniences (television, automobile), and location in the city. Finally, 
some international comparisons were made. Eight major activities are presented 
in the tabulations, with eleven subcategories as follows:
1. Work
2. Travel
a. To Work
b. To Shop
c. All Other
3. Shopping
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4. Active Leisure
a. Education
b. Recreation
5. Passive Leisure
a. Personal Communications
b. Mass Media
c. Other Entertainment
6. Eating
7. Home and Family
a. Housework
b. Child and Adult Care
c. Personal Services
8. Sleep and Rest
These activities were organized to range from the most public: Work, Travel, 
Shopping, to the most private: Personal Services and Sleep. Contrasting the first 
four major activity types with the last four may provide a rough comparison 
between public versus private activities. The so-called discretionary activities fall 
in the centre of the list and are included in the two categories Active and Passive 
Leisure. The two are distinguished from each other by the nature of participation 
on the part of the individual. In active leisure the individual must play an active 
role, either intellectually or physically, in order for the activity to occur. 
Theoretically, some learning or re-creating is taking place.
In passive leisure the individual is required simply to attend to what is going on. 
Though some learning and re-creating may occur, this is not the main purpose 
of the activity, which purpose may be thought of as ranging from simply allowing 
time to pass to actually seeking escape from the present time (with its attendant 
problems and anxieties). This is not to imply that passive leisure is not an 
important activity. For example, personal communications are essential for 
sorting out and interpreting the ‘impersonal’ communications found in the mass 
media. Moral judgement is developed during the personal communications and 
the moral integrity of a culture depends upon them.
The averages shown in the tables that follow include Sunday activities, which 
amount to about one-seventh of the total. The effect of this inclusion is to deflate 
work hours slightly as well as possibly shopping and other weekday activities 
and to inflate slightly Sunday activities such as those in leisure, sleep, etc.
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A Sample of Results from the Research 
General Characteristics of the Population
Briefly, the Athens Metropolitan population in 1972-3 was characteristically 
urban, without, however, the level of material wealth found in Western Europe at 
that time. Families were small (average size of household 3.5 persons). 
Dwelling units were also small (average size 2.8 rooms), 50% of which were 
owner-occupied. This means that the Athens population had not yet reached the 
international standard in developed countries at that time of one room per 
person. For the most part Athenians were satisfied with the conditions of their 
lives, except for their displeasure with the physical environment, particularly the 
absence of greenery. Socially and economically, the household heads were 
mostly lower middle to middle class, the three largest categories being skilled 
workers (18.5%), clerks (24.8%) and small businessmen, tradesmen and 
cottage industrials (19.6%). The small numbers of unskilled (5.6%) and 
executive and professional (5.9%) indicates how few Athenians were to be 
found in the upper or lower class extremes. More than three-quarters of the 
household heads were employed, though a goodly number were retired (12.7%). 
Nearly 50% of the household heads had only an elementary school education at 
that time, with 15% having less and 23% having completed high school and 12% 
university. At the same time the general level of education had been increasing 
steadily and it has always been apparent in Greece that education is a highly 
valued form of investment. As far as communications behavior was concerned, 
the newspaper was clearly preferred at that time, with about three-quarters of 
the population using them as their main source of news. The radio was used 
mainly for music listening and television and the cinema for entertainment.
Variations in Time Use - Comparisons between Males and Females
In a gross comparison of males and females (Table 4.1) it can be seen that men 
are much more likely to be found in public activities than women, on the average 
more than nine hours a day versus a little more than four for women. The main 
trade-off here is between work and home and family activities, the combined 
totals being 7.8 hours for men and 7.9 hours for women. Men travel twice as 
much as women, mainly in the ‘journey-to-work’. Shopping is more a female 
than a male activity, while the active and passive leisure total hours are about 
the same, accounting for about 4.5 hours or a little less than twenty per cent of 
the total time budget.
The largest average number of hours worked was by men with children under 
the age of 18 present in the household. Generally, where children were present, 
employed men worked more hours and spent more time in home and family 
activities. As their age increased these men spent more time in work and in
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sleep and rest, and somewhat more in eating. They spent less time in travel, in 
leisure activities and in personal care. Mass media activities, primarily television 
viewing, were quite constant across age groups, slightly more, in fact, among 
the youngest groups.
TABLE 4.1
Average Time Spent in Primary Activities (Hours and Tenths)
Primary Activity Males (N=797) Females (N=902) Total (1X1=1699)
Work 6.4 1.9 4.0
Travel 1.5 0.8 1.1
to work 0.9 0.2 0.5
to shop 0.1 0.2 0.2
other 0.5 0.4 0.4
Shopping 0.2 0.4 0.3
Active Leisure 1.0 1.1 1.1
education 0.6 0.3 0.5
recreation 0.4 0.8 0.6
Passive Leisure 3.4 3.4 3.4
personal comm. 1.0 1.4 1.2
mass media 1.8 1.8 1.8
other entertain. 0.6 0.2 0.4
Eating 1.2 1.3 1.2
Home & Family 1.4 6.0 3.9
housework 0.3 4.3 2.4
child, adult care 0.3 1.0 0.7
personal services 0.8 0.7 0.7
Sleep & Rest 8J 9.1 9Ό
TOTAL 24.0 24.0 24.0
For employed women, the presence of children in the household decreased the 
average hours spent at work compared to other age groups, except the 
youngest. In fact, the combined demands of housework and child care, plus 
work, on employed women with children were so great as to decrease average 
time spent in nearly every other activity when compared to all other employed 
women. Generally, in Athens, when there were older women present in the 
household, the younger women spent little time in doing housework. 
Unemployed women spent more time in shopping and personal communication 
and less time with the mass media, compared to unemployed males.
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The Effects of Income on Time Use (See tables 4.2 - 4.4)
Income had a definite effect upon time use for both men and women. Low- 
income males, for example, worked more hours on the average and spent less 
time in active and passive leisure as a result. As income increased, time spent 
in sleep and rest decreased for employed men and this ‘extra’ time also 
appeared to be devoted to leisure activities, as well as to a lesser extent, to 
travel. Time spent in education increased with income for employed males. 
Time spent with the mass media appeared to peak with middle-income males.
TABLE 4.2
Average Time Spent in Primary Activities (Hours and Tenths) 
Employed Males by Income Class
Primary Activity
Work
Travel
to work 
to shop 
other
Shopping 
Active Leisure
education 
recreation 
Passive Leisure 
personal comm, 
mass media 
other entertain. 
Eating
Home & Family
housework 
child, adult care 
personal serv.
Sleep & Rest
TOTAL
INCOME CLASS Total
Low Middle Upper Employed Males
(N = 206) (N = 303) (N =93) (N = 687)
7.5 7.1 6.8 7.3
1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5
1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.6
0.2 0.2 0.4 o.:
0.2 0.4 0.3 o.:
2.9 3.5 3.5 3.2
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0
1.5 2.0 1.7 1.7
0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
as 843 8Λ M
24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
‘TOTAL includes 85 cases where no income was reported.
For employed females an increase in income meant less time spent in work, but 
more time spent in travel. Employed upper income women spent more time in
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shopping and active leisure but not necessarily more in passive leisure. They 
also spent more time in child care and sleep and rest. For unemployed women 
increased income resulted in more time spent in travel, in shopping and in 
personal services. However, increased income resulted in less time spent in 
sleep and rest for unemployed women, with low income women spending 
seven-tenths of an hour more on average than high income unemployed 
women.
TABLE 4.3
Average Time Spent in Primary Activities (Hours and Tenths) 
Employed Females by Income Class
Primary Activity
INCOME
Low
(N = 82)
CLASS
Middle
(N = 90)
Upper
(N = 38)
Total
Employed
Males
(N = 247)*
Work 6.7 6.1 5.2 6.2
Travel 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2
to work 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8
to shop 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
other 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3
Shopping 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Active Leisure 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.4
education 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
recreation 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3
Passive Leisure 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.5
personal comm. 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
mass media 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.4
other entertain. 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3
Eating 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1
Home & Family 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.7
housework 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5
child, adult care 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4
personal serv. 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9
Sleep & Rest 8.8 8.2 9J_ 8.6
TOTAL 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
* TOTAL includes 37 cases where no income was reported.
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TABLE 4.4
Average Time Spent in Primary Activities (Hours and tenths) 
Unemployed Females by Stage in the Life Cycle 
STAGE IN LIFE CYCLE
Children
Primary Activity 18-24 25-39 Present 40-65 total
______________________ (N = 61) (N = 30) (N = 310) (N = 254) (n = 655)
Work
Travel
to work 
to shop 
other
Shopping 
Active Leisure
education
recreation
Passive Leisure
personal comm, 
mass media 
other entertain.
Eating
Home & Family
housework 
child, adult care 
personal services
Sleep & Rest
TOTAL
0.5 0.1
1.3
0.0
0.9
0.2
1.1
0.4 0.9
4.6
3.9
1.8
0.7
4.0
1.7
4.5
1.8
0.6
1.1 1.3
2.5
1.5
5.1
0.0
1.0
9A 9J5
24.0 24.0
0.3
0.5
0.0 0.0
0.4 0.2
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.8
0.7 0.0
1.1
3.4
0.8
2.1 1.4
2.0 1.9
0.3
1.4
0.1
8.2
3.8 5.6
0.2 2.1
1.1
9Ό
0.5
24.0
0.3 0.3
0.5 0.6
0.0 0.0
0.2 0.2
0.3 0.4
0.5 0.5
1.1 1.3
0.0 0.4
1.1 0.9
3.9 3.7
1.7 1.6
2.0 1.9
0.2 0.2
1.4 1.4
6.5 6.9
5.3 5.0
0.6 1.2
0.6 0.6
9J3 9A
24.0 24.0
The Effect of Education on Time Use
The effect of increasing education as with increasing income was to decrease 
the number of hours spent in work and to increase the number of hours spent in 
travel for employed males. This suggests, on the one hand, that higher 
education and income decreases the marginal satisfaction or utility of additional 
hours spent in work, and, on the other hand, that more educated and higher 
income men live farther away from their places of work. These ‘gains’ in time by 
the more educated are given over to leisure activities and to personal services. 
More education also results in fewer hours spent in sleep and rest.
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The pattern of time use for employed women was similar to that of employed 
men as far as the effects of education were concerned. More education resulted 
in less time spent in work and more time in travel to work. Time spent in 
personal services also increased with education. For unemployed women travel 
increased with increasing education, as did time spent in shopping. Time spent 
in child and adult care increased along with education as did time spent in 
personal services.
International Comparisons of Time Use (See tables 4.5 - 4.9)
Eight countries were chosen for comparison from among the dozen or so 
involved in the multinational Time Budget Study carried out in Europe in 1965- 
66. These countries were Belgium, Bulgaria, Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Flungary, U.S.A., USSR and Yugoslavia. In a broad comparison of the 
total numbers of these countries it was found that the gross similarities and 
dissimilarities provided a social ‘map’ not unlike the geographical map of 
Europe. In this sense Greece fell quite naturally into the southeast quadrant of 
the European social geography and was the most truly representative of its type.
TABLE 4.5
Average Time Spent in primary Activities (Hours and tenths) 
Multinational Comparisons 
Work
Average Time Spent in Work
Country
Employed
Males
Employed
Females
Unemployed
Females Total
Greece 7.3 6.2 0.3 4.0
Belgium 7.1 5.7 0.3 2.6
Bulgaria 7.6 6.7 0.3 5.6
F.R.G. 7.1 5.0 0.4 2.0
France 6.9 5.7 0.1 2.6
Hungary 7.8 6.7 0.6 4.3
U.S.A. 6.9 5.2 0.1 2.4
U.S.S.R. 6.9 6.3 0.1 5.1
Yugoslavia 7.1 5.8 0.2 2.6
Greek men spent more time in work than all other countries except Bulgaria and 
Hungary (Table 4.5), and employed Greek women the same, if the USSR were 
added to the other two eastern bloc countries.
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TABLE 4.6
Average Time Spent in primary Activities (Hours and tenths) 
Multinational Comparisons 
Daily Travel
Average Time Spent in Daily Travel
Country Employed
Males
Employed
Females
Unemployed
Females Total
Greece 1.5 1.2 0.6 1.1
Belgium 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8
Bulgaria 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.2
F.R.G. 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.3
France 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7
Hungary 1.4 1.2 0.7 1.0
U.S.A. 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.1
U.S.S.R. 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.5
Yugoslavia 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.1
Daily travel time in the Greek sample was also very high (Table 4.6), and once 
again it was the eastern European countries that equalled or exceeded it. The 
one exception to this was the U.S.A., which had almost exactly the same daily 
travel time patterns as Greece, though probably the distances covered were not 
the same. One would have expected Greek travel time to have been higher than 
the average since the work day was divided into two segments at that time, 
requiring four journey-to-work trips for much of the labor force, and in this sense 
it is surprising that Greece was not the highest in this category since it was the 
only Mediterranean country in the sample group.
Shopping was largely a female activity in Greece as in most of the other 
countries (Table 4.7). However, Greek women, whether employed or not, spent 
less time than their counterparts in other countries and the total Athenian 
sample spent as little as half as much time in shopping as other countries in 
Europe. One explanation for this pattern might be that Greece was less a 
consumer society than the others at that time, which was hardly the case, or, 
otherwise, that shopping was somehow better organized in Athens than in the 
other cities included in the multinational study, i.e., that the stores were closer to 
the dwelling units requiring less time to get there and back.
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TABLE 4.7
Average Time Spent in primary Activities (Hours and tenths) 
Multinational Comparisons 
Shopping
Average Time Spent in Shopping
Country Employed
Males
Employed
Females
Unemployed
Females Total
Greece 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3
Belgium 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.5
Bulgaria 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.4
F.R.G. 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.6
France 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6
Hungary 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.5
U.S.A. 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6
U.S.S.R. 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5
Yugoslavia 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6
The Greek sample spent a large amount of time in education at that time, 
exceeded only by the USSR in this activity (Table 4.8). The time spent was 
particularly high among unemployed women and men, which accounted for the 
half-hour daily average in the total sample, exceeded only by the USSR. The 
effects of the Soviet emphasis on continuing education were already clearly 
seen for the employed men and women in their sample, while the high totals in 
the Greek sample represented young unemployed men and women, many of 
whom attended private college preparatory schools, and for whose families 
education was seen as a means to social mobility.
In 1973 Greece was low in time spent in active recreation, similar to most 
Eastern European countries. The Federal Republic of Germany was the highest 
in all categories, which was probably related to the relatively lower amounts of 
time West Germans spent in work and travel. On the other hand, Greeks spent 
up to one whole hour more than half the other countries and up to three-quarters 
of an hour more than the remainder in personal communications (Table 4.9). 
This is a purely cultural phenomenon and since no other Mediterranean culture 
was represented in the list, Greece seemed like an extraordinary country in this 
respect.
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TABLE 4.8
Average Time Spent in primary Activities (Hours and tenths) 
Multinational Comparisons 
Education
Average Time Spent in Education
Country Employed
Males
Employed
Females
Unemployed
Females Total
Greece 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5
Belgium 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Bulgaria 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2
F.R.G. 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
France 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Hungary 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2
U.S.A. 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
U.S.S.R. 0.7 0.5 1.8 0.5
Yugoslavia 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Time spent in personal communications may have resulted from less time spent 
with the mass media, as Greeks spent the least amount of time on average in 
this activity, which may also have reflected a north-south trade-off between 
these two activities. Greeks also spent surprisingly little time in eating, thus 
destroying, as it were, one of the expected stereotypes of its southern location. It 
was not the lowest, however, and, if it were not for the exceptionally high 
amounts of time spent in Germany, France and Belgium, it would have been 
average to high compared with the other countries on the list.
Housework did not appear to occupy Greeks nearly as much as members of 
other societies. Even among unemployed women where the totals are usually 
the highest, Greek women ranked the lowest, and up to an hour or two less than 
several other countries. On the other hand, Greeks did devote a good deal of 
time to child and adult care, more, in fact, than any other country except France 
and the U.S.A. As expected, the socialist countries devoted the least amount of 
time to this activity, since there were state organizations that assumed much of 
this responsibility.
Greece did in 1973 rank high in the activity category of sleep and rest, in fact, at 
9.0 hours on average, higher than all other countries in the multinational 
comparison. Greece was also the only country with a mid-day break, however, 
which would do much to explain its position.
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TABLE 4.9
Average Time Spent in primary Activities (Hours and tenths) 
Multinational Comparisons 
Personal Communications 
Average Time Spent in Personal Communications
Country Employed
Males
Employed
Females
Unemployed
Females Total
Greece 1.0 0.9 1.6 1.2
Belgium 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Bulgaria 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
F.R.G. 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
France 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Hungary 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
U.S.A. 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4
U.S.S.R. 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Yugoslavia 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5
Activities in Time and Space (Figures 1-8, Maps 1 and 2)
In addition to the average time spent in various activities, the time budget study 
in Athens in 1972-3 examined the evolution of activities over the course of the 
average day. This daily rhythm of activities expressed the way in which the 
population scheduled its activities throughout the day, demonstrating the 
dynamic use of time in this respect. Different sub-groups were constrained 
differently in their scheduling of activities and this showed up clearly in the 
diagrams.
Figure 1 shows most clearly the total average schedule of the Athens 
population. The vertical axis represents the total time available to the sample 
population during the hour shown along the horizontal axis. In the case of Figure 
1, where the total sample is shown this would mean that 1699 person-hours are 
represented by each hour space along the horizontal axis. The activities 
themselves are shown as a percentage of this total, so that in every case the top 
of the diagram is the 100 percent line irrespective of the size of the sample sub­
group being portrayed. Thus, in Figure 1 during the hour from midnight to 1:00 
a.m., about 86% of the person hours available are being used in the activity
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sleep. Two other activities, passive leisure (7.5%), and work (3.5%) accounted 
for most of the remainder of the person-hours of activity available at that time.
Figure 1 shows clearly the characteristic schedule of the Mediterranean society 
found in Athens at that time. There was a double surge of activity peaking at 
about noon and 8:00 p.m., and broken by a rest period that reached a maximum 
between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., at least for the fall-winter period during which 
the survey was carried out. All others showed the same double peaking, some 
anticipating the mid-day break more than others. Work and household activities 
were the dominant morning activities, while passive leisure was the dominant 
late afternoon and evening activity. Sleep, of course, dominated activities from 
midnight to about 7:00 a.m., by which time at least half of the population was up 
and about.
Figure 2 not only examines the sub-groups of activities more closely, but also 
displays each major activity on its own horizontal axis, eliminating the 
distributions that might result from cumulating the percentages as in Figure 1. 
Thus, for example, home and family activities clearly had a higher peak in the 
morning and were in any case dominated by housework as the main activity in 
this category. Child and adult care, on the other hand, was more important in 
late afternoon and evening between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., while personal 
services were more common early in the morning up until 9:00 a.m., and 
peaked again in the evening between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.
Shopping peaked in the morning between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., with a 
much smaller peak in the evening between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. Travel, on 
the other hand, peaked before and after the shopping peaks, dominated in the 
morning and midday hours by the journey-to-work. Figures 3-8 illustrate the 
hourly differences between males and females among a selection of activities.
Maps 1 and 2 portray the location by kilometer grid-square of the two major 
activities of work and travel. The density patterns were a product of the number 
of persons present in the grid-square multiplied by the number of hours spent 
there in the activity being portrayed. Because the range of densities resulting 
was very large, the classification was developed from a logarithmic scale. Thus, 
the densities shown at the denser end of the scale were disproportionately 
greater than those at the sparser end. The person-hours were totalled over the 
entire average day for the sample.
Work locations were highly concentrated in the Athens case, though there was a 
secondary concentration in the Piraeus center and a goodly number of minor 
concentrations throughout the metropolitan area. The densities in the Athens 
centre would have been accounted for by the heavy concentration of 
commercial, financial and government activities, while other concentrations 
reflected the localities of industrial activities, on the one hand, and a myriad of 
smaller retail and cottage industry locations, on the other.
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Map 2 shows the density of person-hours in travel according to the grid-square 
location of the destination of that travel. Time spent in travel is, as expected, 
much less than time spent in work. Thus, the overall density is much lower than 
in Map 1. The pattern of densities is, however, quite similar owing to the fact that 
the journey-to-work is the most important type of travel. Thus, the heaviest 
concentration of destinations by person-hours is found in and around the Athens 
core, with a secondary concentration in Piraeus. Time spent in travel to 
destinations in the rest of the metropolitan area is quite insignificant except for 
scattered locations.
The above, briefly, are some of the results of the analysis of time use in the 
Athens population in 1973. Similar studies should take place on a regular basis, 
as is already the case in some European countries, in order to trace changes in 
time use that might suggest changes in urban policy and planning that could 
resolve problems that arise. Differences in time use between males and 
females, employed and unemployed, etc., could suggest planning decisions 
related to work place, shopping, leisure time, and so forth, and all of those in 
relation to location of places of residence. Similar decisions could result from 
indications of shifting patterns of time spent in journey-to-work, as one of the 
most important activities in the metropolitan area. Finally, all Athenians are 
aware of the serious problems of their city and the need for a comprehensive 
socio-economic program to relieve these problems. Time budget research could 
contribute significantly to such an effort.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL CHANGE1
Introduction
Social change is one of the most challenging and perplexing problems of 
concern to social science. Understanding it demands periodic revision of 
analysis and interpretation to accommodate unpredicted, often unsignaled 
alteration in society, and caution against the deception of past experience, which 
is the only basis one has for speculation about change. Conceptualizing 
methods, bound to static situations and constant interactions, rarely transcend a 
‘comparative statics’ approach in their formulations.
While the problems of dealing with social change arise from the complexities of 
society itself, it may well be that these problems are compounded by a 
mechanistic view of the social order which depends to a large extent upon the 
simple causal link and the concept of mechanical equilibrium. The effort of this 
chapter will be to examine an alternative to this view, namely a 
multidimensional, phenomenological perspective on the over-all process of 
social change.
Levels of Reality
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, mathematical biologist and a primary contributor to the 
General Systems approach to science, was one of the early objectors to 
mechanistic explanation as the sole scientific method. Bertalanffy was a 
proponent of the multilayered view of reality. He was initially concerned with 
proposing a solution to the age-old controversy between the mechanistic and 
vitalistic explanations of nature. More specifically, he offered the proposition 
that there were a sufficiently large number of distinguishing characteristics 
attributable to living organisms so that understanding and explaining them 
required new organizing concepts and a new level of theory. This new level he 
proposed to call ‘organismic’, and its organizing principles were to be 
incorporated under a General Systems Theory. His proposal, which was not 
published until the early 1950’s (Bertalanffy, 1952), was based on the important 
assumption that living organisms cannot be adequately understood through a 
reduction to physical and chemical units and processes. He did not deny the 
applicability of physical laws to living organisms, but rather their inadequacy to 
explore fully the reality of nature at that level. Among other things his 
organismic theory incorporated teleology in the form of a ‘dynamic open system’
1 Reprinted from Gerald Gutenschwager (1970) “Social Reality and Social Change”. Social 
Research, Vol. 37, No 1 (Spring), pp 48-70.
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to account for purposiveness or the ‘vital force’ that the vitalists claimed living 
organisms contain. In addition Bertalanffy proposed that the organism be 
regarded from the standpoint of wholeness or gestalt, in order to understand its 
organization, its hierarchical order, its equifinality or ability to move toward a goal 
from a variety of different paths, etc.
While the General Systems contribution to science has been assured by the 
large variety of research efforts that incorporate these original principles, in 
short, by the fruitfulness of the theory, the important point for this discussion is 
the alternative perspective it furnishes on the nature of reality. The General 
Systems goal was to unite all science under a systems perspective governed by 
strict mathematical laws, and many research efforts in this tradition have 
proceeded with such a goal in mind. Much of this effort has been directed to 
locating and defining isomorphisms among various diverse situations that would 
permit interdisciplinary comparison and ultimate systemic formulation. Logical- 
positivists have raised the question as to whether such formulations can have 
any predictive value, given their noncausal nature, whereas Bertalanffy 
maintains that they do have predictive value, especially as the systemic laws 
underlying the diverse situations are formulated. Thus a second innovation 
offered by the General Systems movement was an alternative to the older, 
simpler cause-and-effect formulations of scientific thinking. This in turn was 
related to the view of reality as existing at different levels. Whereas cause-and- 
effect formulations are adequate to deal with several variable situations, they are 
less and less applicable in the multivariable circumstances of organized 
complexity.
Because Betalanffy’s experience was concentrated at the biological level, he 
expressed a certain bias, perhaps oversimplification in his discussion of 
problems at the human and social levels, but the direction was clearly indicated. 
Here an economist, Kenneth Boulding (1956), more fully developed the 
perspective. Boulding (1956, p.205) saw a hierarchy of complexity of 
organization based upon the individual unit of behavior, ranging from a first level 
static structure, the level of frameworks, to a ninth level of transcendental 
systems, all of which exhibit systemic structure. The last three levels are of 
interest to us inasmuch as they deal with humans. At the seventh or human 
level, he saw a beginning of self-consciousness, which is of a higher order than 
the self-awareness found even at the sixth or animal level. Furthermore, 
concepts or images used to organize information into ‘knowledge structures’, 
which also exist at the animal level, have ‘self-reflexive’ qualities at the human 
level. “Man knows he knows, and has some knowledge of his knowledge 
states.” He is able to interpret symbols, and is the only animal that knows of his 
own death. At the eighth or social organizational level are found messages with 
content and meaning, dimensional value systems, transcription of images into 
historical record, symbolization of art, human emotion, etc. At the ninth level of 
transcendental systems attempts are made to account for “questions that do not
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have any answers.” It was Boulding’s contention that only the lower levels of 
non-living matter are at present provided with adequate theoretic models. Not 
even the rudiments of theory appear to exist at the higher levels. The purpose 
of the use of such a hierarchy is, however, “to prevent us from accepting as final 
a level of theoretical analysis which is below the level of the empirical world 
which we are investigating” (Boulding 1959, p 207). At the same time we must 
realize that lower order theory does provide some insight, since each level 
incorporates elements from the levels below.
This perspective on reality is interesting when compared with developments in 
scientific thought in continental Europe during the 20th century. The concept of 
multi-leveled or multi-dimensional reality would appear to be a generally 
accepted perspective in European philosophy and science (Tymieniecka 1962). 
Based upon Husserl’s work in phenomenology, European science has the direct 
analytic objective of “delineating the permanent structures of objects” 
(Tymieniecka 1962, p. 17). More specifically there are three main features to the 
phenomenological approach:
1. Delineating fields of inquiry by their specific nature, followed by 
analyses limited to aspects appropriate to the particular objectives
2. Establishing “models” of inquiry consisting of multi-layered structures
3. Determining irreducible elements, qualities, patterns, or norms 
(Tymieniecka 1962, pp. 19 -20)
The three features are, of course, closely interrelated. The search for 
irreducible elements, qualities, patterns or norms would gradually evolve a 
delineation of the fields of inquiry by their specific nature. This would preclude 
the reduction of units to fit lower level formulations and guarantee that the 
analyses would be limited to those aspects appropriate at each level. The 
multilayered structural model is thus the logical basic organizing concept to 
guide investigation within the phenomenological view given the above 
prerequisites2. In proceeding directly to the phenomena and dealing with their 
multi-layered structures as they present themselves, phenomenology is 
committed to a concept of reality that respects the autonomy and irreducibility of 
phenomena characteristic at each level. Whether the structures uncovered
2 The similarities with General Systems Theory are striking, as the following indicate:
The many-layered organization emphasizes the heterogeneity of elements, but at the 
same time organizes them into an organic unity by means of the hierarchical stratification 
and inter-layer connections. (Tymieniecka 1962, p.20) 
and
[A]n initial allowance of more than one type of inter-layer connection should make 
possible the recognition of various sorts of structural mechanism ... for if causal relations 
are the only sort admitted, as in the reductionist approach, then every object is capable of 
being reduced to its causal relations, its “reasons.” However, the autonomy of various 
realms of being presupposes relations other than causal (Tymieniecka 1962, p.21).
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would be sufficiently isomorphic to permit universal principles or laws, as the 
General Systems theorists wish, is not explicitly claimed by phenomenology, 
although there is an assumption that mathematical formulations and their 
appropriate deductions would serve a useful function in research.
Among American social theorists, several have clearly recognized the need for 
viewing the social order from different levels. Maclver and Page (1949) in their 
book, Society, spoke about social change in relation to three orders: “the order 
of values or the cultural order, the order of means or the utilitarian order, and the 
order of nature on which man’s valuations and man’s devices alike depend.”3 
Such a perspective is consistent with the major contentions of the General 
Systems movement and of European phenomenology as seen above. The 
main claim is that reality, and for our purposes social reality, has many levels or 
dimensions, each of which is related to the others and yet autonomous to some 
degree. The resulting connections between the levels are not sufficiently 
explained through the use of simple mechanistic formulations; causality has a 
circumscribed applicability within this perspective. This poses a problem, 
however, as to the alternative kinds of connecting links between the various 
levels. General Systems Theory offers the principle of isomorphism as its 
leading theoretical concept in this respect; systems expressing similar properties 
may be investigated for possible isomorphic structural laws. Examples might 
include formulations under probability theory, topology, or information theory as 
applicable in various and diverse situations. In addition, Sorokin (1957, pp.4-8) 
has suggested several other types of interrelations besides causal or functional 
integration that might govern cultural elements. One is ‘spatial or mechanical 
adjacency’, a ‘congeries’ of conglomerated cultural elements, which owe their 
interrelations solely to their concurrence in a unit of space. Another is ‘indirect 
association through a common external factor’, but with no functional or logical 
connection between the elements. Finally, there is a ‘logico-meaningful 
integration’ where ‘each part, when set in its designated position is no longer 
noticeable as a part, but all the parts together form, as it were, a seamless
3 Nor are the authors satisfied with simple causal explanations of social phenomena between these 
three orders:
Social phenomena are not, like certain physical phenomena, isolable components of a 
situation. Social phenomena are aspects of a total non-mechanical consciously upheld 
system of relationships. Because the system is non-mechanical, the aspects are 
numerous and dissolve into one another, and we select from among them either by 
convention or because those selected have a preconceived or discovered significance for 
us. Behind every social relationship lie attitudes and interests, which are not separable 
forces but type-phases of dynamic personality... If a number of factors are alike 
necessary to the production of a result, there can be no quantitative evaluation of their 
respective contributions. And if this is true of material categories, themselves 
measurable, and their material products, themselves also measurable, it is more 
obviously true of the more subtle interactions of personalities variantly responsive to 
complex conditions, which determine every social situation. (1949, pp. 627-628) 
measurable, it is more obviously true of the more subtle interactions of personalities 
variantly responsive to complex conditions, which determine every social situation, (pp. 
627-628)
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garment’. Characteristic interrelations of this type are seen in the logical laws of 
identity, contradiction, and consistency, as well as in the broader principles of 
harmony and style where strict logic does not hold. Logico-meaningful 
integration has application only at the human, social and transcendental levels in 
Boulding’s framework discussed above. But it is precisely at these levels that 
theory is least developed, according to Boulding; this serves to give additional 
emphasis to Sorokin’s (1957, p.14) statement that
If in a given concurrence of cultural elements such logico-meaningful unity 
exists, and if it is correctly discovered and the unifying principle accurately 
formulated, the formula is as important in its field from the cognitive stand 
point as any causal formula is in a case of causal coalescence.
This leads to a search for consistencies in form and relationship that persist 
under varying conditions of society. These may include structural 
generalizations such as the hierarchical principle, evolutionary concepts such as 
those that incorporate human subjectivity and intentionality in formulations on 
social reality. The last will be of central concern in the following section, which 
deals with the social order and its multi-layered reality.
The Social Order: Three Modes of Reality
While most of the authors surveyed in the previous section refer to reality as 
structured in levels or layers, there is some danger in viewing the social order in 
this manner. There should, in other words, be no connotation of higher or lower 
order of social reality; each is central in its own right. In the application of 
phenomenological thought to social theory by Berger and Luckmann, as 
described in Chapter 2 above, the levels are treated as aspects of reality 
deriving from the unique socio-linguistic origin of common-sense knowledge in 
human groups. These authors trace in detail the social-psychological processes 
whereby common-sense knowledge is acquired and social reality defined for the 
typical members of society. These processes summarized as ‘externalization, 
objectivation, and internalization’, account for the fact that humans, their social 
and natural world, and their understanding of that world are different though 
dialectically related, each participating in the creation of the other. ‘Society is a 
human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product’; and as 
Berger and Luckmann (1966, p.61) further point out “. . . an analysis of the 
social world that leaves out any one of these three [dialectical] moments will be 
distortive”.
Here we are, if fact, concerned with developing a model (See Diagram) of social 
reality and social change that will include all of these moments. Thus, three 
modes or aspects of reality will be referred to. One of these will be called the 
environmental or physical aspect, including both the natural and social 
surroundings. This might be characterized as the mode of ‘manifest reality’,
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constituted by the total set of phenomena available to the objective sense 
perception of common-sense humans, as well as of social scientists. It consists 
not only of natural phenomena and events, but also recordable and observable 
social phenomena and occurrences. It is the truly statistical aspect of the social 
order, and its manifest availability makes it susceptible to all the various 
mechanistic and mathematically systematic formulations that have proven so 
successful in the natural sciences. It is the aspect demonstrating “. . . the 
possibility that the indeterminacy seemingly inherent in situations involving 
human motivations, volitions, etc., may disappear as the events are taken on a 
larger scale” (Rapoport, 1957, p.56, author’s emphasis). It is here that Boulding 
would see “. . .mechanical elements, independent of the image, of great 
importance in any social system and which we neglect ... at our peril” 
(Boulding, 1964, p. 10). It also includes humans as biological and physiological 
beings, subject to needs and restricted in their physical capacities by their own 
mortal condition and the environment around them.4
While it is true that the environmental aspect, the manifest reality, is available to 
our sense perceptions, its vast temporal and spatial complexities make it quite 
impossible to be fully grasped in an objective manner. Even science, the most 
systematic human effort to understand the environment objectively, is admittedly 
limited in this respect. Common-sense humans, therefore, understandably 
utilize highly subjective images of this reality to help in finding their way around. 
The image constitutes a second meaningful or spiritual mode of appearance of 
the social order, which could be labeled as the ‘subjective reality’. It is the naive 
picture carried by non-scientific humans, their interpretation of the vast and only 
partially known world around them. It is the philosophical vision, the religious 
faith, the ethical system, the complex of attitude, stereotype, and common sense 
construct that constitute the spiritual paraphernalia of the beings in the social 
order. It is an aspect from which social scientists, themselves, are not free5 6, and, 
as in the manifest reality, there is a considerable variation in complexity within 
the meaningful aspect, with images ranging hierarchically from the smallest bias 
to a scope of . . great complexity and many dimensions’.
Intervening between the subjective and manifest reality is the level or mode of 
human intention and intentional action. It is the link between what is imagined 
as real and what is manifestly real. It is both the main locus and main obstacle 
to the understanding of social change. It is here that the distinct human 
sciences demand radically different scientific formulations if they are to study
4 The environmental aspect includes what Berger and Luckmann refer to as ‘objective reality’, but is
also used here in a somewhat broader and more general sense to include the natural order as well.
6[T]he student of man as man is compelled to interpret the facts which he discovers. This 
interpretation . . . will ultimately have to reach a supra-empirical level, and thus always requires a 
hermeneutic horizon. Consequently, the empirical scientist will either have to make use of 
someone else’s philosophical vision that is known to him or propose his own philosophical 
interpretation of his findings.
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society adequately. To agree with Bertalanffy (1962, p. 14), however, that . . a 
great deal of . . . human behavior is beyond the principles of utility, homeostasis 
(equilibrium) and stimulus-response, and that it is just this which is characteristic 
of human and cultural activities”, is not to agree that the ‘dynamic open system’ 
accounts fully for the intentional, goal-oriented activity of humans.
Human activity is intentional within a certain frame of reference:
I anticipate of necessity what I will perceive, experience or discover. By 
anticipation I assign to that which I expect a place within the framework of my 
conceptual systems (Strasser 1963, p. 255).
Humans pre-interpret the outcome of their actions, the anticipated results, while 
their means of arriving at them are largely pre-interpreted for them. These 
constitute for Alfred Schutz (1962b, pp. 69-70) the (a) “in-order-to motive”, that 
is, the “state of affairs, the end which the action has been undertaken to bring 
about”, and the (b) “because-motive”, which relates to past experience or the 
project of action itself. Thus both the anticipated outcome and the means to 
arrive at the outcome have reference to individuals’ ‘reflexive reality’, and, to the 
extent to which individuals in society typify the social group of which they are 
members, their actions are motivated within the meaningful aspect of that group.
We see here, in other words, the chief reason why mechanistic models are 
insufficient for penetrating and accounting fully for social reality. The human 
grasp of the realm of manifest reality is extremely limited, on the one hand, and 
highly distorted by their own image of it, on the other. Their actions are 
motivated and carried out in reference not to the manifest reality but rather to 
their own - and typically their social or reference group’s - subjective reality. 
Not only are their means chosen and the action carried out, but also the results 
are anticipated and, once achieved, evaluated in reference to that subjective 
reality.
Individuals are not born with a subjective reality, of course, and its development 
constitutes the socialization process for them as members of a social group 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp. 129 ff.). The nature of that process in any 
particular group creates an attitude toward future change and flexibility in the 
subjective reality. Social environments within which an ‘open mind’ is 
encouraged, and rewards and punishments organized accordingly, will tend to 
produce individuals with a less rigidly structured subjective reality. The long-run 
implications for change are obvious in such circumstances, and this does much 
to explain the difference between modern open and traditional closed societies 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, pp. 116-128).
Images are extremely resistant to change, since they constitute both the 
individual’s and the group’s basic orientation to life.
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There is an . . . insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo­
environment. To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But 
because it is behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the 
pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated but in the real 
environment where action eventuates. If the behavior is not a practical act, 
but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may be a long time before 
there is any noticeable break in the texture of the fictitious world. But when 
the stimulus of the pseudo-fact results in action on things or people, 
contradiction soon develops. Then comes the sense of butting one's head 
against a stone wall, of learning by experience, and witnessing Herbert 
Spencer's tragedy of the murder of a Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal 
Facts, the discomfort, in short, of a maladjustment (Lippmann 1922, p. 15).
In this sense there must obviously be some degree of consistency between a 
society’s subjective and manifest reality or serious maladjustment will cause a 
breakdown or revision in the existing order. Nevertheless, if it is true, a 
Lippmann points out,
. . . that under certain circumstances men respond as powerfully to fictions as 
they do to realities, and that in many cases they help to create the very 
fictions to which they respond... (Lippmann 1922, p. 14)
then the “ triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture 
of that scene, and the human response to that picture working itself out upon the 
scene of action” (Lippmann 1922, pp. 16-17) is the nexus within which social 
science must work and the origins of social change be sought.
A Model for the Study of Change
Alfred Schutz was another phenomenologically oriented social theorist who 
worked with a multi-aspect view of society in an effort to develop a rigorous 
scientific model of the social order. Although it is not possible to discuss here 
the full development of his thinking, a number of the relevant principles may be 
presented. (Schutz, 1962a, Natanson, 1963)
Since there is in the essence of an individual’s thoughts and actions a certain 
similarity with the thoughts and actions of other individuals within his or her 
group (as well as a certain uniqueness), and since these similarities are even 
stronger when a particular situation or set if situations is defined, it is possible 
for the social scientist (while it is necessary for common-sense humans) to typify 
the actions and thoughts of the social subject. This is possible because it is in 
the inherent nature of social relations that humans will know their counterparts in 
a fragmented yet typical way, according to the environmental conditions defining 
the encounters among them. (Simmel 1959, pp. 337-356, Natanson 1963, 
pp.73-92). In other words, given a particular situation, the commonsense 
human is able to predict with some confidence the actions, indeed, to some 
extent the thoughts of his fellow humans. This is true because every situation in
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its typical aspects has been partially lived and pre-interpreted by other persons 
in the same group. These kinds of information are transmitted to each member 
of the social group in the process of socialization, and adulthood finds most of 
the typical thoughts and actions taken for granted.
This typicality, however, also constitutes the basic datum for social scientist. 
Their constructs, based upon the taken-for-granted constructs of the individuals 
within the group, permit reliable, albeit limited predictive ability. Thus the model 
of the social world constructed by Schutz consists of, first, a circumscribed and 
well-defined situation, an environment which constitutes a section of the 
manifest reality, second, a typical actor or actors with their subjectively defined 
modes of perceiving the manifest reality, and, third, a set of typical “because” 
and “in-order-to-motives,” i.e., situational objectives and courses of action 
appropriate to those actors which together constitute the third or intentional 
aspect of social reality. This descriptive model may be transformed into an 
analytical model by altering the environmental constraints, i.e., by changing 
some of the conditions in the section of manifest reality. The analysis would 
consist of a prediction of how these typical individuals would be likely to meet 
the varying conditions of a changed environment.
How would such and analysis proceed? One must recall that the actions and 
interactions of the actors in the model are outlined by the social scientists 
themselves. They reflect, however, their understanding of that which is typical 
and shared in the subjective reality of the members of the social group under 
study. They constitute, as it were, second-level abstractions, based on the 
everyday constructs that are a necessary component of the commonsense 
individual’s interpretive understanding of his fellow humans within the particular 
context of their mutual interaction. The social scientist, in manipulating the 
manifest reality, the environmental conditions, does not manipulate the 
subjective reality of the actors in the model. She or he merely interprets the 
changing environmental conditions as they would be interpreted by the actors 
themselves, and “moves” the actors as they themselves would act, given their 
typical interpretation of the manifest reality.
The social scientist thus re-enacts the thought processes of typical common- 
sense humans who are faced with information from the environment. Common- 
sense humans rehearse in imagination the typical circumstances similar to 
those that are being communicated to them. They search for their own past 
solutions or reactions to such circumstances, extract that which is typical, and 
apply to the situation, in turn, as many of the typical past solutions as they can 
recall. When and only when they have decided upon that typical course of 
action that they think will best satisfy the present circumstances, will they 
actually move into overt action.
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Thus the overt action of common-sense humans depends largely upon what 
they have experienced typically in the past. Knowing this the social scientist can 
reconstruct with some reliability that which is typical of the members of a social 
group and can use this understanding to predict how the members of that group 
will react to changing environmental conditions. Furthermore, the social 
scientists may estimate which changes in the environment would probably 
transcend the past experiences of the typical members of the group, and in so 
doing produce a crisis in their subjective reality necessitating a search for new 
images. The magnitude of the crisis would indicate the degree to which the 
subjective reality would have to change, but would not always indicate the 
direction of change. Small-scale changes in the subjective reality would be 
easier to predict in this sense, although, in any case, changes of this nature 
would not be strictly covered within the analytical model itself. An effort will be 
made to discuss such changes in the following section of this chapter. 
Meanwhile, there is one further refinement that could be added to the Schutz 
model; this has to do with the manner of manipulating the environmental 
conditions.
Rather than altering arbitrarily the conditions of the manifest reality, one would 
do well to consider possible functional or evolutionary change, such as long run 
statistical trends, apparent in the environmental aspect. For it is here that the 
analytical manipulation of the section of manifest reality could be meaningful in 
the study of change. In other words, one could impute changes in the 
environmental mode, as they seem functionally necessary or statistically 
inevitable. The typicalness of response by the actors would then make it 
possible to predict their actions and the course of events as they might be 
expected to proceed within a functioning and evolving social situation.
Perhaps an example would serve to illustrate the way in which such a model 
would work. In a book written some years ago, Anatol Rapoport (1960) 
discussed the conditions surrounding conflict on the international level. He 
demonstrated quite clearly how the force of events, i.e., military preparations, 
diplomatic exchanges, etc., within the environmental aspect might lead sooner 
or later, perhaps inevitably, to the realization of conflict on a large scale, given 
the propensity of the leaders of the opposing countries to view the situation as 
one of conflict in the first place. In other words, past experience has shown that 
when two countries are engaged in a situation of opposing interests to the point 
where anxiety about national security becomes an issue, war preparations 
ensue such that the actions of one country have a reciprocal impact and 
generate similar actions on the part of the other. This cumulative reciprocal 
relationship can be plotted as a set of per capita arms expenditure curves 
leading to full-scale preparations, such that ultimately almost any minor incident 
is sufficient to precipitate open conflict between the opposing forces. Rapoport 
then drew a parallel with the arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in which he gave considerable weight, in the form of an analysis of
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the mathematical probabilities of war, to the argument that the arms race could 
well have led to ultimate mutual annihilation.6
Rapoport (1960) went on to discuss Game Theory in its use as a basis for 
American foreign policy. Game Theory is a mathematical method designed to 
account for the intentionality and rationality of human action. Given a situation 
that assumes competition, together with the logical premises of Game Theory, 
then the ‘what-to-do-in-case-of strategy principle provides a solution, a choice 
for the best course of action in such a situation of competition. Rapoport’s main 
criticism, however, was in the use of Game Theory, or its premises, as the basis 
for American Foreign policy. H demonstrated how a different view of the United 
State-Soviet Union relationship, i.e., one which sought “areas of validity” or 
agreement between the two value systems or what we have labeled subjective 
realities, could be exploited in an ultimate compromise between the two 
countries.
In terms of the model one can see that a certain typical subjective reality has 
governed the relationship between countries with opposing interests in situations 
that their political and military leaders have interpreted as competitive. This 
attitude has produced typical courses of action and interaction, which have often 
led to war. The formalization of this attitude in Game Theory and a careful 
analysis of the logic of that theory led Rapoport to question neither the statistical 
trends that interested him and Lewis F. Richardson in their study of conflict, nor 
the inherent logic of Game Theory itself, but the very subjective reality that 
produced those trends in the first place. His plea was reasoned scientific 
statement to the heads of state to view the situation in a different light, to change 
their subjective reality, for should these typical images continue to influence the 
actions of the heads of state, the forecast for the future would be open warfare.
Thus, given the pertinent conditions of the manifest reality in the form of a 
gradual trend to full armament, and given the typical subjective reality which has 
marked participation in such trends in the past, namely, a competitive view 
requiring ‘strategies’, the intentional acts of the typical actors, as well as the 
probable outcome of the situation itself, can be foreseen. Meanwhile it is not 
inconceivable that the force of Rapoport’s argument could in the long run, 
especially should a sufficient number of other scholars take up the cause, 
produce a change in the subjective reality of some heads of state. In such a 
case the model could be re-examined under new typicalities for changing 
outcomes that might be generated. At any rate when new information is
6 That the arms race, itself, led to the ultimate economic collapse of the Soviet Union 
whose smaller GNP could not sustain the ever increasing military expenditures, is, perhaps, 
fortunate for the history of war. But this does not alter the basic argument of Rapoport, nor the 
possibility that a future situation could arise where the economic potential of the opposing forces 
would be more equal and the outcome more catastrophic.
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available to typical actors, and should they be willing and able to give it this 
attention, as, for example, when events encourage them to do so, they would 
begin a re-examination of the manifest reality. And it is in this condition of a 
changing manifest reality that new or tentatively altered images are sought, and 
that social change characteristically arises.
Social Change in the Larger Context
We have been examining a model of social reality with regard to its applicability 
in specific cases. One of the assumptions implicit in the Schutz model is that 
change itself, as far as the social order is concerned, is at first largely 
unintentional and thus probably incremental. This, we have shown, results from 
the fact that common-sense humans act in a typical pre-interpreted ways even 
though the environmental conditions may be changing. Their actions, based in 
their subjective reality, tend to exert some force to bring the manifest reality into 
line with their view of it. But since they have knowledge of and control only a 
small portion of the larger environment, the possibilities of unintended change 
are always present, and this is the maladjustment about which Lippmann 
speaks.
The discussion up to now has prepared the ground for filling out the multi-aspect 
model of the social order. The Schutz model, it will be recalled, was sufficient to 
predict relatively small changes that might not necessarily produce a significant 
change in the typical subjective reality of the actors themselves. As the 
Richardson and Rapoport mathematical examples demonstrate, this might be 
sufficient to account for long run, perhaps repetitive trends of cumulative social 
change. Meanwhile, Rapoport’s main argument, indeed, the publication of his 
book, is a demonstration of how change not accounted for in the Schutz model 
might be provoked in the typical subjective reality of the important actors on the 
international political scene. Rapoport is offering a new image, which, however, 
is, communicated as a physical or environmental ‘event’ - the manifest 
appearance of his book, his reasoning. Since the political and military leaders 
may be exposed to, perceive, and be influenced by this information, a series of 
such manifest events, i.e., more publications, demonstrations, arguments, ever 
more destructive armaments, etc., might produce a change in the meaningful 
aspects which would gradually be translated into modified intentions and actions 
that could ultimately result in an altered manifest reality.
Generalizing on the specific case we may describe the over-all process of 
change. The three interrelated modes of social reality are referred to as the 
meaningful aspect, the intentional aspect and the environmental aspect. The 
meaningful aspect is defined as the code of ethics, the vision, the organizing 
concept, the set of images of self, society and nature, and may be thought of as 
the level of ‘actionless’ meaning. The intentional aspect, which derives from the
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meaningful aspect, is the human implementation of values and images, and 
their translation into typical courses of action, and may be thought of as the level 
of rehearsal, deliberation and plan. The environmental aspect, which derives 
from the intentional aspect, is the field or ground of facts and events, both social 
and natural, resulting in large part from the encounter of the intentional actions 
of men with each other and with the structured order of nature and society. The 
environmental aspect may be thought of as the level of ‘meaningless’ action.
The manner of influence is not causal nor is there an absolute correspondence 
among the three aspects implied. In each case the succeeding aspect grows 
out of the preceding one in a process of selection, interpretation and 
experimentation that is more or less typical for any social group in a given 
context at a particular time. Thus, it is not possible to say that variable A which 
is a value in the meaningful aspect will cause or even necessarily co-vary with 
variable A which is a typical intention related to A but within the intentional 
aspect, although there will undoubtedly be some correspondence. In other 
words, the meaningful aspect becomes the intentional through human 
deliberation and through orientation to action. Since this process is only 
humanly rational and not scientifically so, it will be oriented not to the sum total 
of possibilities in the environment, but to the interpretation of those possibilities 
based upon past experience and resting in the meaningful aspect.
Just as meaning becomes intention through a human process of rehearsal and 
plan, so intention becomes action (or a decision not to act) in a process of 
intention with the environment. The environmental aspect expresses the 
intentional act of an individual or group in relation to the intentional acts of others 
on the same scene, as well as in relation to the structure or order of nature that 
is pertinent within that context. The feedback through observation of the 
environment, which is channeled through the meaningful aspect results in a 
constant reassessment of intention even while the action, itself, is in progress 
(Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960). Thus the intention governs the action, yet 
never fully realizes itself. It “...carries along its horizon of empty anticipations” 
(Schutz 1962b, p.72). So likewise does selective perception and retention of 
the environment produce the meaningful aspect. Experience tells us what to 
perceive and how to perceive it. In the process this perception becomes 
incorporated in our experience and helps to determine what we will perceive in 
the future. Thus while what is in the environment will condition perception, it will 
not dictate by itself what will be selected and how it will be interpreted.
We have outlined a cycle which is a continuous process engaged in by the 
members of a social group, a process which in its shared typicality is common to 
all those members. This process is more or less integrated, depending primarily 
upon the scope of the environmental aspect. In closed traditional societies the 
social and natural environments incorporated in the three modes of social reality 
are strictly limited, in the first place by the small numbers of human actors and
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social situations that could be encountered, and secondly by the very restricted 
proportion of nature which is brought under the control of intentional human 
action itself (and not left to chance or the will of the gods). In modern open 
societies the numbers of fellow humans and their actions that have to be 
contended with, both directly and indirectly, are so great that adjustment in the 
three modes is almost a continuous process for those who wish to participate in 
the larger society. In addition, control of the natural environment is extensive 
and relegated to highly specialized actors whose actions are beyond the 
understanding, let alone interpretation, of most of the commonsense fellow 
humans in the same society. The result is a greater distance between the three 
aspects of any social group, and a greater likelihood that changes in its 
environment will go unnoticed and uninterpreted for longer stretches of time. 
The greater complexity of the environmental aspect demands more complex, 
hierarchical organization of the images in the meaningful aspect and hence 
more highly differentiated intentions and plans.
It is for these reasons that social change is seen most often as arising in the 
environmental aspect. Changes in the meaningful and intentional aspects lag 
behind. Over-all change evolves in a process whereby specific successful 
solutions to minor problems, though largely typical, gradually create behavioral 
trends, which themselves encourage slightly more innovative behavior. This 
behavior may gradually become inconsistent with the higher levels of the 
subjective reality or meaningful aspect. In this case personal maladjustment 
and efforts at reducing the inconsistencies gradually alter the images, especially 
at the lowest levels. An example of this process can be seen in Gunnar 
Myrdal’s observations on the Welfare State:
No development has been more unplanned than the gradual emergence and 
the increasing importance of planning in all the Western countries. Ideas and 
ideologies, theories and propaganda, political programs and political action 
directed consciously towards promoting planning, have played an altogether 
insignificant role... While admittedly the state and citizen, step by step, have 
been taking over more and more responsibility for the direction and control of 
economic life, they have been led by events, not by conscious choice 
(Myrdal, 1960, p. 19).
This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that events cause change or 
that they are somehow removed from the human actors who produce these 
events, but rather, that the accumulation of events which constitutes social, as 
distinguished from individual, change, is a product of subjective reinterpretation 
of the manifest reality by successive numbers of individuals whose actions are 
changing in response to these new images, and who may or may not be 
intending social change as such. Opinion leaders interested in change may play 
a critical role in this process by emphasizing and communicating their changed 
world-view, thus acting as catalysts among an expanding group of changing 
individuals, although social change does not depend necessarily upon any
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formal process of persuasion. Likewise, key decision-makers—those with 
power to influence the actions of others in a society or social group—have more 
than normal influence over events relating to change. Thus, in the Rapoport 
example cited above, political and military leaders could alter the cumulative 
trend toward war by decisions that minimize competitiveness, i.e., by decisions 
not to increase arms supplies, etc. But social change may also occur in spite of 
or in opposition to such decisions, as the large-scale opposition in the United 
States to the Vietnam War illustrated.
The problem of studying change within a social group is then one of identifying 
changes, often in the form of emerging trends (which may themselves arise 
from contact with other social groups), within the environmental aspect of the 
group. At the same time, the meaningful aspect must be surveyed for the stock 
of values and images that would probably be drawn upon by that group to meet 
the changing conditions of the environment or that would imply similar change in 
the future. This analysis could be continued through a series of future states 
resulting from successive interactions of meaning, intention, and action, to 
attempt to foresee when and if changes in the environment might reach crisis 
proportion, i.e., when major alterations in images might be necessary and likely. 
Finally, the range of such innovations in meaning available to the group either 
from its own “deviants,” e.g., scientists, poets, messianic leaders, etc., or from 
outside the group, e.g., the larger, international stock of scientific or spiritual 
images, must be surveyed for those that might, on the one hand, be more 
compatible with the existing subjective reality, and on the other hand, be likely to 
solve the crisis or series of crises that could be anticipated. Thus the cycle 
could be entered again to see where the intended actions would lead in efforts 
to produce a new environmental aspect. The actual search for appropriate new 
images would likewise have to allow for the characteristic ways in which people 
change their values and opinions. This would involve consideration of the 
nature of the communication processes of the group, the types of influence of 
opinion leaders, the level of sophistication of images with which the members of 
the group could deal, and so forth (Rogers, 1962).
Thus social change arises out of the nexus of a changing environment and a 
continuous re-interpretation of that environment by the human actors whose 
combined actions produce the environmental changes in the first place. Efforts 
at re-orientation generally proceed from the lower to the higher orders within the 
meaningful aspect. Accurate information about the environment aids that 
search, which emphasizes the importance of effective communication. 
Meanwhile, the potential open-mindedness of modern societies, coupled with an 
ever more elaborated and sophisticated stock of images, decreases the need 
for and likelihood of abrupt, large scale changes in the meaningful and hence 
Intentional aspect, in part because of the built-in flexibility of choice afforded by a 
wider range of past experiences. Hence, lower order or non-revolutionary 
change is for the most part continuous though gradual, marked along the way by
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successive minor shifts in direction and timing that can be fully appreciated only 
from a perspective on society that accounts for human involvement in that 
process.
Figure 10: The Process of Change
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CHAPTER 6
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF HEALTH AND DISEASE
Introduction
It is only slowly over the past several hundred years that human beings have 
developed a sense that they could participate in controlling disease, and it is 
only within the past century that they have had any marked success in doing so. 
Thus the idea that the fatefulness of disease could be moderated by human 
action is quite recent in human history and probably not shared by all the world’s 
population even today. The idea that human behaviour could actually create 
disease, as well as be instrumental in promoting its spread, is even more novel. 
Yet William McNeill’s (1976) account of the history of infectious disease and its 
importance to the success of European imperialism over the past four to five 
hundred years clearly shows the extent to which such an idea should be closely 
examined.
The stimulus for imperialism, apart from the technological advances in 
navigation and armaments that made it possible, was the development of 
industrial capitalism in Western Europe. The success of this unplanned but 
highly successful economic system produced a parallel explosion in knowledge, 
including scientific knowledge about nature. At some point specific inquiry was 
turned to the biological processes that attended disease. Following the 
discoveries of Pasteur and Koch, and particularly in the 20th century, science 
has been very successful in controlling infectious disease.
Modern medicine, inspired by these early successes and by the developing 
positivist paradigm of natural science, now often acts as an impediment to the 
further understanding of human health and disease (Navarro 1980). It fails to 
take account of the intimate relationship between poverty and disease (Hall 
1979), and to be concerned about devising health care strategies that will 
prevent disease at its source, i.e., the social or man-made environment that 
gives rise to it. It is true that complex forms of modem society tend to obscure 
the manner in which health and disease are social problems. Certain types of ill 
health such as occupational disease are easily recognised as human products, 
and certain segments of the medical community are more sensitive than others 
to the social implications of ill health. The prevailing attitude and certainly 
medical training tend to perceive health as a problem more or less exclusively 
within the realm of natural science. There is considerable resistance to any 
broadening of the scope of health care beyond the now conventional 
pharmacological and surgical intervention, particularly within the medical 
profession. This is true in spite of the fact that a social perspective on medicine
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has been a serious concern since the early nineteenth century and has probably 
been as important as the germ theory in conquering the infectious diseases that 
have preoccupied medical workers since that time (McKeown 1976).
Sanitary engineering and improvements in nutrition and family planning were, 
according to McKeown (1976), the important factors accounting for the long­
term decline in mortality from infectious diseases. These improvements can be 
traced to gradual adjustments by the new capitalist social order, some a product 
of its success such as the increase in food production, and some a victory over 
its neglect, such as the successful political struggle for the reform of sanitary 
conditions (Ringen 1979). Many solutions predated the microbiological 
discoveries of Pasteur and Koch, as well as the subsequent experimental work 
that established the basic principles of the germ theory of disease. This in no 
way diminishes the continuing importance of the germ theory nor its applications 
to disease control before and after the discovery of antibiotics. Rather, it is to 
emphasize that social medicine did not await such precise laboratory 
understanding in order to accomplish significant improvement in the state of the 
health of the populations served by its understandings and reforms.
Social Theory and Disease
Historical work in social medicine (as well as conventional knowledge in 
evolution theory and genetics) demonstrates that traditional or slowly changing 
societies are marked by a gradual adaptation to their environments. They also 
adapt to their own behavior as a social structure often as determinant as the 
physical environment in which they find themselves. Selectivity thus operates 
both in the relationship between human organisms and their physical 
environment, and in the relationship between these organisms and their social 
environment. The sickle cell as a defense against malaria would be an example 
of the former, while the evolution of the equilibrium between human host and 
microbiological parasite under the conditions of commerce as described by 
McNeill would be an example of the latter.1 Thus all societies may create and 
institutionalize social practices that constitute a maladaptation between selected 
individuals and their physical environments with the resulting potential loss of 
those types of individuals from the population. In this way modern societies 
sacrifice a portion of their populations to heart disease, cancer, accidents, etc., 
largely because of the social structures that characterize them.
1 McNeill (1976, p.7) further states that: “. . . the slow processes of evolution apply to human 
societies and their symbolic systems a much as to human bodies, so that when logic cannot 
decide, survival eventually will. Terms that direct attention to the critically useful facets of a situation 
clearly do have enormous survival value for human beings. It is this aspect of our capacity to 
communicate with one another that has allowed Homo Sapiens to become such a dominant 
species.” It is for this reason that it is so important to broaden the analysis of health and disease to 
include the social as well as biomedical perspective.
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The assumption that the health of a population results from the intersection 
between society and nature suggests a particular perspective on the problem of 
health. Human populations do not only adapt to natural environments in active 
and passive ways, but also have the possibility of creating and changing those 
environments, with or without information concerning the health implications of 
those changes. Whether or how a population uses information about health 
problems, deriving from its own behavior, which has created or modified its 
environment, is related to how that population is structured socially. This 
depends in particular on whether it is a population with a consciousness of its 
own power to change that environment if it wishes. This in turn is related to the 
way in which knowledge is structured in a society, with the question of who 
controls it, who may have access to it and who may ‘understand’ it. In short, 
however dramatic the contribution of either medicine or laboratory science to the 
understanding of human health, if there are no institutional means for translating 
this knowledge into social behavior which alters the conditions leading to ill 
health, the health problems will remain. Furthermore, so long as the medical 
profession has a vested interest in a biomechanistic definition of human 
phenomena related to health, it will be bound to emphasize therapeutic and 
preventive measures within such a framework. It will also be at a loss to confront 
problems for which there are no such techniques. To the extent that disease 
problems surpass this framework, health is not only a medical problem, but is 
also a problem of social theory and related social action.
There are two separate but related problems confronting an attempt to define 
disease as a social problem. One is sociological, having to do with 
understanding a social formation or the way in which a society is ordered, 
resources allocated, production and consumption organized, behaviour 
institutionalized, etc. The other is epistemological, having to do with how 
knowledge about the social formation and about disease as a social problem is 
to be gained.
To illustrate, modern medicine generally perceives mortality and morbidity in a 
natural science framework. Causal explanations by and large end at the level of 
the organism with epidemiology suggesting strategies for experimental research 
that will ultimately pin down the ‘true’ causes of disease. The idea that societies 
will actually produce different disease patterns is only of preliminary interest at 
best to this perspective. Thus to explain disease as a social problem one must 
first outline a theoretical framework within which this effort may take place. 
Involved would be the question of whether society is to be perceived as a “black 
box”, where only inferences about variables may establish cause and effect 
relationships, or whether conscious human participation in disease causation 
may be addressed as an issue in its own right, quite apart from the bio-medical 
evolution of any disease process.
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The contention here is that disease processes may be seen to originate in 
human behavior, and that a non-mechanistic socio-theoretical framework is 
required to explain the origins of that behaviour and the resulting patterns of 
disease. Thus, an attempt will be made to illustrate how the structure of 
organization of modern capitalist society leads to the predominance of certain 
forms of ill health, just as former social formations created their own 
characteristic diseases. The argument will take the form of an application of 
dialectic materialism to the problem of health and disease. This will require first 
the establishment of a theoretical-historical framework and subsequently 
application of this framework to modern capitalist society in relation to the 
problem of health. The first effort will be to review briefly the history of social 
formations leading to modern industrial capitalism and to recall some of the 
health patterns peculiar to each of those formations, and then to concentrate 
more specifically on the patterns of illness related to capitalist society today.
Institutionalization of Disease Risk Behaviour
A basic argument advanced here is that society creates health problems by 
institutionalizing certain forms of disease-risk behavior. Institutionalization refers 
to the human origins of the established order in any social setting. It is an order 
that is constructed or abstracted as a logical extension of the habitualization of 
successful behavior (See Chapter 2). Over time, habitual behavior becomes 
institutionalized first by generally succeeding in its purposes and second by 
being passed along through succeeding generations in the process of 
socialization. Socialization refers to the process of establishing appropriate 
behavior among the young through the use of rewards and punishment on the 
one hand, and the use of a canopy of symbols to explain that behavior, on the 
other. These symbols are embodied in language and serve to legitimize a 
particular social world. They establish a ‘symbolic universe’ in which it is proper 
and appropriate that the world be organized in this way, that behavior be in this 
form rather than in some other. Societies of great complexity can thus be 
organized and controlled by controlling the symbols that define and legitimize 
the reality of that society. Disease-risk behavior can therefore be institutionalized 
far beyond the reach of any well-meaning medical profession or enlightened 
citizenry. The individual may have a marginal, though not unimportant freedom 
within the institutionalized world, but it is a freedom that depends upon the rare 
ability to grasp the manner in which social reality is constructed, rare because 
institutionalizing processes are not likely to be also self-critical. To alter them 
often requires confrontation with no less than one’s own identity.
The seriousness of this confrontation with social identity can be appreciated by 
understanding the manner in which it is tied to the material base of society, for a 
social order does not arise out of thin air. As noted above, it arises gradually and 
continuously out of the successes and failures of the human endeavor to
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survive. One must, however, expand the references to the historical evolution of 
a set of practices and priorities that govern the basic ways of producing and 
consuming goods and services and the social relations involved; in short, the 
extraction of things from nature and their transformation into usable entities. 
This is the material base from which the institutionalized interdependencies of 
the social order are inescapably derived. Since material production must be 
perpetuated if a society is to survive, one can begin to grasp the urge to 
determinism that is inherent in all socialization and institutionalization. Thus, in 
order to turn these basic sociological principles into a useful historical analysis, 
one must answer the question as to why a particular social structure and its 
corresponding definition of reality are found in a particular time and place. The 
abstract concepts that explain social reality must be given concrete form; they 
must be placed in a historical context.
The History of Western Social Formations
As Western society has developed its institutionalized world, it has produced a 
modern technological order that has grown out of the past in a history 
characterised by a gradual progression from small scale agrarian to a mass 
industrial society. What marks this progression since the earliest recorded 
history is a continuous elaboration in the production of surplus. Hunting and 
gathering societies were know to have little surplus and, therefore, little ability to 
increase production and accumulation. Population densities were limited, and 
mortality and morbidity patterns were characterised by gradual adaptations to 
environmental factors, including serious nutritional deficiencies (Boyden 1970). 
Historically, infectious diseases may have wiped out entire hunting and 
gathering settlements, but rarely found the population density thresholds 
necessary to form chronic patterns (McKeown 1976, p.53).
The first real surpluses were created in the agricultural societies formed along 
the great flood plains of the Nile, the Tigrus and the Euphrates, the Indus and 
the Yangtze Rivers, starting from 7,000 to 5,000 B.C. Here fifty or more 
agricultural workers were needed to produce the surplus necessary to support a 
single person, but this was sufficient to create a class of people who exercised 
control over the production process and over the lives of those engaged in 
production. This control was ultimately formalized as the slave society, which 
also was marked by advances in technology and by elaborations in social 
organization.
Subsequent developments in production resulted in important changes in social 
form. The specialization of tasks in society created a gradual division of labour, 
which over time increased the interdependencies among the various members 
and classes of society. This division of labor and these interdependencies were 
in turn reflected in an increasing need for exchange and ultimately in the
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development of the market. The market, and commerce in general, facilitated 
communication and exchange, including the exchange of disease pools2. 
Because of the concentrations of population and their increased contacts, 
infectious diseases reached epidemic proportions, first in the Mediterranean and 
later in other parts of the urban world. Thus, as specialized goods were first 
bartered and subsequently impersonalized as commodities to be bought and 
sold, so also was disease brought to a new level of exchange. The evolving 
division of labor and the resulting formalization of exchange through the use of 
money were to have profound effects upon subsequent human history, even 
while disease was preying upon these urbanizing and developing populations.
Once goods and services were transformed into commodities, whose sole 
function was to be exchanged for other commodities and whose exchange value 
was then abstracted as money, the nature of human society was transformed. A 
new class of merchants set as its sole objective the accumulation of profit or 
surplus with little concern for the nature of the commodities that were being 
exchanged (Kay 1975). Mercantilism in turn encouraged improvements in the 
technology and efficiency of production, which in time created a class of 
industrial producers who were solely concerned with the production system.
The production system, as the term implies, is more complex than exchange. It 
includes, in addition to the technology of production, the industrial labour force 
itself (including the workers’ skills, education, welfare etc.), all of which have an 
ultimate bearing upon production. Thus, while the spirit of accumulation marked 
the birth of industrialism, it was tempered, in part, by broader concerns. In the 
first place the industrial accumulation was derived from the more formal and 
complex relationship between owners and workers. Surplus was gained not 
from buying cheap and selling dear but from selling the product for more than it 
cost to make it. If this production surplus or profit were too great it would 
threaten the welfare of the workers and be reflected in lower productivity, 
besides threatening the ability of the workers to buy the commodities that were 
produced.
Thus, in time the industrial bourgeoisie developed some concern about the 
health of its population since it became fairly obvious that the production of 
surplus and the long run success of accumulation would depend on that 
population. This may in part explain the successes of Chadwick and other 
reformers in bringing about the sanitary reforms in nineteenth century Europe, 
with the attendant first real success in dealing with disease as a social problem
2 According to McNeill (1976, p.55), “Person to person ‘civilized’ types of infectious diseases 
could not have established themselves-much before 3000 B.C. When they did get going, 
however, different infections established themselves among different civilized communities in 
Eurasia. Proof of this fact is that when communications between previously isolated civilized 
communities became regular and organized, just before and after the Christian era, devastating 
infections soon spread from one civilization to another...”
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among concentrated urban populations. While it is probably true that diseases 
were evolving and adapting along with their human hosts, it was industrial 
capitalism that brought the first concentrated effort to deal with disease on a 
societal level3. At the same time industrialism also benefitted from and 
encouraged and supported science, which in turn produced the first real 
understanding of disease mechanisms in the human body.
Disease Risk under Modern Capitalism
Today we find ourselves with a set of modern priorities, which represent the 
cumulative ‘wisdom’ of this long historical progression. These priorities are 
summarized in the center box of the diagram. Their wisdom focuses upon a 
narrowly defined rational order of social and economic life in which domination 
plays a key ideological and instrumental role (Leiss 1974). The human and 
biological implications of this rational order are only dimly perceived by the 
theorists who provide the key symbols that legitimize modern society.
Jacques Ellul (1964) characterizes this technological society as one given to 
over-standardization, rationalization, resolving in advance, reliance on method 
(not individuals), and the machine as the ideal or prototypical form. Political- 
economic theory has been replaced by methods and techniques such as 
econometrics, accounting, input/output, modelling, etc., and society has been 
reduced to an aggregate of probabilities and utilities. Individual behavior is 
anticipated (and manipulated) through opinion polls and various psychological 
techniques.
3 As Knut Ringen (1979, p.14) points out, this concern by the industrial bourgeoisie for the health of 
its workers was as much political as medical. ‘The health conditions were leading to a radicalization 
of the working class, he [Chadwick] said, for the epidemic diseases were weeding out those older 
members of the working class who had a ‘responsible’ view of the relationship between capital and 
labor, and the unions were being taken over by '... a population that is young, ignorant, credulous, 
irritably passionate and dangerous’ . . . Chadwick . . . felt strongly that sanitary reform was one 
means to stabilize a potentially revolutionary working class.” In addition, however, it was clear that 
the urbanization attendant upon the growth of the industrial capitalism both encouraged the 
conditions for epidemic diseases and increased the social overhead costs for dealing with their 
effects, to say nothing of the fact that in a city, after all, the wealthy may be as susceptible as the 
poor to vector bone disease.
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Anxiety and Stress
These polls and techniques are all pervasive in modern capitalist society and 
they influence a good deal of behaviour that places individuals at risk for 
disease. In other words, alcoholism, smoking, drug abuse, improper diet, lack of 
exercise, stress, even accidents are not simply chance occurrences. It is clear 
that a great deal of money is being spent to encourage people to smoke, to 
drink, to eat junk food, to drive big, fast cars, and so forth. There are people who 
work very hard to encourage others (and often themselves) to engage in this 
kind of behaviour. The advertising industry, for example, is a multi-million dollar 
industry composed of businessmen, social scientists, and artists. The 
businessmen are pragmatic, hardheaded and sophisticated accountants. They 
watch the weekly effects of their investments and do not make random 
decisions about advertising and marketing (Ewen 1976). Psychologists are also 
very important in the consumer society. They know the structure of stimulus- 
response and reward and punishment, and they use the accumulated 
experimental and theoretical knowledge of psychology in an effort to persuade 
people to engage in what often amounts to disease risk behavior.
Finally, there are the commercial artists, the people who are the technicians of 
the aesthetic, and more significantly from the standpoint of persuasion, the 
dramatic; those who understand, in other words, the importance of 
‘sociodramatic form’ (Duncan 1962). This form depends upon the natural cycle 
of introduction, tension, climax, and relax, a form that we find throughout nature 
and in the art of all societies. As an application in advertising, for example, we 
have ‘the lady next door’ who discovers dirt on her husband’s shirt. The laundry 
soap is presented, the shirt goes in the washing machine, and voila, the shirt is 
clean. Or a more subtle kind of sociodramatic form: a large billboard which may 
be seen in many black neighborhoods in the U.S.A., a billboard all in black with 
a beautiful, reclining black woman and a black man leaning over her. This sign 
is advertising Black Velvet whiskey, and the slogan underneath says, "Try Black 
Velvet on your neighbour!” One possible extension of these techniques of 
persuasion was described in a book called Subliminal Seduction (Key 1974), 
which outlined the extremes to which advertising persuasion could be carried. In 
short, consumerism constitutes one form of institutionalised behavior, which 
places people at risk for disease and health.
Consumerism is, however, but a recent aberration in human society, effective in 
persuading individuals who have been separated from their traditional reference 
groups. The basic material and ideological forces designed to isolate individuals, 
to destroy the primary group and the human community, have been at work for 
centuries. It was the gradual metamorphosis of the products of labour in the 
marketplace and ultimately of labour itself into commodities that marked the
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transformation to a modern capitalist society. Bookchin (1974) describes this 
transformation to
a society that dissolves the natural basis of civic life by transmuting the 
fraternal relations of the medieval commune into harsh commodity relations .
. . with the enormous physic a well as economic changes that were to be 
introduced by the capitalist mode of production. The commodity, like a 
mysterious external force, now seems to rise above men and determine their 
destiny according to a suprahuman autonomous law. With the increasingly 
problematic abstractions of labor from its concrete forms, all relations, objects 
and responsibilities acquire a monetary equivalent. Natural life shrinks from 
the community to the individual; the city becomes a mere aggregate of 
isolated human monads - a grey featureless mass, the raw materials of 
bureaucratic mobilization and manipulation . . . With the emergence of a 
highly monetized economy, human beings become interchangeable with the 
very wares that are the result of their human powers. They too become 
commodities, the passive objects - whether as workers or spectators - of 
economic laws.
While these material forces were at work, the philosophers were preparing the 
ideological base for the new social order. Macpherson analyzes seventeenth 
century English thought from Hobbes to Locke in which the basic philosophy of 
‘possessive individualism’ was first carefully laid out. These philosophers 
cleverly sought what amounts to a metaphysical basis for individualism and for 
the class order evolving in capitalist society at that time, Ironically, they sought 
this basis in physical nature, drawing upon their interpretation of the ‘laws of 
nature’ as a basis for the ‘nature’ of society. Accumulation and accumulative 
behaviour were thus claimed by Locke to be rational and natural within the “. . . 
condition of human life [which] necessarily introduces private possession of land 
and materials to work on.” (Macpherson 1962, p. 236) Furthermore, the class 
order that was derived from this accumulative behaviour, where advantages of 
any kind were turned to the expropriation of others’ labour, was considered to be 
equally natural. Thus, society as it appeared to these philosophers, with its basic 
division into property owners and propertyless workers, was well within the 
appropriate order of things and derivable, according to their logic, from natural 
law.
More recently, Social Darwinism (Hofstadter 1959) has provided the ideological 
basis for an alienated class society. This vulgar interpretation of biological law 
has rationalized much of the twentieth century exploitation that characterises the 
capitalist social order. Individuals find their place in society according to their 
‘natural’ abilities. If the material conditions of the more advantaged are superior 
it is because they are endowed with superior abilities. Life is a struggle for the 
upper hand, each individual pitted against every other in order to survive.
Insofar as these principles order the behaviour of individuals, separating and 
alienating them from one another, it is not surprising to find that stress disease, 
mental illness, and drug dependence and abuse are among today’s most
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common diseases. The main source of stress can be found in the workplace. 
Work has been reduced to a set of mechanical operations, which, as Ellul 
(1964) says, imply an absence rather than a presence. Here the clock is the 
most important invention. Once time has been quantified, workers can be 
ordered and controlled; they become extensions, indeed, are organized as 
models of, the machines that determine their work and lives. But control does 
not end here. Entire professional disciplines -industrial engineering an industrial 
psychology - devote themselves to the development of techniques for the 
manipulation and control of the work process. Incentive systems are invented to 
pit workers against each other in competition for prizes, all the while increasing 
production. Lie detectors, wiretapping, and psychological testing are used to
discover and weed out employees with potential personal and family 
problems, undesirable personal characteristics like aggressiveness or 
inquisitiveness, and union sympathies (Dollars and Sense, 1979).
These techniques are part of a long tradition to create a “flexible labour force .. . 
manipulated as required by the opportunities for investment and profit” (Eyer 
and Stirling 1977). This labor force began to move from the small-scale 
communities in the countryside to the market and subsequently industrial towns 
in England and northwest Europe as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. Rural to urban migration and the breakdown of the small scale 
community has characterized capitalist development since that time, and can be 
seen today in continuing south to north worker migrations in Europe and North 
America. These migrants, isolated from their communities, are isolated even 
further by language and cultural barriers and by the advancing specialization in 
the work process itself. Capitalism and industrial engineering add further 
impetus to the competitive, aggressive and hence fragmenting and diminished 
existence of the working class, which finds itself increasingly under the impact of 
physiological and psychological arousal without any means of resolving this 
tension.
Even as consumers of the products of their labor, these twentieth century 
populations were unable to experience the relaxation of this tension. They were 
coaxed and goaded to an endless striving for the ‘good life’, toward ever higher 
standards of material well being. Retailing and merchandising were 
revolutionized in the United States (as well as in Europe) with an emphasis on 
packaging and impulse buying. Complemented by an ever more sophisticated 
advertising technology and an elaborate credit system, the modern production 
system has created a consumer to suit its own needs. This is a consumer 
whose emotional needs can only (yet never) be satisfied through consumer 
goods, a consumer isolated from all social interaction by an ever more pervasive 
mass media that commercializes and trivializes all feeling and thought. This 
cultural domination is amplified worldwide through commercialization of the 
broadcast media (Schiller 1976). The metropolitan centres provide 
‘entertainment’ and the advertising messages that surround it. The content of
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both generates anxiety, relating either to sexual inadequacies and fantasies or 
to the romanticization of power and violence. Political affairs are reported as 
mindless events, and in-depth reports provide ‘all sides’ and no bases for 
judgement about why things occur.
Drug Dependence and Abuse
The overall effect of these cultural forces is reflected in the alienating and 
mindless producer, consumer and political roles that reduce the average citizen 
to apathy and fear. The anxiety that derives from this feeling of powerlessness is 
reflected in increasing rates of alcoholism and drug abuse, including especially 
smoking. Respiratory diseases, particularly lung cancer, heart disease, stroke 
and cirrhosis of the liver are directly related to these dependencies and are 
among the leading causes of death in industrial countries.
The tobacco industry, which in the United States alone sold over $17 billion 
worth of tobacco products in 1978, spends millions of dollars on advertising 
each year and hundreds of thousands on direct political lobbying. Nicotine, a 
physically addictive drug, works directly on the central nervous system. As 
Gwenda Blair (1979, p.33) says,
Cigarettes provide the ideal solution to the tedium of routine lower-level jobs:
At about ten minutes apiece (plus occasional coffee breaks to give the day a 
few high points), smokes not only help pace out a day - on the production 
line, in the typing pool, behind a lunch line - but they give you a steady flow 
of small rewards to keep on trucking. No wonder, according to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, cigarettes are the first luxury item poor people 
buy.
The alcohol industry, too, works hard to promote dependency. Most of the 
examples from Key’s book Subliminal Seduction were taken from the alcohol 
industry. At one point Anheuser-Busch, one of the largest brewers in the world, 
briefly introduced Chelsea, a new soft drink for children, which foams like beer 
when poured. Its 0.4% alcohol placed it just outside the limits of alcoholic 
beverages, but the intent was clearly to capture future addicts early in their lives.
The number of women alcoholics is also increasing in the United States, where 
they constitute half of the estimated 10 million addicts. With women, alcoholism 
is often combined with abuse of prescription drugs, particularly psychotropic 
drugs, anti-depressants, and amphetamines, indicating an uncritical participation 
by the medical profession in fostering these dependencies (St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch, 1977). Use of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is also widespread 
among Americans, particularly within the military. The latter is not surprising, 
given the role of the military and paramilitary in promoting the $500 billion global 
narcotics industry (McCoy 1972, Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada 1998, p.24).
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Mental Illness
Mental illness is a complementary, sometimes corollary, response to anxiety. 
Advancing rates of suicide, mental hospitalisation and even homicide are 
indications that this is also a growing problem. Dr. Harvey Brenner has shown 
that the state of the economy has had a great deal to do with the mental health 
of the population of the United States over the past century (Brenner 1973). This 
is particularly true for the poor, who are, of course, most likely to suffer un- or 
under-employment even when the economy is doing well.
Stress Diseases
Finally, for those who do not react to anxiety with drug abuse or mental illness, 
there is a host of stress related physical pathologies ranging from coronary heart 
disease to ulcers and possibly cancer. As Eyer and Stirling (1977) have 
demonstrated, it is primarily the young (ages 15-30) and the poor who suffer the 
greatest stress and corresponding elevations in death rates because of the 
unstable economic conditions in the capitalist world. It is they who are poorly or 
inappropriately trained for the increasing number of white collar or service jobs, 
and who are unprepared for the growing uncertainty in their sector of the job 
market.
In response to this worsening of conditions, there has been a decline of 
marriage, increased marital breakdown, and a dramatic fall in the birth rate, 
accompanied by a rise of illegitimacy. These changes are themselves further 
sources of stress (Eyer and Sterling 1977, p.31).
Accidents
Drug abuse has the further misfortune of correlating highly with motor vehicle 
accidents. This is true, of course, because of the supreme importance of the 
automobile in the capitalist world. In 1973 there were 3.5 million workers in the 
automobile industry worldwide and together they produced upwards of 40 million 
cars in that year (Bloomfield 1978 ). General Motors at one time had an annual 
budget exceeded by only a half-a-dozen countries in the world. The automobile 
has completely transformed the western city and is increasingly altering cities all 
over the world in the same way. Eighty percent of Americans depend upon the 
automobile for their journey to work. The automobile determines urban 
residential patterns and even commercial and industrial patterns.
This 20th century transformation of the city would not have occurred without a 
significant intervention by the state at all levels. The automobile runs on 
channels - public streets and highways - that are provided by the state. This
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substantial investment is hidden from the car buyer though it is collected 
ultimately through a series of taxes. As a means of public conveyance the 
automobile is the least efficient in terms of person-costs per distance travelled. 
Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of individuals are killed and injured every 
year because of automobiles, and nearly everywhere where pollution is a 
problem, the automobile is a serious contributor.
The tremendous costs of pollution and accidents are borne by the people of 
capitalist societies so that this critical industry can survive; and the cost is borne 
willingly and eagerly because the automobile adds yet another attractive means 
of escape from the alienated life of these societies. As a final irony, the 
automobile contributes to an increasingly sedentary lifestyle, which is more and 
more recognised as a contributor to heart disease and stroke.
Pollution
As societies develop and industrialise, the state at all levels more and more 
mediates this process. Under socialism this role was formalized and the 
attendant responsibilities were clearly recognized, but under capitalism this has 
occurred in a much more haphazard way. Nevertheless, the state in capitalist 
societies regulates the economic process and therefore participates in the 
distribution of the benefits and costs of this process as much as in socialist 
countries. The philosophy of liberalism and neoclassic economic theory tend to 
obfuscate this role by referring to it as ‘government intervention’, but monopoly 
business knows well its importance. The provision of streets and highways 
mentioned above is one example of this. Equally important is the management 
and regulation of the production process in relation to the overall social welfare 
of society. In the industrialised and industrialising countries, the contradictions 
between production and welfare are seen in the health costs of pollution and 
occupational hazards. It is widely agreed for example, that pollution of various 
kinds accounts for the majority of cancer deaths. In 1977, the World Health 
Organization estimated that each year 4.5 million people were dying of cancer 
worldwide and that six million were developing the disease. For Europe where 
the data are quite reliable, it was estimated that 14 million died during the 
1970’s.
One of the leading causes of this large number of cancer deaths may be the 
increasing use of nuclear energy. A 1978 study by Ernest Sternglass of the 
University of Pittsburgh Medical School showed that increases in cancer rates 
were greater in the less urbanized and otherwise less polluted states, which, 
however, had greater development of nuclear power (Mother Jones 1978). 
Nuclear power is deadly in all stages of its development and use (Caldicott 
1979). Mining emits a radioactive gas called radon, which is inhaled by the 
miners, and mining produces huge piles of waste, which again produce radon.
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But the enrichment and fuel fabrication process are the most dangerous, for 
here the deadly plutonium is produced. Plutonium also enters the lungs of its 
victims. With a half-life of 24,000 years it can produce cancer over and over 
again for countless generations. Breeder reactors continuously increase the 
amount of plutonium, and at this time there are no known means of permanently 
storing or disposing of if. Even the waste from the enrichment process contains 
dangerous radioactive elements such as radioactive iodine, strontium 90, 
cesium and other highly toxic radionuclides, all of which are cancer-causing 
agents.
For industrial workers, radioactive materials are but one category of hazards in 
their work environment. In 1978 alone, 100,000 American workers died from 
job-related injuries and illnesses (Shirk 1978). The National Cancer Institute and 
the National Institute of Environmental Sciences reported at the time that 
between 20 and 38 per cent of cancer deaths, or 80,000 per year, resulted from 
exposure to carcinogens used in industry. Asbestos was then one of the most 
important carcinogens, affecting over four million American workers, but there 
are over 2,000 other known or suspected cancer-causing agents as well. Of 
these, the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Agency had regulated only 20; 
clearly in he United States at least, there has been no intention to resolve the 
production-welfare contradiction in favor of the latter.
In the developing capitalist countries the situation is even worse, for there are 
virtually no regulations at all. The history of occupational and environmental 
pollution is short, of course, so that the long run effects will take years to appear; 
but whereas political reformists have some margin for success in the political 
institutions of the metropolitan centres, in the countries of the periphery there is 
virtually no opportunity at all. Many of these countries are under dictatorships or 
threatened by them, and in any case their parliaments are often sold out to the 
multinational corporations. Thus, the future effects of pollution should be even 
more disastrous for these countries, adding to the existing burden on their 
inadequate welfare systems.
Infectious Diseases
In the tropical countries, in particular, the inadequacies of welfare investment 
are reflected in elevated mortality and morbidity rates from infectious diseases.
Except for a variety of newly discovered viral diseases and several resistant 
strains of older infections, the technology for controlling these diseases is well 
known. It is a technology related to immunization, nutrition and sanitary reform, 
and wherever these diseases are serious problems, it is the lack of this kind of 
investment that is important.
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There is good reason to believe that for developing countries, the lack of 
investment in public health is a direct result of imperialism, both for today and in 
the past (Doyal and Pannell 1976). Since the same diseases were conquered in 
the past in Europe and North America as a result of the improvement in the 
living conditions, then it must be lack of such improvements in the third world 
countries that accounts for their persistent importance. Furthermore, it was 
mainly in those countries that had broken with the world capitalist system - 
Cuba, Vietnam, China - that mortality rates from infectious diseases had 
decreased substantially. Ironically, most third world countries have actually 
contributed, through their exploited labor, to the improvement of health in the 
imperial centers. While slavery was the most blatant example of this, the 
process of using third world labour for first world accumulation continues even 
today. A good example of this exploitation is found in the Sahel, a region along 
the southern edge of the Sahara in western Africa. There, periodic famines 
claim the lives of hundreds of thousands even while the region is exporting 
barley, beans peanuts, cotton, fresh vegetables, and beef (Lappe and Collins 
1977). During a drought, relief food may be coming into the Sahel on the same 
planes that are carrying these commercial crops out!
Malnutrition and Hypernutrition
Malnutrition and infectious diseases are closely linked, particularly in relation to 
infant mortality, which generally accounts for as many as half of the deaths in 
the third world countries. Multinational companies such as Nestle, Abott, 
American Home Products, Bristol-Meyers and Cow and Gate have contributed 
to the infant mortality rate in a particularly insidious manner. In pushing baby 
formula they encouraged third world mothers to accept an expensive substitute 
for their own milk. The special prerequisites of pure water, sterilization 
procedures, and exact measurements can hardly be met among these 
populations, many of whom are illiterate. The cost encourages the mothers to 
dilute the formula and this, in combination with the unsanitary conditions, has 
resulted in a three-fold increase in infant mortality and morbidity among these 
‘bottle babies’. Infant malnutrition is observed after eight months instead of two 
years as in the past, with resulting chronic diarrhoea and other symptoms.
Thus, the multinational companies use cheap labour and unscrupulously market 
their goods in the third world countries, following policies that they have 
developed on their own poor and uneducated populations through these 
practices. By directing needed public investment from disease prevention they 
contribute more than anything else to the pattern of infectious and nutrition- 
related diseases throughout the world.
Since the nutrition-robbed products of the food industry are equally available 
throughout the world, there is a growing suspicion that various forms of hyper-
122
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
and malnutrition-related diseases plague the populations of industrial countries 
as well. Nutrition is likely to be one of the key variables in a prevention-oriented 
medical care system. That is, with the environmental dangers of pollution, 
stress, infection, etc., it may become increasingly necessary to defend oneself 
through carefully planned nutrition. Often, this may mean nothing more than 
returning to more traditional foods, such as the high fibre foods that were 
common before hyper-refining became necessary to protect the long shelf life of 
the products of the monopoly food industry. But it would also probably entail 
more careful long-term research on the effects of specific nutrients on aspects 
of human chemistry, physiology and disease pathology (Williams 1971).
Meanwhile, epidemiological evidence from a host of sources implicates nutrition 
as a key health variable. One unusual source was a study of U.S. Navy pilots 
held prisoner in North Vietnam whose health was compared with a carefully 
selected group of non-prisoner fliers, alike in all other respects. The prisoners, 
who followed an austere diet and exercise programme with little or no alcohol or 
tobacco, were significantly healthier than their ‘free’ controls in half a dozen 
areas: glandular problems, heart disease, genito-urinary disease, bone and joint 
difficulties, and others, including headaches (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1977).
A longer-term study of mortality among Seventh Day Adventists in California 
showed similar results (Phillips 1975). The Adventists are vegetarians and use 
no alcohol or tobacco. They also have a strongly supportive socio-religious 
context in which these practices are encouraged and supported. In a study of 
50,000 Adventists aged 35-and-over, compared to the entire California 
populations of the same age who died during the years 1958-65, it was found 
that the Adventists had mortality rates ranging from only 5 percent of the 
California total for mouth, throat and larynx cancer to 72 percent in the case of 
breast cancer. The Adventists death rate for all causes in the 35-and-over age 
group was 59 percent of that for the total California population with the result 
that Adventist men had six years more life expectancy at age 35 and women 
three more years than the California men and women respectively.
But Adventist behaviour is abnormal in North American society, as must be the 
behavior of anyone seeking a healthier diet and lifestyle. More common is the 
person who lives as modern capitalism socializes him or her to live: in a polluted 
environment; under stress from traffic, work and debt; seeking escape through 
drugs, fantasy or consumerism; eating the junk food that is readily and cheaply 
available; and hoping that the probabilities that combine these risks into disease 
will be true for others but not for oneself.
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Conclusion
In this context disease-risk behavior is no longer an abnormality. Abnormal is 
the person who seeks to avoid paying the heavy price for membership in 
modern capitalist society. Yet now humankind has the social and intellectual 
capacity to create a social order free of many of these risks, a capacity which it 
has used over the past hundred years to free itself from so many of those 
infectious disease risks that plagued earlier generations. A simple germ theory 
of disease and a mechanistic social science do not constitute the theoretical nor 
ideological canopy under which such a social order could be created, however. 
We must now begin to understand how society is like a complex tapestry, 
structured through our own intentions and behavior, and to examine consciously 
the priorities and effects inherent in that behavior.
What this implies is that health is no less a political-economic problem today 
than it was in Chadwick’s time. The refusal of most health related professionals 
to see this connection and to concern themselves with understanding the 
disease implications of modern capitalism is one of the greatest obstacles to 
improved health today. While this is ironically true even for the inhabitants of 
advanced capitalist societies, it is grotesquely true for the less developed 
countries, which supply the cheap raw materials and labor to keep the advanced 
capitalist economies going. There the conditions of exploitation and super­
exploitation (Gunder-Frank) maintain pre-industrial patterns of poverty, 
malnutrition and disease while introducing the new forms of illness described 
above. It is painfully clear that only a transformation in the perception of health 
as a social problem in the broadest sense will allow this problem to be 
comprehended and solved in terms appropriate to its scale and origin.
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PROLOGUE - PART TWO
To review the argument to this point, it is claimed that planning is a form of 
social intervention designed to help (re)organize society, often, though not 
always, in its spatial effects. Its purpose is to improve the state of society in 
some significant way. Often enough it does not give sufficient attention to the 
possible inequitable effects of its actions, i. e., some people might benefit while 
others suffer as a result of planning interventions. Usually these benefits and 
costs are measured in political-economic terms, though there are other social 
and psychological benefits and costs that could be accounted for if planning 
were conceived in a more humanistic framework. As an intervention planning 
has an obligation to know the social world into which it is projecting itself. As I 
have argued in the above chapters there is more than one way of knowing the 
social world. The ‘outside’ view of positivism gives vital descriptive information 
on a large scale, and this information is indispensable for proper planning 
strategies. At the same time, knowledge from within the phenomenological 
framework would help planning to appreciate that the social world is composed 
of people who do things in meaningful and purposeful ways, i.e., that descriptive 
patterns, however complex and unintended they might be, are always the 
product of individual actions, thoughts and purposes. Furthermore, there is a 
differential and unequal distribution of power to accomplish one’s purposes. 
That is, different people have different political-economic abilities and resources 
to accomplish their goals.
Ultimately, however, even powerful individuals are locked into the same 
structure of institutionalized behavior that controls everyone in the social world. 
In short, they cannot act in any way they please. They must use their power 
according to the structured rules, formal or informal, of the social system to 
which they belong. Indeed, they gain their power because, in their social roles, 
they represent these structured rules. However, as this structured system is not 
a mechanism, i.e., does not in the final analysis succumb to natural law, 
planning must understand how these structures are created and maintained 
socially. They must understand the use and manipulation of symbols, and the 
rhetorical importance of all communication in this respect. Planning enters this 
‘conversation’, as Burke calls the social struggle, with its own communicative 
resources. An engineering view of this process will permit only the use of a 
technocratic language, a language that has its own rhetorical impact, of course. 
But a technocratic language, though filled with mystery, hence power, is also 
alienating. It is ill suited for democracy. Assuming that the latter is important, i.e., 
that planning, itself, is not alienated from its social (as distinguished from its 
scientific) role, then it must sharpen its understanding of these different 
perspectives on society. It must use all the epistemological resources it can to 
attain this understanding, and then learn how to share this knowledge so that 
planning may contribute to, rather than inhibit democracy. Part Two of this book 
will address this important issue.
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CHAPTER 7
SOCIAL STRUCTURES AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
Introduction
To turn economistic, technocratic planning into a more humanist endeavor 
would require attention to the ways in which society is structured at every level, 
from the individual to the collective. It would require treating individuals as 
human beings with consciousness and intention, and society as a product of that 
consciousness and intention, however misinformed and misdirected they may 
be on occasion. In fact, one major challenge for a humanistic planning would be 
to find ways to confront m/sinformation and dispel it so as to better inform 
collective intention and action. This would require research and understanding 
about the existing state of society, the forces working to structure it in various 
ways, forces that are often unknown or only partially understood by the people 
who compose, indeed create it, as well as about the existing state of social 
theory that seeks to explain these forces at both the individual and social level.
Informing collective intention and action is not, however, a simple technical 
procedure. It requires public discourse, a dialectic that can illustrate complex 
technical information in humanistic terms. This requires translation, a process 
that is well known to artists, writers and dramatists, but suppressed in the 
technocratic world of positive science and bureaucratic planning. This chapter 
will attempt to introduce the path to such a humanistic theory of planning by 
looking briefly at the structures and forces that appear to characterize 
contemporary society at the turn of the century. Chapter 8 will examine the 
current state of planning theory, while Chapters 9 and 10 will attempt to theorize 
a more humanistic, participatory approach to planning itself.
Objective Reality at the Turn of the Century
The 20th century began and ended with capitalism as the dominant force on the 
world scene. Its purposes, its forces, have influenced, and in most cases 
determined the social structures in developed and under-developed countries 
alike. At the beginning of the century its major forces - industrialization, 
urbanization and mass society generally - were the focus of concern by artists 
and social theorists. Gustav Le Bon's book La Foule, (1897) (The Crowd, or The 
Mob), among others, inspired much concern about the loss of tradition and of 
culture generally, that the evolution to mature capitalism seemed to entail. 
Tratner (1995) describes the ways in which major writers at the turn of the
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century confronted these issues. Some sought a return to authoritarian 
structures of the past where paternalistic authoritarian leaders might supply the 
guidance lost in the impersonal mass society. Others, influenced by Marx's 
analysis of capitalism, sought a classless, socialist solution. But more than 
anything, the idea of the crowd became a metaphor for the uncontrollable, the 
unknown and the unpredictable. Lost would be both the power of tradition as a 
stabilizing force and the 'gentile' parliamentary debate as a means for resolving 
conflict.
By the end of World War I it appeared that the crowd could also be a force for 
positive change. Thus, as Tratner (1995, p.15) says, "before the war, many 
modernists and most politicians in government feared being drowned by the 
masses; after the war, they feared being left out of the mass movements 
transforming society". Thus, mass society, the characteristic form of the 20th 
century, would become the object of extensive analysis by social scientists and 
others, leading to new "techniques of representation and address [that] this 
analysis made possible" (Tratner, 1995, p.21). Capitalism, itself, supplied the 
inspiration for these new techniques, as it sought to forestall economic crises of 
overproduction by turning society into a mass of consumers. The forms 
developed by advertising became the forms of modernist literary technique, as 
they would ultimately become the forms of all the mass media in the 20th 
century.
Advertising has shown that the mass mind is influenced by utterly bizarre 
images and words. Politicians have borrowed such tactics, moving more and 
more toward the Imagist poetry of 'sound bites' as modern media have become 
more and more mass media . ... If we extract 'sound bites' from modernist 
works, we find moments quite as propagandistic, pandering, randomly violent, 
titillating and banal as anything in any ad. Modernist works are full of short 
passages that would be at home in horror movies, pornography, or late night 
TV, just as advertising juxtaposes images from Shakespeare, Wagner, the 
Bible and T. S. Eliot as freely as did Eliot himself (Tratner, 1995, p.27).
More revealing was the modernist belief that "if they wrote in clear, easily 
comprehensible, realistic forms, they would be disconnected from the masses, 
thus merely serving the nineteenth-century capitalist system" (Tratner, 1995, 
p.27).
This approach to commercial and artistic communication has evolved 
throughout the 20th century, reaching its most extreme forms in postmodern art 
and literature. Its purpose is anything but pedagogic, where complex ideas 
would be simplified in the service of education and democracy. Its purpose is to 
impress, to dazzle, to confuse, to disorient, so that conscious thought can be 
replaced by unconscious impulses, which in their commercial form is an impulse 
to shop, to consume.
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Capitalism has a simple, straightforward agenda: to invest capital in the search 
of profit, to be repeated in a subsequent reinvestment of capital, plus the earlier 
profit, in the search for more profit, and a continuous accumulation of wealth 
generally. In this pure form there is absolutely no concern for the human and/or 
environmental costs of this process. Under industrial capitalism, capital is 
invested in production of goods and services, and it is still assumed by most 
economists - or at last their methodologies betray this assumption - that, as 
stated by Say's Law, the income generated by labor in the production process 
would insure that there would be a market for the goods and services produced. 
Keynes thought otherwise and the welfare state was the product of his and other 
pragmatic efforts to circumvent or enhance the market so that capital could 
continue to be invested for a profit.
Korten (1999, pp.47-48), in fact, documents the multifarious ways in which this 
welfare concept has been shifted from the people to capital itself over the 20th 
century in order to keep the system afloat. Subsidies range from extensive 
infrastructure investments covered by local taxpayers, to tax breaks, to 
extensive health and environmental costs covered by governments, to massive 
corporate 'bail outs' to protect against bankruptcy, to outright graft and theft by 
insurance and defense contractors, to say nothing of the extensive use of the 
war machine to insure 'proper conditions' for investment by US companies 
overseas. Korten (1999, p.48) cites figures from Estes that suggest that 
corporate welfare in the USA may be as much as five times greater than 
corporate profits, amounting in 1994 to $2.6 trillion vs. $530 million in profits, 
and these figures do not include direct subsidies and tax breaks. This corporate 
welfare constituted 37% of US GDP in 1994, and when extrapolated to the 
whole world would suggest something like a $10.7 trillion subsidy to maintain 
capitalism as a system. Thus, Korten concludes that:
. . . although capitalism claims to be an engine of wealth creation, in fact its 
primary vehicle, the corporation, is more accurately described as a powerful 
engine of wealth extraction - its profits dependent on imposing enormous costs 
on the rest of society, so that a few top executives and large shareholders may 
enjoy unconscionably large financial rewards. If market rules applied, most of 
the dominant corporations would have long ago found themselves unable to 
cover their own costs and gone bankrupt or been restructured into smaller, 
more efficient firms.
Finally, Korten (1999, p.54) explodes the myth that the stock market has 
anything to do with capitalism as a mode of production. In 1993, according to the 
Federal Reserve, only 4% of capital raised by US public corporations came from 
the sale of new shares. The rest was obtained from ", . . borrowing (14%) and 
retained earnings (82%)". Corporations actually spent more money buying back 
their own shares than they received from issuing new stocks. As Korten (1999, 
p.54) says,
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... the stock market is a sophisticated gambling casino with the unique feature 
that through their interactions the players inflate the prices of stocks in play to 
increase their collective financial assets and thereby their claims on the real 
wealth of the rest of society.
In any case, capitalism unleashed powerful forces that have both enhanced and 
threatened life on the planet. The successes and failures are quite well known 
by now. By the end of World War II there was no longer much hope, except in 
certain quarters, that a return to traditional 19th century social forms was 
possible. By the end of the 20th century there seemed to be no viable alternative 
to capitalism for managing mass society. National socialism of the German and 
Italian variety was short-lived and most state socialist experiments collapsed 
under their own weight by the end of the 1980s (with a lot of help from the 
advanced capitalist countries, of course). These two efforts at managing mass 
society did solve certain problems such as unemployment and the recurrent 
crises of realization, i.e., the lack of adequate investment opportunities for 
capital, that have always plagued capitalism, and they did create a more 
equitable distribution of (sometimes limited) goods and services than the free 
market system could achieve. Moreover, in the case of Germany, Hitler not only 
solved these problems at home but almost instantaneously in the other capitalist 
countries as well. The 'secret' remedy was war, and the war machine, which has 
dominated the West, and particularly the United States since that time. Dwight 
D. Eisenhower warned in 1960 of the increasing influence of the military- 
industrial complex in American society, but no American president since then 
has pointed to this problem. The fall of communism in the late 1980s was 
supposed to bring a 'peace dividend' to the US, but William Clinton was so 
ridiculed, publicly, on military matters, that he never gave such an agenda 
serious attention. The result is that the military budget in the US is now well over 
$400 billion, and accounts for more than 50% of the federal budget annually. 
Military armaments also constitute the largest trade item on the world scene, 
amounting to something between $700 and $800 billion annually (Korten, 1999, 
p.33), followed by narcotics and petroleum at more than $500 billion each.
Needless to say, in a socio-dramatic sense, a war machine requires war, and 
war requires an enemy. The McCarthy witch-hunt just after World War II was a 
socio-dramatic event sufficient to serve as a reminder until 1989, and various 
rogue leaders, 'human rights abusers' and, more recently, international terrorists 
have supplied the necessary enemies to maintain this war machine into the 21st 
century. In a practical sense, the war machine also works to resolve conflict 
amongst competing capitalist nation states. Large scale warfare of the sort 
presented by the two World Wars in the 20th century is precluded in the nuclear 
age, but 'low intensity' warfare allows continuous experimentation and 
'demonstration' by the US of its willingness to use nuclear-tipped guided 
missiles, chemical weapons such as Dioxin, or whatever, when necessary, to 
protect its national ‘interests’.
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Capitalism is an aggressive, competitive system. The accumulation of wealth in 
this system requires control over resources, both human and natural. It requires 
technologies that will enhance this control. Social structures at the turn of the 
century are, thus, dominated by these requirements. The war mentality plays an 
indispensable role in these structures, from Hollywood to the football field. War 
and conflict supply the sensational news sought by all newscasters, they supply 
escapist entertainment for stressed-out individuals in mass society, satisfying 
that need for a little extra something that consumerism, nicotine, caffeine, 
alcohol, sex, or whatever, leaves unsatisfied.
Depending upon where one or one's parents are in the social hierarchy, he or 
she will be plagued by a need for security or for affiliation, either of which will 
create a susceptibility to emotional manipulation, whether political, religious or 
commercial, of the sort described by George Orwell and Aldus Huxley, those 
mid-20,h century authors who had such insight into the social psychology that 
would come to fruition in the latter part of the century, not under socialism as 
they imagined, and where the manipulation was crude and clumsy, but under 
capitalism. Here it has been honed into a refined set of techniques, combining 
survey and market research with highly sophisticated socio-drama to bring large 
populations into the proper frame of mind where they can be manipulated and 
watched over by 'Big Brother'.
But neither the war machine nor consumerism has been sufficient to ward off 
completely the recurrent crises of realization for capital, though both are still in 
full force in the increasingly debt-ridden populations of the globalized capitalist 
world. As a result, financial capital has taken increasing control of the capitalist 
system, generating a 'casino' mentality and an unbounded regime of 
speculation. This has been accompanied by an increasing concentration of 
capital, a natural outcome of competition in any case, as mergers, takeovers 
and bankruptcies dominate the landscape of the production system. New 
technologies are indispensable to this process and to its globalization, as 
centralized control is extended over most of the natural and human resources of 
the world. The new ‘Wizard of Oz’ is in the computer, which contributes so many 
of the new ‘whistles and bells’ that allow this to happen.
Ronald Dore (2000) characterizes this new evolution as 'stock market 
capitalism', which he attributes as much, if not more to 'political will', as to the 
forces of globalization and technical change. This political will he sees embodied 
in a key set of policies put into force in the USA and UK since 1980 (Dore, 2000, 
P-5):
• lower taxes and smaller government
• improved national competitiveness through encouragement of a spirit of 
enterprise
• belief in the superior efficiency and justice of allocation through 
competitive markets rather than through politics and administration.
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He also adds 'consumer sovereignty' to the last item, hopefully with 'tongue in 
cheek'. The 'good society' in contrast to that suggested by Keynes and the 
welfare state, will be ensured by a return to the idea of the 'invisible hand1, which 
has always been accompanied by the war machine and its all too visible fist. 
Dore (2000, p.10) traces the shift from stakeholder, as the name implies, those 
who have a stake or an interest in the viability of an enterprise, including 
everyone from employees, to suppliers, to creditors, to customers and local 
communities, etc, to shareholder values, as those to be maximized by the new 
managerial class. Managers are ‘bribed’ to change their allegiance from the 
company to the shareholders through stock options and performance bonuses, 
as much as by salaries. What this results in is "an economy centered on the 
stock market as the . . . measure of national well-being, as opposed to an 
economy which has other, better, more pluralistic criteria of human welfare for 
measuring progress toward the good society" (Dore, 2000, p.10). It is outside 
the scope of capitalism to be much concerned about human welfare in any case, 
and pragmatic adjustments to the contrary in the past are now likely to be 
washed away by the new rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank, as well as by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Meanwhile, not all the world has jumped onto this Anglo-American bandwagon. 
Japan and Germany, as well as the rest of continental Europe, have resisted the 
total abandonment of the welfare system implied by finance-led Anglo-American 
globalization. Much of Dore's book is an argument that the shift to stock market 
capitalism may, in the long run, prove to be more destructive than creative, in 
the Schumpeterian sense. Unfortunately, this discussion is still within the 
framework of growth as the 'mantra' of all economic theory and business 
practice, and whatever course the stock market versus welfare capitalist contest 
takes, it will largely ignore the environmental and deeper human costs of such a 
perspective.
All of this is played out differently in the Third World, where promises of the 
good society to be brought about by 'democracy' and the 'free market' society 
are even more questionable. The 'free market system' is 'free' in many different 
senses. In Third World countries it is 'free', i.e. open to entrance by transnational 
capital that is 'free' to compete with smaller, localized capital with all the 
inequality that such competition implies. Transnational capital is 'free' from any 
constraints by government at any level. It is 'free' to ignore, or to impose on local 
governments, infrastructure requirements that accompany its investments. It is 
'free' to ignore any social or environmental costs that might be a result of its 
production activities, e.g. unemployment, health and safety hazards, pollution, 
etc.; it is 'free' to support local political leaders who will grant any necessary 
concessions; and so forth (Bauzon 1992, pp.9-10).
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The result of the 'New World Order1 which has been created by the 'free market' 
system is that most of the Third World is worse off today than it was forty to fifty 
years ago when development first became a concern for international 
organizations. Bauzon (1992, p.11) reports that Africa has suffered the greatest 
losses, with problems related to . . deforestation, desertification, drought, drop 
in export earnings, severe indebtedness, and civil wars." Latin America has 
suffered less but is still burdened by an enormous external debt whose service 
requires up to 10% of national incomes, with accompanying declines in GNP 
and resulting severe problems of". . . malnutrition, infant mortality and disease". 
Asia is more complex, with substantial growth recorded in the 'Asian Tigers', at 
least until the mid 1990s' recessions, but with other Asian countries such as the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia suffering declines or stagnation in GNP. 
Bauzon (1992, p.15) claims that the concept of the 'New World Order' is little 
more than a ". . . rhetorical shroud to conceal . . . hegemonic aims" in a neo­
colonial, corporate-controlled world system.
This argument is carried even further in Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith's 
(1996) and David Korten's (1999) extensive critique of the world capitalist 
system. As Korten (1999, p.1) says, "In the 1980s capitalism triumphed over 
communism. In the 1990’s it triumphed over democracy and the market 
economy". On a global scale this has been accomplished through policies of 
'restructuring' and deregulation as formalized in the rules of GATT and the 
WTO, as an extension of the same policies introduced under the regime of 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the USA and the UK in the 1980s. 
These policies succeeded in forestalling the crises of realization in these 
countries by shifting profit making from the industrial to the financial sector, 
unleashing a wave of speculative activity that has lasted into the 21st century. 
This new concentrated capital was available for overseas investment and 
required a global structure to allow this to happen. While successful, at least 
temporarily, in narrow economic terms, the social and environmental costs have 
been enormous, characterized by Mander and Goldsmith (1996, p.4) as:
the spreading disintegration of the social order and the increase of poverty, 
landlessness, homelessness, violence, alienation, and, deep within the hearts 
of many people, extreme anxiety about the future. Equally important, these are 
the practices that have led us to the near breakdown of the natural world, as 
evidenced by such symptoms as global climate change, ozone depletion, 
massive species loss, and near maximum levels of air, soil and water pollution.
It might be well to recall why the American colonies fought their war of 
independence in 1776. Essentially, they were trying to protect their local 
industries and local economy from the free entrance of British capital into the 
colonies, the result of which would have been complete economic domination by 
Britain. The southern colonies were already caught in this syndrome as their 
economy was focused upon the monoculture of cotton, which was exported to 
the British textile industry. The cost of labor was minimal, since it was supplied 
by slaves, and manufactured goods were imported from Britain with virtually no
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local industry in the South to compete. There was little in the way of social 
services and no welfare system at all for the poor, outside the 'largesse' of the 
slave owners. Thus, the northern colonies fought against the extension of this 
form of domination into the North. If Britain had had the will and a more effective 
war machine, and communication and transportation had allowed, the USA 
would probably still be part of the British Commonwealth today. Yet this is 
precisely the form of relationship that the US and other transnational 
corporations would, and to a large extent, have imposed on the Third World. 
Indeed, as much as they can, they seek to impose the same conditions on their 
own populations with the resulting income gaps that are all too well known, 
especially in the USA and the UK.
In a section named "Mechanisms of Self-Delusion", Mander and Goldsmith 
(1996, pp.14-16) outline the various ways in which economists and current 
economic theory participate in perpetuating this social debacle. As they say, 
"economists have devised the perfect measurements for gauging their own 
success and confirming their own self-delusions." For example, GNP and GDP 
include "depletion of natural resources, the construction of more prisons, and 
the manufacture of bombs . . .[as], . . measures of [economic] 'health' ", and 
exclude such things as ". . . unpaid housework, child care, community service, 
or the production of food to be eaten and artifacts to be used rather than sold via 
the formal economy", as if they contributed nothing to the economy. Ted 
Halstead and Clifford Cobb in the same volume (1996, pp.197-206) propose a 
new set of measurements, which they label "The Genuine Progress Indicator", 
to redress these contradictions. They include in this index all the social and 
environmental aspects of economic activity that are beneficial to society and 
nature, and that are left out of traditional measures.
The problem with the 'free' market system as currently defined by economic 
theory is that there are no price signals to indicate environmental or social 
abuses. Those looking for evidence can find it, of course. For example, 
Guatemalan newspapers occasionally report that peasants have been severely 
injured or have even been killed when 'falling off their land". Such bizarre news 
items are explained by the fact that, 'el pulpo', the octopus, as the natives refer 
to the United Fruit Company, has taken over all the flat land and left only the, 
sometimes very steep, hillsides to the native peasants! Nor are there any price 
signals to indicate that too many toxins are being dumped into the environment, 
though the health effects can be registered by careful epidemiological research, 
and so forth.
To further illustrate the extreme distortions in the world economy, Tony Clarke 
(1996, p.297) cites statistics that emphasize how control is exercised. He writes 
that if we include the economies of all the nation states, "forty-seven of the top 
one hundred economies of the world are actually transnational corporations; 70 
percent of global trade is controlled by just five hundred corporations, and a 
mere 1 percent of the TNCs on this planet own half the stock of foreign direct
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investment." The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported in its 
Human Development Report for 1992 that 20 percent of the world's population 
in the richest nations receive 82.7 percent of the world's income, while the 
bottom 20 percent receive just 1.4 percent, averages, which even then mask 
poverty in the rich nations themselves (Korten, 1996, p.24). The agreements of 
GATT and the WTO, the policies of the IMF and World Bank, the globalization 
of finance, and, finally, of culture via cinema and television, will only further 
serve to encourage this concentration of wealth and increase the gap between 
the richest and the poorest.
The ultimate irony, of course, is that these developments are not the result of 
some forces of nature or of natural evolution, as is claimed by neo-classical 
economics, imbued with the spirit of positivism, but are the product of human 
intentions, policies and plans, carried out by key actors on the world scene, 
actors who seek merely to further their own interests. These key actors meet 
together frequently, having over time institutionalized these contacts in various 
fora. The July 1944 Bretton Woods meeting, under the auspices of the United 
nations Monetary and Financial Conference, was the first of these multinational 
fora, though Korten (1996, p.21) states that US corporate interests were 
conceiving plans to dominate the global economy as early as the 1930s under 
the auspices of the US Council on Foreign Relations. The Bretton Woods 
meeting established the IMF and the World Bank and provided a framework for 
subsequent agreements such as those contained in The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the WTO. These oligarchic agreements have 
largely succeeded in their goals by fostering unprecedented growth in economic 
activity - output, trade, income, etc. - but have totally ignored the social and 
environmental costs of this growth.
In May 1954, North American and European leaders established another forum 
to discuss world political-economic policy, called simply 'Bilderberg'. These 
meetings over the years have included ". . . heads of state, other key politicians, 
key industrialists and financiers, and an assortment of intellectuals, trade 
unionists, diplomats and influential representatives of the press with 
demonstrated sympathy for establishment views." (Korten 1996, p.27). In 1973 
the Trilateral Commission was established by David Rockefeller, chair of the 
Chase Manhattan Bank, and Zbigniew Brzezinsky, its chair until he became 
Jimmy Carter's national security adviser in 1977. The purpose of the Trilateral 
Commission was to formalize the meetings of the heads of the world economy, 
and to recognize Japan as the third side of the trilateral world political-economic 
oligarchy. Besides political leaders from the three dominant regions of the world 
economy, the commission has also included ". . . four of the world's five largest 
non-banking transnational corporations, top officials of five of the world's six 
largest international banks, and heads of the major media organizations". 
(Korten 1996, p.27). The G7 and G8 meetings have carried out this tradition in 
yet another forum in recent years.
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While part of a competitive system, these leaders recognize the common need 
to maintain a certain world framework within which they can operate freely. This 
framework ensures that the Third World, that labor and the environment, will 
continue to be available as exploitable resources for use by transnational 
corporations, and that any costs to society and nature will be borne by the poor 
and the powerless. Meanwhile, the American 'war machine' insures that the 
proper hierarchy within this 'club of the privileged' will also be maintained. In 
other words, this 'absentee' political-economic oligarchy is a world government 
but with a very narrowly defined agenda, an agenda which considers social and 
environmental concerns only under duress and only as a last resort, and when it 
is absolutely necessary, to preserve the overall stability of society and nature.
Meanwhile, there are ample signs that the stability of both nature and society are 
increasingly endangered, though the 'absentee oligarchy' seems blissfully 
unaware or unconcerned. One clear-cut example of this is the new epidemiology 
of disease. The Harvard Working Group on New and Resurgent Diseases 
(1996) summarizes the important changes that have occurred as a result of the 
global economic strategies of free trade, mono-culture, export-oriented 
agriculture, deregulation and rapid economic growth (Harvard Working Group. 
1996, pp.160-161).
1. Changed land use, including deforestation, irrigation, monoculture, and 
urbanization, all of which cause a loss of biodiversity.
2. Widespread malnutrition, as the gap between rich and poor is widened; loss 
of publicly provided health care.
3. Resource depletion and chemical pollution of land and sea.
4. Migration to escape political turmoil and to seek economic opportunity.
5. Increased, uncontrolled use of chemical therapies - drugs, vaccines, and 
pesticides - which turns health care itself into a commodity.
The results of these changes are several and varied but all have led to an 
increase in exposure to pathogenic micro-organisms, a decline in human 
resistance to them, and a resulting steep rise in infectious diseases, and this 
only two decades after the health community was convinced that infectious 
diseases were a thing of the past! Briefly, the Harvard group (p. 161) 
summarizes the pattern of these changes:
The loss of biodiversity means fewer natural predators are available to control 
disease vectors; people move into new regions [bringing with them and coming 
into contact with] unfamiliar pathogens; eutrophication of coastal waters (from 
run off sewage and fertilizer) allows plankton blooms to increase bacteria and 
viruses.
The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 16.4 million people died of 
infectious diseases in 1993, with eight million new TB cases reported in 1991. A 
third of the world's population is now estimated to be carrying this infection and
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there are several strains now resistant to all known anti-TB drugs (Harvard 
Working Group, 1996, p.162). Comparable increases in diphtheria, the plague, 
malaria, cholera, dengue fever and yellow fever have also been recorded.
As described in Chapter 6, human diseases and their changes over time are a 
result of a complex set of relationships between human activity and the natural 
environment. The biomedical factors are only one aspect of this complex. The 
recent increase in the incidence of infectious diseases is one more example of 
how this complex has worked itself out in the past two decades, as noted by the 
Harvard Group. Globalization and the 'New World Order1 have succeeded in 
recreating disease patterns that had largely disappeared from human society. 
Given its single-minded approach to all things, we can expect that the global 
oligarchy will not seek solutions to this problem by altering profitable 
interventions in nature, however short term this profitability might turn out to be. 
Rather, we can predict that new 'magic bullets' will be sought, new drugs, new 
equipment or new techniques, that will insure profits to the pharmaceutical 
industry, the medical equipment industry and others who might stand to benefit 
from these new technical fixes. (Harvard Group 1996, p.170).
As stated above, globalization and the new world order are not simply the result 
of evolution. The human intentions that have created them are supported by 
certain forms of belief, which in the past we might have labeled as mythology, 
ideology or religion, but which in the 20th century are now called paradigm 
assumptions. Positive science with its mechanistic, Newtonian framework, 
supplies the inspiration for most of modern science and social policy. Within this 
framework, consciousness and life generally are mere evolutionary accidents, 
not to be taken seriously in the important work of science, which explains the 
universe as a giant clockwork governed by universal laws. Thus, the idea that 
we as human beings could actually change the way in which we confront each 
other and nature, by changing the way we explain these things to ourselves is 
not a widely held paradigmatic assumption at this moment in history. The idea 
that we could inspire ourselves and work toward a more cooperative, humane 
world, is ". . . blocked by a modern equivalent of the dogmatic intellectual 
tyranny once imposed by the church" (Korten, 1999, p.13).
Korten (1999, p.15) supplies an agenda that would move us toward such a 
world, once we have overcome this tyranny:
• End the legal fiction that corporations are entitled to the rights of persons and 
exclude corporations from political participation.
• Implement serious political campaign reform to reduce the influence of money 
on politics.
• Eliminate corporate welfare by eliminating direct subsidies and recovering 
other externalized costs through fees and taxes.
• Implement mechanisms to regulate international corporations and finance.
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• Use fiscal and regulatory policy to make financial speculation unprofitable and 
to give advantage to human-scale stakeholder-owned enterprises.
Such an agenda would seek to alter dramatically the world, as we know it. It 
would confront powerful economic and military interests, and could never be 
accomplished without a new paradigm that empowers human beings to seek 
goals and to believe that they could be accomplished by their personal and 
collective efforts. Indeed, such monumental changes have been accomplished 
in the past by exactly these means.
Meanwhile, science and technology have so profoundly affected the social 
scene, that any struggle for change must take place within such a framework. 
Thus, it is not religious or ideological fervor that must be sought, but a 
movement that is based upon the spread of information and communication. 
Just as the education of children is understood as a necessary means to 
develop a modern society, so the continuous education of adults must be seen 
as indispensable to the creation of a more humane postmodern society. But this 
will require a major shift in the worldview of scientists, involving a quite different 
perspective on the relationship between science and society. Part one of this 
book outlines ways in which the tyranny of the mechanism could be overcome 
within the social sciences, so that they could play a more active role in liberating 
people in the broader society. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent 
the broader society would be susceptible to such a liberation.
Subjective Reality at the Turn of the Century
As it turns out, there is reason to be hopeful that change is underway, even in 
the absence of a concerted and responsible intervention by scientists onto the 
social scene. Of course, there are always those ‘rogue’ scientists who will insist 
on abandoning the so-called 'value free posture' of positive science, people like 
Naom Chomsky, Barry Commoner or Ralph Nader, who will seek to uncover the 
dangerous effects of modern science and technology as well as the extensive 
abuse of power and wealth in contemporary society. Indeed, their efforts have 
often had effects on public policy and the course of human events. For example, 
Barry Commoner collected baby teeth in the mid-western Unites States in order 
to establish that radioactive fallout from atmospheric atomic tests in the US was 
not dispersing into the atmosphere as military and government officials were 
claiming in the 1950s, but was landing in the pastures where it was eaten by 
cows whose milk was drunk by babies, with the result that their teeth (as well as 
the rest of their bodies) contained strontium 90. His work over the past fifty 
years has continued to expose the deleterious environmental and health effects 
of corporate activity, and has influenced countless citizens to become active in 
efforts to address these effects. (Commoner 1966, 1972, 1990).
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Ralph Nader's efforts to publicize auto safety issues 20 years later resulted in a 
host of safety-enhancing changes in automobile design, such as seat-belts, air 
bags, reinforced doors, etc. Recent efforts by Nader and Naom Chomsky and 
other social scientists to inform the world about corporate abuses of political, 
economic and military power have been instrumental in inspiring wide-spread 
protests against globalization and the new world order based upon these 
abuses, with effects that have yet to be played out on the world social scene.
The effects of these and many other scientists, journalists and activist citizens, 
along with a general increase in the level of education and affluence has given 
the citizens of the developed countries the freedom and the will to be concerned 
about the overall quality of their existence to the degree that some of the basic 
premises of late 20th century capitalist society are now being widely questioned. 
The extent of this questioning is being documented by social scientists, who 
have been surveying and researching public attitude over the past twenty years, 
not in the service of the corporations who seek to exploit this knowledge in order 
to extend their control over these populations, but in order to emancipate them 
(and themselves) from the reified structures of thought and action that sustain 
this society.
One such effort is that by Paul H. Ray and Sherry Ruth Anderson (2000), who 
interviewed over 100,000 Americans, conducted sixty in-depth interviews and 
organized hundreds of focus groups over a period of thirteen years. They found 
that 50 million Americans, or 26 percent of the adult population ". . . have made 
a comprehensive shift in their world view, values and way of life . . . and are 
shaping a new kind of American culture for the 21st century." (Ray and 
Anderson, 2000. p.4). Since the 1960s, this group, which Ray and Anderson 
label the 'cultural creatives', has grown from less than 5% to more than a quarter 
of the adult population, which, as they say, ". . . on the time-scale of whole 
civilizations where major developments are measured in centuries, ... is 
shockingly quick," and they report similar numbers in the European Union.
Cultural creatives are those people who reject consumerism, and materialism 
generally. They reject greed, racism and social inequality, inattention to the 
weakest in the name of social Darwinism, and the cynicism and hedonism under 
which modern sophisticates hide their sense of powerlessness. Politically, they 
. . reject the intolerance and narrowness of social conservatives and the 
Religious Right”, and mistrust all large-scale institutions "including both 
corporations and government." (Ray and Anderson, 2000, p.17). They are 
middle-aged, under age 70 and over age 25. Their occupations and social class 
are a cross section of the American population, as is their religious affiliation, 
except that few would call themselves "New Age" or dogmatic with respect to 
any religion. What does set them apart is their gender: almost two-thirds are 
women!
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Ray and Anderson (2000, pp.25-32) contrast the cultural creatives with the 
'moderns' who constitute 48 percent of the adult American population and 
'traditionals' who represent about a quarter of the adult population. Moderns are 
more male than female, are accustomed to and support most of the ideas of 
modern capitalism, including the mechanistic assumptions that govern its 
approach to understanding and constructing social reality. Thus, they have a 
high need for achievement and fit the ideal as described first by Max Weber as 
the ‘Protestant (work) ethic', and as propagated by David McClelland (1961) at 
mid-century as necessary for economic development, the ultimate purpose in 
life according to most moderns inside and outside of science. The measure of 
their success is money and the consumer goods that it can buy, as well as the 
status that it bestows. At the same time, they believe in the principles embodied 
in the American Bill of Rights: freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, right 
to a fair trial, etc, as well as, more generally, honesty, fair play, hard work, the 
importance of the family and education, the ability of science and engineering to 
solve most problems, including the ones created by them. They are also likely to 
be individualistic and not very altruistic, values that have from the beginning 
been necessary for the competitive mechanisms of capitalism to work properly. 
Moderns are cynical about politics and unlikely to join movements for social 
change. This is understandable, since they are quite content with modern, 
urban, industrial society as it is currently organized.
Traditionals are a declining portion of the American population, dropping from 
nearly half the adult population at mid-century to their current 25 percent. They 
are older, poorer and less well educated than the other two groups. They are 
fundamentalists in their religious beliefs, they believe in the traditional gender 
separation of roles, with males in the dominant position. They are highly patriotic 
and xenophobic, and intolerant of difference and change. They support the 
military, as well as their own right to bear arms. At the same time, they are 
opposed to big government and to big business and to the ways in which it is 
destroying the natural environment.
Needless to say, the cultural creatives are the heroines and heroes of Ray and 
Anderson's book. They are the sign of the future, and much of their effort is 
spent in analyzing this group. They, "Like mariners of old . . . have sailed beyond 
the familiar horizon" (Ray and Anderson, 2000, p.43). They question the 
assumptions of modern (and traditional) society. They examine values critically, 
seeking to escape from the control of the 'thought police' who dominate the 
mass media and modern culture generally. One of their heroes is David Quinn, 
whose book, Ishmael, is widely read. Quoting from him, they write:
According to your maps, the world of thought. . . ends at the border of your 
culture, and if you venture beyond that border, you simply fall off the edge of 
the world. Tomorrow, we'll screw up our courage and cross that border. And 
you'll see, we will not fall off the edge of the world. We'll just find ourselves in 
new territory. (Ray and Anderson 2000, p.57 and Quinn 1995, p.91).
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In other words, the first step toward gaining freedom is to understand all the 
ways in which modern society controls us, to understand the socio-drama, the 
theater within which we are all acting, including its mechanistic aspects, of 
course, but going beyond them to appreciate the values and intentions which 
govern our behavior and give the mechanism its direction.
Those who guide the mechanisms of modern capitalist society cannot, 
themselves, be unaware of the problems that the cultural creatives are 
exposing, at least not those who were present at their meeting in Davos, 
Switzerland in 1996. There, Oren Lyons, an Iroquois Indian, described the 
present world situation in an unmistakable metaphor:
/ see you all as jockeys, and your companies are the horses you ride. You're 
beating your horses on in a race, but now you can see that you are racing 
toward a stone wall. You see some of those ahead of you smashing into the 
wall, but you don't turn around or even pause. You're beating your horses on 
anyway as fast as you can. (Ray and Anderson, 2000, p.57).
Elisabeth Sahtouris confirmed that the problem is widely understood in a 
conversation with a Brazilian banker, who claimed that he and his colleagues felt 
that ". . . we are all going over the edge of a cliff” (Ray and Anderson, 2000, 
p.57).
Modernists, still half the adult population in the US, are more or less content with 
the present capitalist system, or at least are trying to make their way within the 
confines of its established values. Traditionalists are oriented to the past and 
seek to recover it in whatever ways they can. The cultural creatives are trying to 
create a new system, but without any defining plan or blueprint, such as those 
guiding leftist politics and revolutionary movements in the past. They have, 
however, been strongly influenced by social movements in the 20th century, 
particularly those that began in the 1960s. The antiwar movement, the women's 
movement, the civil rights movement, the environmental movement, the student 
movements, etc. have all been influential, and, in fact, many of the cultural 
creatives have participated in one or more of these movements.
But, as these movements lost coverage in the mass media that are advertiser- 
driven and oriented to sensation, they began to evolve into more localized and 
less 'entertaining', but more sustainable efforts. Orienting movements to the 
mass media will always confront the problem that media content is closer to 
entertainment than information. The media are superficial and time-constrained, 
concerned with events rather than their causes or underlying conditions. Their 
fixation on audience ratings encourages them to interview prominent politicians 
and movie stars, rather than academics and intellectuals. Thus, the analyses 
they offer are of the three-minute, if not thirty-second, sound bite type. As a 
result, cultural creatives have been led to believe that they are alone in the
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world, though they may join a few others in local struggles around issues of the 
sort that were of national significance in the sixties. The importance of Ray and 
Anderson's book is to demonstrate how widespread are the sympathies for 
something new, for a new culture that respects nature and fellow human beings.
Their book also cites numerous examples of business enterprises that are 
seeking products and processes that are more respectful. Examples include a 
line of upholstery fabrics that could be returned safely to nature. William 
McDonough, Dean of Architecture at the University of Virginia, and his 
colleagues spent several years designing fabrics and seeking “dyes, finishes, 
polishes and fire retardants that were 'clean1, meaning no mutagents, no 
carcinogens, no endocrine disrupters" (Ray and Anderson, 2000, p.163). Sixty 
chemical companies refused to work with them, but ultimately Ciba Geigy 
agreed, with the result that they had to eliminate nearly eight thousand 
chemicals in order to find thirty-eight that were acceptable.
Another example is a large bank building in Amsterdam, designed by Amory 
Lovins at the Rocky Mountain Institute. He was instructed to design a building 
that would be "organic . . . , full of light, air, water, ecologists’ plants, nice 
sounds, and happy people, and it shall not cost one guilder more per square 
meter [than any other design would].1' (Ray and Anderson, 2000, pp.164-169). 
The building, which took several years to design and construct, and required 
extensive cooperation among designers, artists, engineers, landscape architects 
and construction people, is an outstanding success, with resulting significant 
increases in productivity among bank employees. These and other examples 
are cited by Ray and Anderson to illustrate that the cultural creatives are not 
romantics or mere idealists. They find concrete ways to implement their ideals 
and to demonstrate the more intelligent and emotionally satisfying ways in which 
society could be structured once the current system has 'run into the wall'.
A more sustained example of how the cultural creatives are acting out their 
ideals is the turn of American people to alternative medicine and organic or 
natural foods. Industries serving these needs are growing at a rate of 10 to 20 
percent per year and are estimated to have earned as much as $75 billion in the 
year 2000. (Ray and Anderson, 2000, p.185). Alternative medicine includes 
yoga, biofeedback, homeopathic medicine, acupuncture, holistic healing etc., all 
approaches that view the human being as something more than a sophisticated 
mechanism with organic dimensions. Capitalist health care, designed to 
maximize profits for the pharmaceutical companies, medical equipment 
manufacturers and hospital real estate speculators, is under attack even by 
medical doctors themselves, a third of whom reported, in 1999, that they would 
choose another profession if they were to start over again (Ray and Anderson, 
2000, p.195). It's important to emphasize, of course, that alternative health care 
does not mean an abandonment of modern medicine but rather a search to 
supplement something that is absent from it. In 1997, forty-two percent of 
American adults sought this 'something else', increasing their number of visits to
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alternative health practitioners from 427 million to 629 million in the years from 
1990 to 1997, while visits to establishment physicians actually declined from 388 
million to 386 million during the same period. (Ray and Anderson, 2000, p.330).
These changes and many more cited by Ray and Anderson illustrate the extent 
to which there is a global change in consciousness among American adults. 
This change has gone unnoticed in its scale, even by the people who are 
involved in it. The reason, of course, is the nature of the mass media in the US, 
as described above, which can find nothing sufficiently sensational to warrant its 
attention. Thus, like Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring", this revolution, if it is one, 
is taking place without the fanfare of wider public attention. Nevertheless, a new 
'story' is being created, a new image of the future, which may well in time serve 
to keep modern civilization from 'running into the wall'. And a new story is just 
that; it is a way of incorporating all the divergent, specialized strands of a given 
situation into a comprehensible form. As Ray and Anderson (2000, p.229) say, 
"we need good ways to convey big abstractions in human, relevant and 
symbolically meaningful terms". In other words, we must stop the destruction of 
nature and society in the name of profit, and its limited and impoverished 
scientific rationality, and we must create a story, a vision and a theory of how 
this may be accomplished. Since the USA is seen by many as composed of the 
most ‘sedated’, the most 'colonized', to use Habermas’ term, of the affluent 
populations in the world, it is important to realize that a quarter of that population 
is engaged in a search for something new.
Another major research effort extends these findings beyond the USA (Inglehart, 
1997). Combining data from the 1981 European Values Systems Survey, the 
World values Surveys in 43 societies, the Euro-Barometer Surveys and the two- 
wave Political Action Study, Inglehart and his long list of collaborators, have 
established that there are major new trends in cultural values extending around 
the world. He uses the term 'postmodern' to describe new cultural realities in 
those societies affected by these changes. Furthermore, his analysis is squarely 
within the context described here in Chapter 10 on human needs, based upon 
Maslow's hierarchical concept. In other words, where societies have 
experienced important levels of affluence, people seek to satisfy 'post material1 
values of the sort described by the need for love and affiliation, esteem and self- 
actualization. As important, however, is the finding that these value changes are 
inter-generational, being affected by the pre-adult, especially early childhood, 
experiences of individuals. In other words, emotional and intellectual 
development, which depends upon a childhood whose physiological and security 
needs are well-satisfied, will more or less inevitably lead to the search for higher 
order need satisfaction in adult life, with many important social, political and 
economic ramifications. Thus, while people were able to work hard, even be 
exploited, as dictated by the Protestant Ethic under modernism, they will no 
longer offer themselves to this syndrome under postmodernism. They will even 
be willing to deny themselves the latest consumer goods, if necessary, in order 
to avoid meaningless and stress-filled work. At the same time, they will seek
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more meaningful relationships, both at work and in leisure, at least some of 
which will be of a political nature. Thus, Inglehart found that while participation in 
elections and general confidence in the modernist political institutions is 
declining, people are more active than ever in the particular causes that they 
find important. These causes are first and foremost directed toward ecology and 
the environment, but also include gender roles, inequality and poverty as well.
Generally, authoritarian institutions that might have seemed important under 
conditions of poverty and insecurity are no longer tolerated. While an 
authoritarian science and engineering may have seemed liberating after nearly 
two thousand years of autocratic religion, they no longer seem so, with the result 
that more educated and more secure people not only wish, and are in a position 
to understand the implications of planning decisions and instrumental rationality, 
generally, but now also wish to be involved in the processes where these 
decisions are made. This is not a wholesale rejection of rationality and 
modernity, as some postmodernist writers would like us to believe, but rather a 
strong desire to be involved in its uses and application. Economic development 
is no longer seen as an end in itself, one that would justify almost any means, 
including those propagandized by globalization apologists. Nor is the 
rationalization of everything in society, as suggested by Max Weber, with its 
resulting patterns of regimentation and specialization, an acceptable way of life. 
The alienating effects of this, and of mass society generally, are now well 
understood, not only as a result of the analyses offered by the Frankfurt School 
and others in the 50's, 60's and 70's, but also because many people are now 
secure and educated enough to understand and agree with these analyses. 
Thus, just as modernization brought the decline of traditional-religious morality 
and authority, so postmodernism is now bringing the decline of rational-legal 
authority, or at least its unquestioned and universal use:
. ... the core societal goat of traditional society is survival under the conditions 
of a steady-state economy, in which social mobility is a zero-sum game. During 
the modernization phase, by contrast, the core societal project is maximizing 
economic growth - and, in both capitalist and socialist societies, it tends to be 
carried out by ruthlessly extracting the necessary capital from an impoverished 
populace, regardless of the costs to the environment and the quality of life. In 
postmodern society, by contrast, the top priority shifts from maximizing 
economic growth to maximizing subjective well-being (Inglehart 1997, p77).
Inglehart (1997, p.84) is quick to point out that these multinational trends are by 
no means universally the same. Each local culture identifies its own 
relationships to capitalism and modernization and its own dialectical evolution 
beyond them. Many things play a role in this: "leaders, institutions, climate, 
geography, situation-specific events, and other unique elements that make up 
its own distinctive heritage". Nevertheless, there are world-wide patterns 
associated with economic development that tend to undermine its importance 
over time, shifting values from growth, acquisition and greed to emotional well­
being and justice. These pressures are now being felt in advanced capitalist
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nations, with resulting demands for participation in decision-making and more 
democratic institutions in both the public and private sector. This will mean 
moving beyond the representative oligarchy that passes for democracy in the 
public sector and the management retreats and workshops that pass for 
democracy in the corporate sector (Inglehart 1997, pp.293-323). Unfortunately, 
as Inglehart demonstrates, these trends can be reversed under conditions of 
crisis and uncertainty, e.g., the former socialist countries, South Africa, 
Argentina, etc., and there are short term fluctuations related to economic 
conditions, particularly inflation and unemployment, in any case. Nevertheless, 
the longer term trends are quite steady. (Inglehart 1997, pp.136-7). Thus, while 
the students and youth of the 1960's may not be as visible today, at least until 
Seattle and Genoa, they still persist in expressing the values that were a product 
of their early childhood security, though we can expect the mass media 
increasingly to reduce demonstrations against corporate globalization to sound 
bites, as they follow their true nature into the future.
One interesting finding by Inglehart and his colleagues was that European Union 
countries are changing more rapidly in the direction of post-modernism than the 
United States. His explanation is that this is correlated with higher growth rates 
after World War II, but one must also recognize the more equitable distribution 
of income, and particularly welfare benefits in the European Union with resulting 
higher levels of security. Even the restructuring demands of American capital 
have not yet (?) succeeded in reducing overall welfare to the minimal levels 
found in the US. Thus, it is not surprising that "the two youngest European 
cohorts rank well above their American counterparts", though he is quick to add 
"the United States has shown a significant movement in the predicted direction." 
(Inglehart 1997, p.147).
What Inglehart's analysis does not address are the autonomous structural 
forces of capitalism. While it is true that people's values are shifting in a post­
materialist direction, there are serious constraints on the level of self- 
actualization and emotional well being that can be attained without serious 
structural alterations in the present capitalist system. Somehow, imperialism (at 
this stage, mostly American) must be tamed and the war machines reined in if 
the world at large is to attain any overall sense of security. Political organizing for 
environmental concerns, social justice, gender equality, ethnic and racial 
tolerance, or whatever, will sooner or later run up against its own wall of 
corporate power and social irresponsibility. In addition, no one can predict the 
effects of some major worldwide crisis in the capitalist system itself. The 
rampant speculative nature of the world financial casino almost insures that 
some such crisis will arrive sooner or later. In other words, efforts to alter the 
institutional rules governing capitalism as a system must be just as much an 
objective of citizen organizing and demonstrating as efforts to improve levels of 
individual and collective well being. In that sense, Korten's effort to grapple with 
what a post-corporate world could look like is an indispensable complement to 
the analyses of subjective factors as carried out by Ray and Anderson and
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Inglehart. This is precisely what movements like the World Social Forum are 
trying to accomplish (www.forumsocialmundial.org). In response to the World 
Economic Forum established twenty years ago in Davos, Switzerland for the 
world economic elite, (i.e., the ‘absentee’ world oligarchy), the World Social 
Forum has set out to turn attention to the social impacts of neo-liberalism and 
globalization. It was decided to hold this forum in a Third World country to 
emphasize symbolically its anti-Davos orientation. Porto Alegre, Brazil was 
chosen for the first meeting in January 2001, followed by a second meeting in 
January 2002. This forum is not a deliberative body, is not seeking to become a 
world government or to seek political power in any way. Indeed, according to its 
charter of principles, it will serve as:
... an open meeting for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, 
formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for 
effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to 
neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of 
imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society centered on the 
human person.
In this sense it represents the new consciousness characteristic of social 
movements all over the world. They are decentralized, democratic, information­
sharing and committed to decision making through consensus. They attempt to 
build a solid base among the people through education and discussion. There 
is no search for power in the classical Marxist sense, no group or class that 
would seek to represent the interests of others or of the whole society. They 
appear to have taken very seriously Lord Acton’s famous statement in his April 
3rd, 1887 letter to Bishop Mandell: “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely’, a statement that should be blazoned over the door of every 
politician and every corporate executive.
This probably goes a long way to explaining why citizens, worldwide, have lost 
confidence in political institutions and in the ability of political leaders to solve the 
most pressing problems in their respective countries (Norris, 1999). This does 
not mean that the ideal of democracy has in any way been eroded but rather 
that citizens are disillusioned in various ways with the manner in which 
democratic institutions are working. This decline in confidence is probably not 
unrelated to the way in which the restructuring demanded by the global financial 
institutions has increased uncertainty in all countries. At the same time, political 
leaders appear to be less accountable and less subject to electoral defeat, with 
a growing sense among citizens that there is no way for them to participate in 
important decision-making. In other words, elections seem not to matter very 
much, with a resulting decline in voters exercising their rights, and there are no 
other institutional means available for participation, especially at the national and 
international level. As a result, ". . . elite-directed forms of participation such as 
voting are stagnant or declining, [while] elite-challenging forms of participation 
are becoming more widespread". (Inglehart 1997, p.236). This loss of
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confidence and trust also erodes the willingness of citizens to comply with laws 
generally, and makes it more difficult for states to govern without coercion 
(Norris 1999, p.257). The result of this rise in the number of critical citizens is an 
expectation that demands for institutional reform will increase, along with those 
for more meaningful participation at all levels of government.
Sociologists and political scientists cannot repeat it often enough: the European 
democracies are facing a demand for renewed participation by citizens in public 
affairs. A desire for a more participatory democracy, closer to the real concerns 
of individuals, is gradually emerging. (European Commission, 2000, p. ix).
One would think that the new information technologies would offer considerable 
opportunity for new forms of communication and participation. Indeed, the 
explosion in information and communications technology is mind-boggling. 
Numbers become almost meaningless in this context because the moment they 
are written down they are out-dated. In this sense, it is important to recognize 
how recent the new technologies are. For example, the first network for sharing 
documents was demonstrated publicly only in 1991 and was named the World 
Wide Web (WWW) at that time (Albarran and Goff, 2000. p.6). By 1999 there 
were nearly 45,000,000 Internet hosts, and an estimated 50,000 new Internet 
users are now being added daily, with an estimated 300,000,000 by the year 
2005. (Albarran and Goff, 2000, p.7, 14, 18). This, along with the rapid increase 
in home computers, should make it possible for citizens to communicate with 
each other and with decision-making centers and thus increase the overall level 
of political participation.
Unfortunately, while the potential for the more widespread dissemination of 
uncensored information is there and is being exploited, there are also limitations 
and abuses that inhibit the realization of democratic goals. First, much of the 
communication is personal or restricted to specific interest groups. Rita Kirk 
Whillock (2000, p.167) argues that these interest groups have little need of each 
other and that ". . . the ideas of the individual continue to be devalued in the 
political process, depriving them of an effective, deliberative voice and of their 
individual identity." She further claims that the separation of internet users by 
time and place further alienates them from political organization which results in 
"only the illusion of community." Further problems arise because of the ease 
with which misinformation can be disseminated by hackers and others, thus 
confounding purposeful uses. Finally, corporate and government control can 
ultimately be expected to restrict freedom of communication in much the same 
way that they have with other mass media in the past and present. Indeed, this 
control may be necessary to limit the range of abuses already present, such as 
child pornography, cyber terrorism and information warfare. Whillock (2000, 
pp.185-7) gives examples, such as hackers altering the home page of both the 
Tory and Labour parties during their latest election campaign, or where a whole 
different site was established mimicking and ridiculing Bob Dole in the 1996 US 
presidential election, or where, even more dramatically, ", . . the Spanish
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government was accused of supporting the e-mail bombing of a web site based 
in San Francisco that supported Basque separatists."
The future of the use of these new technologies will depend as much upon the 
ways in which these technologies evolve and the speed with which they become 
available to the masses of people throughout the world, as well as upon the 
manner in which they are manipulated by official and unofficial sources. The 
potential for the wider dissemination of information is there, and for the time 
being is unhindered by any censorship or control, other than the not inexpensive 
access to it. If whole books and articles become available it will truly overcome 
the friction of space in gaining access to the even more substantial forms of 
information that only well-stocked libraries can supply today. In a political sense, 
alternative viewpoints on all questions can, for the time being, be made available 
almost instantaneously throughout the world, including on highly delicate 
questions such as the bombing of the twin towers in New York, with potentially 
profound effects on public consciousness and international relations 
(http://cyberjournal.org). As long as this potential exists, there is a world-wide 
freedom of information that only visionaries have imagined in the past, a 
freedom that approaches Habermas' undominated communication, and perhaps 
only truly realized in the forum of Ancient Greece, though modern Greece 
continues to maintain a good deal of this tradition even in the mass media, 
perhaps more than any other country in the world today.
However, the potential for establishing more democratic political institutions will 
depend upon more than new technologies. It will depend upon the ability of the 
majority of citizens to understand truly the issues in all of their complexity, and to 
actually participate in public affairs. Without this kind of understanding, as Jean- 
Claude Thebault says, ". . . access to and exploitation of information will be the 
privilege of an educated minority, who, either consciously or unconsciously, will 
exercise a form of domination which will jeopardize the very foundations of 
democracy". (European Commission, 2000, p. x). This educated minority must 
thus be seen as a key factor in the democratization of society. Positivist 
scientists, as seen in Part I of this book, cannot be expected to offer much hope 
in this respect; they are self-censored by their own paradigmatic assumptions. 
We can also gain insight by asking, within the framework of Chapter 10, what 
were the early childhood experiences Of this minority. If these experiences were 
influenced by insecurity, by deprivation, we can expect that ‘exercising 
domination’ would be quite acceptable if it were to further personal gain, and no 
amount of scientific education would likely alter this. Only a paradigmatic shift in 
both personal values and social (scientific) outlook of the sort that appears to be 
taking place in the ‘post-autistic’ economics movement could accomplish 
this(www.paecon.net). If democratization is crucial to the stability of modern 
society, as the research findings seem to indicate, we can begin to appreciate 
how important the paradigm shift of this educated minority has become to 
humanity in the 21st century. Nor can the market, or the 'unseen hand', or any 
existing political process be expected to substitute for the painful process that
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the 'educated minority' must go through if this is to be accomplished. If "a 
substantial majority of players must acquire the cognitive faculties which will 
enable them to play a part in this new society" (European Commission, 2000, 
p. 146), then only the 'educated minority' can make this happen, and only a 
concerted effort on their part to understand bow this can happen will allow it to 
happen.
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CHAPTER 8
PLANNING THEORY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
Planning is as old as human society; it simply reflects the need to organize 
behavior for any collective endeavor. Its traces can be seen in all the remains of 
past civilizations. What has changed the nature of planning in the past 200 
years is the rise of industrial capitalism and the massive uprooting and 
concentrating of populations in urban enters. Mass society, in other words, has 
strained the social mechanisms for establishing and maintaining order in the 
ever-increasing complexity of modern industrial and or postindustrial society. It 
is no longer possible for planning to be accomplished intuitively by a handful of 
male leaders, though this tribal mentality is hardly absent from the current 
hegemonic class in modern society. Nor was it absent from the group of often 
architect planners who envisioned the ‘big plans’ that gave form to nineteenth 
century Athens, Paris, Washington D.C., Chicago, etc. Nor has the rise of 
science, which accompanied and facilitated the rise of industrial capitalism, 
altered this mentality among, especially, male positivist scientists and engineers, 
who participate, even if only vicariously, in this exercise of domination and 
control. (Sandercock, 1998, p.68)
What has changed in the twentieth century, of course, is the epistemology of 
planning. Thanks to the enlightenment and the liberation of thought from 
ecclesiastical authority, nature, and subsequently society, could be understood 
in totally different ways. This knowledge has allowed humans to reason about 
the mechanisms that govern natural and social phenomena, and to establish 
causal relationships that allow ever more sophisticated systems of planning and 
control to be imposed. Male hegemons can use these systems even if they 
don’t understand fully their natural and, especially, social implications. Those in 
positions of power can always find some scientists and engineers to tell them 
only what they wish to hear about these effects, in any case. Thus, mass 
society is one that has been increasingly subject to technocratic control as a 
means to govern organized collective endeavors. This control is largely male 
dominated and is based in positive science. The rise of a theory and 
epistemology of planning has also been a positivist and masculine undertaking. 
According to Leonie Sandercock (1998 p.68, 70)
Feminists argue that positivist epistemology excludes women as ‘knowers’ or 
agents of knowledge and excludes women’s life experiences as valid foci of 
study; that this rise of science is a masculine one; and that history has been 
written only from the point of view of men of the dominant class and race.
[Feminists] insist on the importance of discussing the politics of theory and 
method and the origins and implications of our theoretical hierarchies. ..[They] 
insist on paying attention to the political content of knowledge creation, to the
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ways in which knowledges are institutionalized, and to who benefits from the 
production of which knowledge.
[They further] . . . argue that knowledge is not, has never been, gender 
neutral and that knowledge in planning, for example, is loaded with 
assumptions about the appropriate relations (of subordination and 
domination) between the sexes, as well as with assumptions about who is 
the legitimate knower.
It is worth quoting and listening at length to what Leonie Sandercock says, both 
because it is so eloquent but also because it illustrates how profoundly absent 
has been the female voice in planning and science until very recently. It also 
helps to explain why and how planning theory had to change over the past forty 
years, in part because this female perspective came to be heard.
Technocratic (Positivist) Planning
While city planning was not unknown even in the large industrial cities of Europe 
and North America, it was the experience of Keynesian economics, socialist 
experimentation and the large scale planning required by the operations of the 
Second World War that encouraged a shift from design to scientific planning. 
Wartime reconstruction in Europe and economic ‘reconstruction’ in the U.S. 
posed huge planning problems on those two continents. War accounted for the 
destruction of property in European cities, while sophisticated political-economic 
‘forces’ accomplished some of the same levels of destruction in northeastern, 
industrial cities in the U.S., though this was little understood even by scientific 
planners, until Marxist structural analysis in the 1970’s laid bare the workings of 
capitalism in urban space.1 Also little understood were the enormous human 
costs in community mutilation and population displacement as a result of this 
destruction, something that (anti-humanist) social science and planning were 
simply blind to at that time.
Nevertheless, extensive applications of positive science brought new methods 
into areas like transportation planning, which use concepts from physics, such 
as the gravity model, and management and programming, which use concepts 
from systems theory and decision theory. Planning theory was assumed to be 
rational, objective and clinical. It sought to use theoretical (cause and effect) 
social science knowledge to regulate and control society for the good of all, 
good being defined by outside political processes or ‘common sense’. It sought 
to influence decisions, suggest regulations such as zoning ordinances and 
subdivision regulations to rationalize space. In other contexts it sought to 
influence social policies and to rationalize the delivery of public services by 
regulating the public sector for the improvement of social life. It was a planning
1 A German mortgage banker visiting St.Louis in the early 1970’s exclaimed that he had never seen 
such destruction of property as that in central St.Louis, except in Berlin after the war!
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theory focused upon instrumental rationality, which studied organization theory, 
decision theory, systems theory, policy making and public choice theory, etc. It 
put emphasis on controlling and simulating reality, using explanations developed 
in the positivist social sciences. It was and is a planning theory of means, giving 
less importance to the substance of what is being planned for than to the 
methods that a proper planning theory should employ.
Positivist (modernist) planning sought to be comprehensive (to include all 
elements in the system being planned for), rational (to choose the most efficient 
means to achieve the stated goals), technocratic (to operate as an engineering 
model), objective (to act in no one’s particular, but in the ‘system’s’ interest), and 
public (to act in the public sphere and in the public interest). While there was a 
utopian urge in 19th century planning, this was largely lost under the positivist 
paradigm where it was replaced by system efficiency and other mechanistic 
concepts borrowed from the natural sciences. Furthermore, planners, 
because of their ‘superior’ knowledge based in positivist social science, were 
thought to occupy a privileged position in determining the ‘best possible future’ 
and the best means for arriving there. Needless to say, few practicing planners 
believed in their privileged position for more than five minutes after they 
confronted the real centers of privilege (power) in their actual planning work , 
though the technocratic model took much longer to displace and may still 
occupy premier status in the minds of most planners, practicing or academic, 
because of its symbolic importance as an occupational emblem. (Allmendinger 
1999, pp.3, 250-4).
Scientific or positivist planning was and is closely related to the philosophy of 
social science from which it sprang in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Marios Camhis (1979) has traced these connections, suggesting and criticizing 
the evolution of scientific planning theory in the period up to the late 1970’s. His 
first point is to stress the difference between a theory ‘of planning’ and theories 
‘in planning’, the latter referring to substantive areas in which planning is in 
operation, a distinction drawn by Henry Hightower (1969) in the late sixties. 
Camhis (1979, p.6) stresses, in this respect, the real danger that an over 
emphasis on a theory of planning will lead to an occupational blindness to the 
substantive areas within planning, which themselves would suggest a planning 
strategy for leading that area into a better possible future. Ultimately, this raises 
the question of whether there can ever be a scientific theory of planning, based 
as it is on the mechanistic assumptions of positivist science, or whether a 
different set of ontological assumptions might suggest that this notion is naive, if 
not down right counter productive to whatever progressive impulses professional
2 In 1959-60 I toured 20 North American cities, from Tampa to Anchorage and from Los Angeles to 
Montreal, where I interviewed planning directors, for Doxiadis’ ‘City of the Future’ project. It was 
amazing how closely they already followed the patterns suggested by the phenomenology of 
planning developed by academics in the 1980’s and 1990’s, at least insofar as they negotiated with 
various powerful actors on the urban scene (see below).
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planning might contain. But before examining this ‘aporia’, it would be well to 
retrace some of the ground covered in Chapter 1 as it relates to a theory of 
planning.
Camhis examines the scientific pedigree of planning within the ontological 
dichotomies of rationalism-irrationalism and materialism- idealism. The former 
dichotomy refers to the use of reason and intellect versus the use of the 
(irrational) supernatural and mystical, and is distinct from the meaning of 
rationalism as a deductive system based upon a priori assumptions, axioms and 
theorems, which, as we shall see, also can be related to a certain approach in 
planning. The former meaning of rational is more general than, and may even 
be seen to incorporate, the latter meaning. The latter meaning contrasts 
deductive reasoning, where conclusions are drawn in a strict logical way from 
initial axiomatic statements, with inductive reasoning, where conclusions are 
drawn empirically from observation in the ‘real’ world. Idealism, on the other 
hand, constructs criteria for assessing an adequate understanding of reality and 
judges the perception of reality in relation to those criteria, whereas materialism 
believes that objects are real and the criteria for understanding them vary 
according to our improved understanding of them. An example of idealism 
would be the belief that only those things that can be examined by the scientific 
method actually exist (at least from a rational standpoint), whereas an example 
of materialism would be the belief that wolves are different than dogs even if we 
cannot (at first) perceive a difference between them, or that the world is 
structured even if we can only see the effects of those structures, etc. The 
tendency of positivist science to reify method is not unlike the tendency of 
planning theory to reify instrumentalist rationality; they both lead to a form of 
idealism. So long as planning theory is a theory of means, a theory emphasizing 
instrumental rationality without concern for ends or for the substance of that 
which is being planned for, it is an idealist effort. Fortunately, neither planning 
nor science follow the strict rules of their philosophies, with the result that both 
science and planning are far more flexible pragmatically than their norms would 
suggest.
The results of this variability have not always been for the better, as Camhis 
illustrates in the examination of the twists and turns of science and planning. He 
examines one form of ‘rational comprehensive planning’ as the closest 
approach to the more narrow a priori deductive rationality defined above, where 
a utopian vision or blueprint is proposed as the axiomatic format for the planning 
process. This approach generally assumes some form of ‘environmental 
determinism’ as the basis for the anticipated success of the implemented plan. 
A comprehensive plan may also set a number of goals given to it from 
elsewhere (political processes, market processes, etc.) These goals serve as a 
priori axioms, on the basis of which planning strategies are deduced, i.e., the 
application of instrumental rationality assures that the most efficient means to 
achieve the given goals will be derived. Deductive rational planning may work
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well in a business enterprise because there is one over riding goal, to make a 
profit, and all other actions and objectives are subordinate to it. Planning in 
society, however, has to accommodate a complex variety of goals, not all of 
which are compatible, a question that is repressed in the deductive planning 
approach.
Capitalism has given rise to various ‘explanations’ about how overall (social) 
rationality is to be achieved. One is to assume generally, as did neo-classical 
economics, that the sum of individuals acting in a rational way would 
automatically produce a rational (social) whole. That different individuals might 
have different access to information, resources and power and that those who 
are advantaged with respect to this access could constitute themselves as a 
group or class that acts collectively to enhance this access at the expense of 
other individuals, or that business enterprises themselves would at some point 
declare themselves, legally as ‘individuals’, even though their ‘individual’ budgets 
are larger than those of some countries, has simply been ignored in much of this 
subsequent (neo)liberal thought. The other explanation assumes that society is 
like an organism (or system) and will automatically, as such, rationalize its 
various parts. These two views are not incompatible and in some ways 
presuppose each other. Furthermore, they both serve to obscure the differential 
role of political-economic power and, more importantly, have led planners to 
believe that the interests of the advantaged and powerful class were 
coterminous with the public interest (Camhis 1979, pp.23-24).
A modification on the strictly deductive approach is one which treats planning as 
‘advanced decision making’, where a general set of goals is established, the 
means for achieving them outlined, the likely consequences of each examined 
in relation to the original set of goals, and a final choice of means established on 
the basis of this process (Camhis, 1979, p.30). As Camhis points out, this 
moves the idea of rational planning towards the more general meaning of 
rational (as opposed to the irrational) and away from the previous restricted 
deductive meaning of the term. In fact, he likens this compromise to the 
hypothetico-deductive approach of science generally, where hypotheses are 
tested or verified against empirical facts in the same way that alternative 
planning strategies are tested against the stated goals.
As it turns out the idealist reification of method in planning has suffered the 
same ‘discontent’ as the hypothetico-deductive method in science, as seen in 
Chapter 1. Thus, Popperian ‘falsification’ as an attempt to preserve rationality in 
science was paralleled by ‘disjointed-incrementalism’, or ‘muddling through’ as 
the British planners called it, as an attempt to preserve rationality (in the more 
general sense) in planning (Camhis, 1979, ch.2). The proposal to abandon 
large scale utopian engineering in planning is in keeping with Popper’s anti­
communist sentiments in his political writings, not that such large-scale planning 
in the Soviet Union was not fraught with difficulties, many of which have been
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examined in the planning literature as problems associated with trying to 
establish goals and planning strategies in a complex social system (Braybrooke, 
and Lindblom, 1963 and Lindblom, 1965).
Nevertheless, incrementalism must be seen for what it is, an attempt to maintain 
the status quo. It would accomplish this by making only small-scale changes or 
corrections in the social system, whose effects could be closely monitored. It 
was, to quote an anti-poverty program director in the mid-sixties, speaking to a 
group of us eager recruits, planning that “would change something so that 
nothing need be changed”. It was “. . . a problem-directed rather than a goal- 
directed approach” (Camhis, 1979, p.41). If the status quo represents the order 
of things as desired by those with power in society, and if incrementalist 
planning will not even examine questions of power, let alone change anything 
other than that which would enhance the powerful, one can see that any claim to 
real progress is contradictory to this form of planning. Camhis (1979, p.54) also 
examines the use of systems theory in planning and directs the same criticism 
at it:
[Systems theory], . . tries to imitate the natural and biological sciences; 
makes non-valid analogies; includes only those aspects of reality that can be 
quantified; and ignores what is not susceptible to mathematical analysis.
Finally, both systems theory and falsification are ahistorical and conservative.
Efforts have been made to seek a ‘happy medium’ between the deductive 
rationality of the comprehensive plan and the non-change approach of 
incrementalism planning, so as to give planning a more realistic role without 
suggesting such a tightly controlled logic. Mixed-scanning, developed by Amitai 
Etzioni (1973, 1968), seeks to combine deductive rationalism and
incrementalism in an approach that allows both high-level goal setting and 
incremental planning decisions, with continuous effort to relate these two levels 
during the planning process. Such an approach to planning allows a good deal 
of feedback during implementation and mitigates the deterministic tendencies 
found in comprehensive planning. This approach does not resolve the issue of 
combining often-incompatible goals, however, or of even arriving at an agreed 
upon set of general goals in the first place, and thus begs the question of how 
specific decisions are to be related in the feedback process. Thus planners and 
decision makers would need supernatural powers of foresight if they were to 
evaluate effects of specific decisions on the overall course of planning. This is 
especially true in the application of systems theory and cybernetics to the 
planning process, given that these techniques are useful in closed or nearly 
closed systems, whereas social systems are always open, especially in the 
context of modern capitalism (but even socialism, as the former Soviet Union or 
utopian religious communities in the U.S. have learned to this dismay).
Mixed scanning is compared by Camhis (1979, pp.65-72) to Imre Lakatos’ 
(1970) ‘methodology of scientific research programmes’, suggesting that both
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efforts brought more flexibility and pragmatism to the processes of planning and 
science. But both were . . unwilling to expose further difficulties inherent in 
the attempt to define ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ criteria that can be applied in the 
process of planning or in the philosophy of science, as well as the difficulties 
present in trying to solve problems through the specification of a methodology 
that claims universal applicability” (Camhis, 1979, p.72). These and further 
unresolved problems in the uses of instrumental rationality are summarized by 
Sandercock (1998,p.88) in a quote from Judith Innes (1995, p.88):
Rittel and Weber (1973). . . pointed out ‘wickedproblems' which could not be 
solved because the problem definition kept shifting and there was no way to 
aggregate incommensurable values. The unsolvable puzzles were many, 
including the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), the prisoner’s dilemma 
(Rapaport and Chammah 1965), the failure of collective action (Olson 1965), 
the limitations of Cost-Benefit analysis and other systematic analytic methods 
(Rivlin 1971), the indeterminacy of the implementation process (Bardock 
1977; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), the inevitability of uncertainty in goal 
and technology for planning problems (Christensen 1985), the impossibility of 
aggregating the public interest so that its optimization can be amenable to 
rational systematic analysis (Altshuler 1965), and the impossibility of relying 
on the large-scale model for societal guidance (Lee 1973). [For references, 
see Innes article]
All of these methods and their inherent dilemmas are predicated on the use of 
monetary values as a measure of benefits and costs, and on the assumption 
that all human welfare can be reduced to such values. Indeed, this fact may 
have done more damage to humanity than all the above dilemmas combined. 
This question will be taken up in Chapter 10, in an attempt to humanize planning 
theory.
Finally, rational (positivist) planning borrowed not only the deterministic and 
mechanistic assumptions of positivist social science, but also its misplaced 
arrogance; both believed that they were real centers of power in modern, mass 
(capitalist) society, this power deriving from the superior knowledge to be gained 
from applications of certain scientific methodology to the understanding and 
explanation of society. This certainty, this arrogance disappeared to some 
extent among practicing planners and applied social scientists, at least to a 
greater extent than it did among academic theorists. Nevertheless, the effects 
of this attitude were strong enough to create a rather dark side of planning 
history, modified only in part by the ‘enlightenment’ of the 1960’s (Flyvbjerg 
1996). This history is marked by the absence of any mention of the contribution 
of women to planned solutions to social problems in the past (Sandercock, 
1998, pp.37-38). Even worse the modernist architect- planner embodies:
... an implicit conceptualization of planning as a system of installing 
patriarch order, a system of gendered control of urban space in which 
women's place was in the realm of the emotions, the body, the private - that
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is, the home. In Hooper's (1998) reading, modernist planning is a masculinist 
order, ultimately, a masculinist fantasy of control (Sandercock, 1998, p.24)
Also absent is any mention of the fate of minorities at the hands of state 
planners, ranging from American segregation policies resulting in a whole 
system of planned ‘reservations’ for Native Americans, or public housing 
‘projects’, as they were referred to in postwar American cities, as places where 
Blacks were ‘concentrated’. It is important to reveal these aspects of ‘rational 
planning’ because . . unless we discuss these hidden intentions and 
consequences of planning practices, we will continue to perpetuate them” 
(Sandercock, 1998, p.41)
There have been important shifts in planning theory and practice as a result of 
the critiques elaborated above, but there has apparently been no global shift in 
professional attitudes. As Allmendinger (1999, p.3) states:
. . . planning and planners are [not] pushing for any great change or re- 
evaluation of their role. After 50 years, the message emanating from 
academies and professional [in the U.K.] seems to be ‘business as usual, 
please'. The 1997 Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) members survey 
found that the main reason for becoming a member was career progression 
while central government areas seem as the main source of thinking about 
planning . . . The technocratic professional seems alive and well.
The reason why this is so is because planning in the advanced capitalist 
countries has a social status; it has arrived as a profession; and, most of all, it is 
not a threat to the status quo. Its status is based exactly upon its technical skills, 
its quantitative methodology, and the mystifying language of mathematics. Most 
planners are not willing to jeopardize their social (professional) status by 
suggesting that rational planning is not all that it appears to be. It must give an 
impression of objectivity and certainty and ward off the fear of anarchy, of chaos. 
At the same time, it does embody cultural capital; it is symbolically important and 
socially legitimated. Even if planning is not strictly rational, it must, for 
sociological reasons, offer the illusion that it is.
The Phenomenological Turn
The dilemmas in technocratic planning theory eventually fostered a search for 
new ways of explaining the social and professional role of planning. This 
entailed a phenomenological turn in planning theory which encompassed two 
separate but related questions: 1) what do planners actually do, a sort of 
'ethnomethodology' of planning?, and, 2) what should planners do, given a 
growing understanding of the phenomenology of their activities? The latter has 
usually been seen to entail a discussion of good communication techniques, 
often with the framework of a Habermasian ideal speech situation.
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A fortunate turn of events in the Unites States prompted this interest in the 
phenomenology of planning, though it has never been referred to as such in the 
now extensive literature on 'what is to be done' in planning once the technocratic 
model had been seen to be inadequate. Because the United States has 
enormous financial resources to throw at social-political problems, 
notwithstanding various other economic parameters that accompany any given 
stage in the evolution of its always troubled capitalist political-economic system, 
it could create a social mechanism outside the usual channels of local municipal 
planning, This it did in the 1960’s when the Great Society program gave birth to 
hundreds of community planning projects with funding directly from the federal 
government. In the process it created a class of planners interested in planning 
at that level and, to some degree at least, outside the immediate control of the 
local municipal planning authorities.
These community planners became, in time, a set of ‘Guerillas in the 
Bureaucracy’ (Needleman and Needleman, 1974), many of whom identified with 
their communities and often in conflict with the (technocratic) planning agencies 
who also employed them. While technocratic planners in the U.S. prior to this 
time had generally understood the limitations of positivist planning and had 
accepted the ‘political’ and communicative dimensions of planning, they had 
rarely shifted their identity to the disadvantaged to the degree that community 
planners in the 1960’s and early 1970’s did. This identity shift translated 
ultimately into an opposition between planning conceived as something to be 
accomplished by trained technocratic professionals and planning which requires 
the meaningful participation of those affected by the planning, with all that this 
might imply in terms of both the training that planners should receive, as well as 
the actual set of professional activities they should engage in. Not only were 
early community planners unprepared for this type of planning, but neither were 
the communities themselves, to say nothing of the existing institutional 
structures of planning in American cities. Indeed, as the Needlemans say, 
(1974, p.89) "Community planning fits into the community's expectations and the 
city's institutional structures like a heretic in church", an idea expressed by 
Theodore Roszak (1969) in somewhat more colorful language in the 60’s when 
referring to the introduction of moral questions into the cathedral of positive 
science.
Most community planners, therefore, educated themselves on the job, so to 
speak. They sometimes found themselves serving as lightning rods for 
community anger, which was often the case when they were identified with the 
'establishment'. In more positive circumstances they would serve as providers 
of technical knowledge and/or guides through the government bureaucracies, 
and, ultimately as allies in community struggles for community planning 
objectives or against threatening city policies (Needleman and Needleman, 
1974, p. 63-4). In most cases they were caught up in an exhausting round of 
meetings and activities with an emotional involvement that could only be 
compared to life in the theater. Indeed, community planning is much more
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closely related to theater and art than it is to science and engineering, 
suggesting much of what was to become the new metaphor for planning under 
the phenomenological perspective.
Community planners thus found themselves thrust onto the urban stage as 
protagonists with little knowledge of what to expect. The past history of 
undemocratic, technocratic planning had created a backlog of hostility which 
often attached to the planner as the nearest target. Only time and hard work 
could deflect this hostility to others in the local bureaucracy, not always 
necessarily other planners. Here community education could play an important 
role, teaching citizens where the true power actually lay, directing attention to the 
'managers of the circus, and not its clowns', as it were, assuming the community 
planners were in command of such a structuralist understanding in the first 
place, of course. Other dilemmas were even more difficult to resolve. For 
example, communities were more likely to be interested in social priorities, while 
city planning is directed to physical interventions. Furthermore, there were often 
conflicts of interest between community priorities and overall urban 
requirements, and, finally, communities and their planners have usually had 
limited ability (power) to influence larger events on the urban scene (Needleman 
and Neeldeman, 1974, p.86).
Confronted by the problems inherent in conflicts between community and city­
wide planning, some (advocacy type) planners became guerillas in the 
bureaucracy, undermining the actions of the official planners, and sometimes 
engaging in open administrative insurgency (Needleman and Needleman, 1974, 
p.120). This posed a more general problem for planning, both as theory and as 
practice: should community (or advocacy) planners merely reflect community 
needs or should they also seek to educate communities and their citizens to 
better understand the political-economic structure of the city and their 'true' 
needs within it? This question leads beyond the (descriptive) phenomenology of 
planning and will be taken up in the last part of this chapter. It is important to 
realize, nevertheless, how moving out of the official institutionalized role of 
technocratic planning has opened the door to these and other such questions 
for the profession as a whole.
Community planners confront most of the same sorts of problems that 
anthropologists have confronted as they began to move out of the 'armchair' and 
into the field since the early twentieth century. Planners who move beyond the 
'armchair' of their traditional technocratic role could benefit immensely from the 
accumulated experience of anthropology and phenomenological sociology in 
this respect (Junker, 1960; Jongmans, 1967; Williams, 1967). Fieldwork (and 
community planning) require gaining entrance to a community, winning the 
confidence of the local population, listening to and understanding the socially 
constructed reality of the community, constantly deepening this understanding 
by checking it against actual situations and with a range of local informants, 
avoiding leadership roles so as not to disrupt the community upon departure.
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and so forth. The contrast between this sort of professional activity and that of 
the more male-oriented technocratic planning is the same as, and, indeed, is 
informed by, the contrast between a male-oriented positivism and a 
phenomenological social science.
The Needleman's (1974, Ch.6) applied these phenomenological techniques to a 
description of the socially constructed reality of planning generally in American 
cities in the early 1970s. Planning, for all its legitimate place in urban 
government, has had no clear role in the minds of local political leaders. As the 
Needleman's say (1974, p.169),
... the concept of rationalized centralized city planning fits awkwardly into 
the fundamentally irrational value system of a 'liberal' [read capitalist] society
. . .the physical shape of the city is still determined primarily by private 
developers who follow the logic of individual profits rather than rational land 
development, and the administrative policies of city government are usually 
based on considerations of politics rather than planning, decisions.
The Needleman’s labeled the planning style which develops within such an 
irrational context 'counter-irrationality'. Staff assignments, project development 
and even hiring practices are determined more by political expediency than by 
any rational organizational plan. Planners act more like librarians, technical 
advisors and legitimators of politically motivated decisions than anything 
suggested in the professional role model. Technocratic planning itself is 
fragmented, ad hoc and spasmodic in such a context, further contributing to the 
'discontent' of the profession. Nonetheless, many technocratic planners have 
clung to their professional identity, for the reasons discussed above, which often 
brings them into conflict with community-based planners who are much more 
politicized, more democratic and more radical in their approach to planning. In 
fact, the latter consider it to be immoral and professionally irresponsible not to 
be more interested in the execution or implementation of plans, however much 
this might involve them in political and even insurgent guerilla activities within 
the urban administration.
Actual contact with the people has forced community planners to realize that 
social problems cannot be solved with physical plans, undermining the 
'environmental, or physical determinism' that is so common among technocratic 
planners. Given that the history of city planning since the nineteenth century on 
has been a history of physical planning, one can see how disquieting this new 
approach to planning has been for the profession. Nevertheless, an awareness 
that physical blight is a product of deeper social structural problems is an 
important insight that community planning has brought to planning thought, one 
that leaves physically-oriented planners at a loss as to what they should do, 
indeed, as to what they are, professionally, causing a potential identity crisis of 
no small proportions.
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One response to this insight that physical problems are a product of social or 
political-economic causes is simply to ignore it. Practicing technocratic planners 
are quite aware of the tenuous status of planning as a substantive activity within 
the political economy of capitalism, though they are unlikely to see it in such 
terms. In any case, they are not willing to jeopardize this tenuous and the social 
and economic rewards that it entails by imagining themselves as anything other 
than 'good’ technocrats. But the Pandora's box of citizen involvement, and a 
deeper level of structural understanding, was opened by the community 
planning experiment in the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Now the ineffectiveness of 
planning can be seen not as a psychological problem for disappointed, often 
cynical professional planners, but ultimately as a social and political-economic 
problem, with all that this entails for planning thought and practice. Nor is this 
dilemma restricted to planning; it extends to most of the professions offering 
services to the people, from health care professionals, to social workers, to child 
psychologists, to educators, and so on.
The rebellion against systems of authority and discrimination that marked the 
1960’s, and which gave rise to a complex of thought that would later be called 
postmodernism, also gave rise to the community planning experiment in the 
United States as part of a general State reaction that sought to 'change 
something so that nothing need be changed'. This experiment, along with a 
general surge in awareness associated with the "Making of a Counterculture", to 
quote the title of Rozzak's (1969) influential book, has resulted in a serious 
(re)examination of the actual phenomenology of planning within academia and 
the profession. 'Hidden' forms of discrimination against women, minorities, 
homosexuals, etc., have been shown to be associated with the positivist theory 
of planning (Sandercock 1998; Dear 2000). Attention has also turned to the 
politics and persuasion involved in planning practice (Hoch 1996a, 1996b, 
Forester 1989, Fischer and Forester 1993), to the question of citizen 
participation (Pateman 1970, Burke 1979, Fagence 1977, Healey 1997), and to 
the need to democratize planning and decision-making generally (Zisk 1992; 
Pierce, et al 1992; Svara 1994; Fischer 1994; Clarke and Rempel 1997; Turner 
and Hulme 1997; Douglas and Friedman 1998; Steinmetz 1999; Larsen 2000; 
Estrella 2000; Watson and Barber 2000). Also examined have been questions 
relating to the ethics of planning (Wachs, 1985; Harper and Stein 1992; Hendler 
1995).
Each of these new areas of interest suggests new roles for planners and new 
knowledge and skills that have not been a part of the preparation for the 
technocratic professional role. Certain skills, like argumentation and negotiation, 
are necessarily learned on the job, but in the postmodern world of planning the 
range of voices that has to be heard has increased dramatically. And the more 
voices that must be heard, the more complex and less technical becomes the 
planning process. Technocratically oriented planners seek precise engineering 
solutions, but the socially constructed reality of planning is more like the 
competing voices of the theater, the parliament, or the 'agora'. In such contexts,
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humans have to make choices between apparently equally valid claims. These 
are ethical choices and there are few technical or instrumental means for 
making them. Positivist social scientists and technocratic planners have sought 
to escape the painful distress of such choices by regressing to and reifying their 
methods. The new phenomenological turn in planning theory has argued 
forcefully against this reification, and has exposed planning thought to the 
messy reality of argumentation and rhetoric (Fischer and Forester, 1993). Thus, 
Throgmorton, (1993, p. 117) suggests that
, . . all planning and analysis is rhetorical [author's emphasis], and that tools 
such as survey research, computer modeling, and forecasting can be thought 
of as rhetorical tropes; that is as figures of speech and argument that give 
persuasive power to the larger narratives of which they are a part. As 
rhetorical tropes used in practice, such tools also construct the planning 
analyst's character and the kinds of communities that can be formed between 
planning analysts and their audiences.
If planning analyses and documents are seen as rhetorical devices (in addition 
to whatever technical purposes they might serve), then planners must consider 
what this means. In other words, different audiences might require different 
presentations, as architects, for example, use models and renderings for lay 
audiences and sections and plans for audiences composed of fellow architects. 
Indeed, actual buildings may serve this rhetorical purpose for architects and 
their clients (Gutenschwager, 1996). Furthermore, planning as rhetoric must 
also then be seen as part of a conversation, statements directed towards actual 
or anticipated responses from an audience or audiences relevant to the planning 
situation. Learning to read audiences and imagining how they will respond 
requires hermeneutic skills of the sort that politicians either must learn or, more 
often, possess intuitively. Here ambiguity is frequently more useful than 
precision, as this allows more flexibility in interpretation by different audiences 
who will 'read into' utterances what they wish to hear, as a result of the 
psychology of 'selective perception'. The reason for drawing attention to this 
rhetorical aspect of planning is not to suggest some Machiavellian use of 
language, but to emphasize the importance of being understood (and not 
misunderstood) in the service of more adequate communication during the 
planning process. In other words, research results, technical documents and 
planning statements are not neutral, as positivist science and planning theory 
would lead us to believe. The very same technical information can be used in a 
variety of ways and for a variety of purposes, all of which must be imagined and 
understood by planners as they go about their professional activities; the age of 
technocratic innocence is being eclipsed by a phenomenological sophistication 
in planning theory.
The understanding of selective perception and reception of communication can 
be deepened by recalling the importance of paradigms in the history of science 
or the systems of relevance and multiple social realties as discussed in Part I of 
this book. At a national or regional scale, these frames of reference are
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understood as culture, but within planning situations they may be constituted by 
such things as professional training, class location or life generally. Especially 
important are those associated with minority status in a larger dominant culture. 
In this sense, Rein and Schon (1993, p.148) refer to the distinction between 
'policy disagreements' and 'policy controversies', the former referring to conflicts 
within a given frame of reference which can usually be resolved through 
reference to the commonly agreed-upon rules within the frame, and the latter to 
conflict between frames of reference which cannot be so easily resolved 
because "the same body of evidence can be used to support quite different 
policy positions". Conflict resolution in the latter case reminds of the problems 
Kuhn describes in the process of paradigm conflict. Because frames of 
reference, like paradigms, are composed of a complex set of normative and 
ontological assumptions, as well as sets of evidence and facts related to them, it 
is often necessary to delve into these subjective depths in order to resolve 
conflict between competing frames. This generally is a long and sometimes 
painful process because of the interactions between cognitive, emotional and 
ethical presuppositions that mark the acquisition of a frame of reference. Thus, 
it is not unlike the transformational demands placed upon planners who confront 
the shift from a technocratic to a phenomenological framework in planning 
theory, itself.
The specter of relativism is never far from a discussion on frames of reference, 
indeed, postmodernism glorifies this relativism. However, decisions cannot be 
made in a totally relativistic world; some closure is always needed if a specific 
action is to proceed. Specific problems often force an examination of 
paradigmatic assumptions in this respect, hopefully leading to an understanding 
that sometimes assumptions, as well as their frameworks, are useful and 
applicable only in certain circumstances, some of which may no longer even be 
in force. In this context, the planner’s ability to translate across frameworks and 
circumstances to illustrate the appropriateness of one or the other perspective is 
a very useful negotiating skill. This is not just a question of translating issues 
and circumstances into the, sometimes mystifying, language of positivist social 
science or technocratic planning, a defensive course of action often chosen in 
earlier, innocent times. Rather, this is the need to be able to interpret and 
understand the differing social realities and to find some common ground 
among them, if possible. Just being sensitive to this as an issue is the most 
important first step to developing this skill.
A more hazardous course for planners is the attempt to de-reify the 
assumptions and inferences in a given framework, assuming, of course, that 
they have already been able to do this for their own framework. Here, 
assumptions are examined for what they are, the product of human thought and 
experience, not the product of divine inspiration, natural 'law', or some other 
outside force, something which their taken-for-grantedness is likely to 
encourage. I say 'hazardous' because de-reification is a more painful experience
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even than conversion to a new framework, it not only has great emotional and 
moral costs, but it also confronts the chaos of social existence. It is the 
supreme loss of certainty; once again glorified by postmodernism, but not to be 
taken lightly.
These are all issues raised by the context of this discussion on frames of 
reference. If positive science is no longer the only framework within which policy 
and planning controversies can be resolved, then nothing can substitute for a 
planning theory that is sophisticated in the social psychology of phenomenology 
and hermeneutics, and in seeking to generate a social context within which such 
understandings are made possible. This is an important prerequisite to the ideal 
speech situation to which Habermas' theory of communicative action is directed 
(Habermas, 1984). It is a situation in which different parties may listen to each 
other's 'stories' and from them understand the sometimes hidden biases in 
presupposition and belief that guide different judgements and behaviors (Dryzek 
1993). Dryzek makes an important distinction between clients and audiences in 
this respect. Persuading clients, the typical situation in the architectural design 
model of planning, for example, is quite different from persuading an audience, 
many of whom may have no interest in implementing a given policy or a plan. 
Indeed, they may see this as threatening to some of their own policies and 
plans.
In the past these potential conflicts of interest would have been resolved by 
reference to 'objective' facts and scientific (positivist) reasoning. In the United 
States, at least, it was the failure of this approach to succeed in most of its 
major efforts in the 1960s and 1970s that caused a change in the approach to 
national policy-making and planning. Dryzek (1993, p.219) quotes DeLeon 
(1998, p.96) here: "If the Great Society programs, Vietnam and the energy crisis 
taught anything to policy scholars and practitioners, it should have been humility 
regarding both the power of their tools and their roles in actual decision making". 
While these statements suggest a structural analysis of these 'failures', one 
which would place them in the context of the world capitalist system (see below), 
they can still be examined within a phenomenological framework, which is 
necessary, in any case, in order for a critical planning theory to be advanced. 
The call for an ethic of communication in planning and policy discourse is of 
unusual importance in any system that calls itself democratic, and is probably 
indispensable if planning is to succeed in such a framework. An ethic of 
communication would involve ". . . exposing and counteracting manipulation of 
agendas, illegitimate exercises of power, skewed distribution of information, and 
attempts to distract attention . . . Dialogue in the ideal speech situation is free 
from deception, self-deception, domination, strategizing, and any exclusion of 
participants or arguments" (Dryzek 1993, p.228).
These rules should lead to a search not only for a new critical approach to 
planning, but to democracy in general. Current 'democratic' systems are rife with 
the violation of these rules, which would account for the growing discontent with
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established political institutions. Planners have to work in the face of this 
antipathy, as well as in the face of ignorance. Thus, in addition to their skills as 
learners (in the anthropological sense) and as communicators, they must also 
develop skills as educators.
Education is a special case of translation, but also, as we shall see, a special 
case of learning as well. Unlike the translation among competing frames of 
reference in a policy debate, education is involved in translating complex, 
technical information into common, everyday language. Citizen participation, in 
particular, but even participation by business or political leaders, may require 
extensive education about the likely effect of any given course of action, such as 
the implementation of a plan or the application of a policy. Given the variation in 
paradigmatic suppositions outlined in Part I of this book, one can appreciate that 
this is not simply a matter of translating scientific (mechanistic) explanations into 
everyday language; it is a problem of allowing social reality to be presented in all 
of its positivist, phenomenological and structural complexity. This problem of 
translation takes us far beyond the idea of the ‘report’ and the ‘presentation’, 
however clearly formatted with audio-visual techniques they may be.
Besides the methodological variation suggested by differing social science 
paradigms, planning research, itself, is a form of directed learning for planners. 
As such, it could be directed in part to anticipated planning actions themselves 
(Argyris, et al, 1985). This would entail, among other things, participation of 
those affected by the research in the actual design of the research (Argyris, et 
al, 1985, p.xiii). In this way the research process would be a learning experience 
for citizens as well, while also ensuring that the results of the research would not 
be 'alien' to those citizens. Such an approach to research would direct attention 
to those things that might need to be changed, i.e., subjected to planning or 
policy actions, something which neither positivist nor phenomenological 
research is necessarily aimed at accomplishing (Argyris 1985, Ch.8). 
Meanwhile, a communicative, participatory approach could further alter the way 
such planning-oriented research intentions were realized, when contrasted to 
the technocratic approach.
Another teaching-learning technique which could be used in planning and policy 
analysis is focus groups (Kreuger, 1994). Focus groups are small groups of 8- 
10 people, hopefully representative of a larger community, who meet to discuss 
a specific topic. They have been used mainly as a marketing device, but 
constitute an approach that lends itself to social research and participatory 
planning as well. Focus groups require a moderator who guides the discussion 
and some means of keeping a record. While they have been used mostly as a 
research technique, there is no reason why they cannot also be used to 
educate, or to experiment with ways of educating citizens on planning problems 
and issues, if the focus groups are representative of, or even include, citizens 
with leadership roles in larger communities, the effects can be amplified. At the
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same time, valuable in-depth information can be gained about how best to 
communicate to larger communities on any given set of issues.
A more complex learning device that could be employed in citizen education is 
the simulation game. Simulation games can not only abstract on and summarize 
important aspects of any planning situation, they also require participation and 
human interaction, valuable attributes in any learning situation (Boocock and 
Schild 1968). They also allow attention to focus on the importance of the rules 
that govern the game and, thus, on the aspect of social reality to which they 
refer. In this sense, games are free to allow exploration of any form of 
maximizing behavior for individuals and/or groups, not just that related to 
monetary values to which most planning situations are reduced. Thus, important 
human needs, such as security, self-esteem, or even self-actualization can be 
played out in the gaming situation allowing insight into some of the 'hidden' 
benefits and costs of planning situations. Group needs for democracy, 
participation, justice or the destructive (or constructive) effects of competition or 
conflict, can also be built into and evaluated in the gaming situation.
Simulation games have the ability to combine both mechanistic and/or systems 
aspects of social reality with more humanistic attributes such as those on which 
phenomenology and/or theater are based. If the puzzle is the prototypical 
positivist form and theater is the prototype for artistic form, the simulation game 
has the unique ability to combine these forms in a particularly satisfying way.
[The simulation game] .... combines both theater and puzzle. It 
accommodates both dramatic and mechanistic forms of behavior, and 
perhaps more importantly, it may be perceived in both of these forms by the 
players. The result is that while players attempt to solve the puzzle or 
mechanism that underlies the game, as the author of the game had to solve 
and validate the 'puzzle1 in the real world in order to construct the game, they 
are also aware that the game may have a variety of outcomes. They may 
also be helped to understand . . . that the rules governing the play of the 
game are representative - and reasonably so - of the real world rules. 
Nevertheless, the rules governing the game mechanism are largely a 
scientific convenience designed to produce the appropriate outcomes in 
relation to the range of possible decisions by the players. The players play 
against the ‘black box' of the game mechanism much as they play against a 
real world only partially known to them. In that respect, the game is 'real'. At 
the same time, they interact with other players within a moral context of 
things to do and not to do, and in the end judge the outcomes as good or bad 
for themselves or others. In this respect, also, the game is 'real'. Solving the 
puzzle, however, and judging the play and its outcomes (as both action and 
theater) are two quite different acts of knowing, and they derive from the 
ability of the game to reflect reality from the two different points of view 
expressed above. The puzzle has but one solution, the one built into the 
mechanism of the game, but the outcomes deriving from the goal-seeking 
actions and interactions of the players can be many. Judging the outcomes is 
generally based upon criteria existing outside the game itself, though the 
game experience ought to illustrate the implications of the judgements 
underlying the rules of play and the effects of these rules on the players'
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judgements and on the outcome of the game. This in turn is much like the 
experience of watching the outcome of a play [or story], where the 
audiences, and actors, experience the effects of the actors' moral 
judgements and their derived actions (Gutenschwager, 1979, p.30-31).
It is important to emphasize that simulation games be used as heuristic and not 
as problem solving devices. In this sense, computerized simulation games are 
not very useful; they obscure more than they illuminate and educate. They place 
too much emphasis on the mechanistic and not enough on the sociodramatic. 
Players need to be able to see the game transactions taking place and the 
human emotions that accompany them. Only in this way may such experiences 
approach 'ideal speech situations'.
Simulation games, focus groups, action research, street theater, devised 
theater, posters, pamphlets, comic books, etc., are some examples of the many 
techniques that may be used to implement the idea of a participatory, 
democratic approach to planning. Once the theoretical issues have been 
worked out, the profession can draw upon the widespread experience of those 
interested in education and communication to complete its phenomenological 
purpose. Meanwhile, this purpose, itself, may need to be strengthened and 
broadened by a structural understanding of planning and its role in the larger 
social, political, and economic scene on which it plays out this purpose.
The Social Structure of Planning
The essence of structuralism, as seen in chapters 3 and 6, is the study of 
relationships. Structural analysis would thus locate planning as an activity, as 
well as theories about, or of, planning in the social structures of the time and 
place where it is found. Interest in structuralism in planning theory has been 
reflected mainly in an increase in the applications of Marxist theory in the social 
sciences since the 1970’s. Structuralism has not really been taken up to a large 
extent by planning theory, however, at least in the English-speaking world. Part 
of the reason for this is that it gives no clear direction to professional planning 
activity; its methodology calls for ‘reflective abstraction', a not very satisfying 
approach for the pragmatist mind-set in either technocratic or communicative 
planning. Furthermore, it is likely to move planning thought beyond the 
radicalism embodied in the participatory approach into the more disquieting 
waters of national, even international, political activism. Thus, the many reviews 
of the history of planning and its theory that has occasioned and/or been 
occasioned by the phenomenological turn do not refer in any systematic way to 
the changes in the political economy of capitalism that have inspired these 
changes.
Planning is embedded in the structures of capitalism, the system which has 
increasingly defined life on this planet over the past several hundred years, and 
even longer if we consider mercantilism as its antecedent structuring force. The
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shift of planning from a design to a scientific orientation half a century ago was a 
product of the crisis in the world capitalist system, a crisis in over-production and 
over-accumulation that brought a wave of speculative activity, which ended in 
the Great Depression. This was not the first (or the last) such crisis in the 
capitalist system, but it was the most threatening up to that time. There was a 
bright and a dark side to the resolution of this crisis. The bright side was the 
application of Keynesian economic theory and the creation of the welfare state, 
a development that suggested that people in a mass society could live with 
some level of satisfaction of their basic needs, including especially a minimum 
sense of security, hence the name 'Social Security1.
The dark side of the resolution was war. War, of course, has not been unknown 
to capitalism; it is its very essence, both literally and metaphorically. The 
massive destruction of human life and property that resulted from the advanced 
weaponry of the two world wars in the twentieth century has modified the degree 
to which it can be imagined as a means to resolve the metaphorical war that is 
represented by the competitive nature of the system, though, as seen in Chapter 
7, this has in no way altered the desire to develop new, more destructive 
weaponry, nor the importance of the war machine in the economic structures of 
capitalism.
In any case, these responses to the Great Depression in the U.S. created both 
the idea and the need for a more broadly based scientific approach to planning 
at all levels of society. Thus, the subsequent history of the idea of planning must 
be related to the structural needs of capitalism. For example, the Second World 
War and the sudden increase in industrial production needed to sustain it also 
produced a need for additions to the labor force, needs that were met in the U.S. 
by recruiting drives in the South and in the 'suburbs'. The result was a 
substantial increase in the migration of rural populations, especially blacks, to 
the industrial belt cities of the north, and of housewives from the central and 
peripheral areas of those same cities into industrial employment. These two 
populations tasted the independence and self-esteem brought about by well- 
paid and more or less satisfactory employment. Their sudden dismissal at the 
end of the war sent 'Rosie the Riverter' back to the suburban homestead where 
she would constitute a reserve of consciousness to inspire the subsequent 
feminist movement, and unemployed blacks into the ghettos where they would 
create the planning problems for the newly 'scientized' profession of planning. 
Unemployed wives could be seduced by the new cornucopia of consumer 
goods, including the 'good life' in new towns and new suburbs, where they were 
once again 'subordinated' to their well-paid husbands who benefited from the 
post-war boom in the world economy.
Suburban development, as the critical, usually Marxist, geographers and 
sociologists would demonstrate, was not unrelated to the structural forces of 
capitalism as they worked themselves out in urban space. Insurance companies 
and banks engaged in 'red-lining' practices where central city areas were
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outlined and 'outlawed' for insurance and financial assistance that is necessary 
to protect property values. Meanwhile, federally assisted financing in the form of 
Veteran's Administration and Federal Housing Administration loan insurance in 
the U.S. included regulations that allowed only lower density suburban housing 
to qualify. The combination of these factors stimulated economic activity in all 
the sectors related to suburban development, including especially the 
automobile industry. This created the need for planning of these new suburbs 
and of new transportation systems, to accommodate them, which in turn called 
for the application of many of the newly developed scientific planning 
techniques, related especially to urban infrastructure and land use and 
transportation modeling. Inner city banks (among others) in the meantime, were 
siphoning off deposits from central city dwellers to finance this suburban 
development, even while denying this financing to those same depositors.
At the same time, the other populations of 'redundant' workers, to use the 
colorful British euphemism, i.e. the blacks and other, mainly Latino populations 
who had migrated north to take advantage of the war industry, were simply left 
to fend for themselves. One result was the race riots in American cities in the 
late 1940’s and the resulting birth of a planning specialty in 'race relations'. The 
newly enforced poverty experienced by these populations also, in time, created 
new scientific planning approaches in social work, education, health care, and 
so forth. They also created the need for new scientific planning applications in 
housing and urban renewal, as the massive destruction in exchange values of 
inner city property resulting from red-lining in time also resulted in the massive 
destruction of use values, prompting the comment on the 'bombed out' look of 
inner cities by the German mortgage banker mentioned above.
The fate of housing for the minority populations was described by Meyerson and 
Banfield (1955) in their book entitled "Politics, Planning and the Public Interest" 
where 'politics' would substitute for the interests and workings of capital on the 
urban scene. These public housing projects, as I discovered myself while 
working on a report for the Chicago Plan Commission in the mid-fifties, were 
remarkably different from similar projects designed to house rural white or 
sometimes Native American populations prior to World War II. Those pre-war 
projects were low density, low-rise projects, integrated into existing 
neighborhoods. The post-war housing projects were high-rise, high density, and 
highly segregated. Pruitt-lgoe, a prototype, architectural, prize-winning project in 
St Louis that was blown-up twenty or so years after its construction, was much 
studied by sociologists in an effort to understand its failure as a planned solution 
to low income housing (Rainwater, 1970). ‘Politics’ had again resulted in many 
architectural design modifications that rendered the projects unlivable for the 
low- or non-income families that occupied them.
This dark side of urban and social planning exposed its racism and 
discrimination and prompted an awareness among blacks and a sufficient 
number of whites to inspire the Civil Rights Movement of the early 1960’s in the
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U.S. This movement was part of an extended world-wide insurgence against 
authority structures that depended upon and used scientific planning as a 
means of fostering economic (technological) development, while controlling 
people (and nature) in the name of progress (Leiss, 1974). It evolved quite 
naturally into, and paralleled, the anti(Vietnam)war movement in the U.S. in the 
late 1960s, marking the first time that young people refused to participate in the 
imperial adventures of the American war machine. Both the Civil Rights and the 
anti-war movement raised awareness about capitalism, prompting a resurgence 
in reading and writing about Marxist structuralism on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Meanwhile, the rest of the (Third) world had experienced enough of the darker 
side of capitalism so as not to require such 'enlightenment1, though there was a 
burst of writing on 'dependency', coming out of Latin America and Africa 
especially, which helped explain to First World audiences how capitalism 
actually worked in the periphery. As explained above, the Great Society 
Program resulted in large part from these movements and gave many young 
planners the opportunity to come even closer to the dark side of planning, with 
the resulting phenomenological turn in planning theory over the past quarter of a 
century, as evidenced by the large number of writings attesting to this 
transformation.
Meanwhile, there is a danger that learning to communicate and negotiate more 
effectively will simply add a layer of phenomenologically oriented instrumentality 
to the former technocratic mentality. Thus, if planning theory is still understood 
as a set of rational methods specific to the situation at hand, now bolstered by 
rhetorical techniques referring to the manner of negotiating the application of 
these techniques, and if the measure of success is the ability to execute plans 
according to their 'sponsor's' interests, even if these are localized interests, then 
planning theory is still relegated to the same apolitical and amoral status as that 
propogated by the earlier 'value free' positivist approach. Thus, in order to 
transform itself, to move beyond an effort to find a universal method, it must also 
include and be governed by a social theory in the broad sense, one which 
explains existing reality, but not as a form of propoganda in service to the status 
quo. It must also include a 'counter-analysis’ (Sandercock 1996, p.85), which 
also includes a theory of 'social transformation'. This was the practical purpose 
of Marxism, but the social transformation it sought was too dependent upon 
authoritarian structures, adequate, in some sense, for an underdeveloped 
largely uneducated population, but not possible to sustain when the complexity 
of the system and the demands for participation increased. Thus,
. . .a broader, more political definition of planning domains and practices [its 
structure] . . . will have to include mobilizing constituencies, protests, strikes, 
acts of civil disobedience, community organization, professional advocacy 
and research, publicity, as well as the proposing and drafting of taws and 
new programs of social intervention (Sandercock 1998, p.204).
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A dialectic structuralism sees this (re) definition of radical planning as an effort 
to place planning and social theory within the process whereby theory confronts 
reality and is shaped by it, even while it is helping to shape it. Changes in theory 
do not occur separate from the reality that it seeks to explain, and this reality 
and the changes in it inspire changes in that theory.
Theoretical transformations (especially in the social sciences ....) are neither 
the unfolding of independent ideas in the mind, nor simply the outcome of 
contradictions within a theoretical domain between theory and a static reality.
They are strongly related to and affected by changes in reality itself. This 
position is not to be taken as advocating some kind of materialist 
determinism. Ideas or theories are themselves part of reality, and at the same 
time are instrumental in structuring and restructuring this reality (Camhis 
1979, p. 126).
The modern world system is in the process of being deconstructed, even 
dismantled. First, by capital, in a desperate search to maintain profit levels. 
Second, by workers at every level in the socio-occupational hierarchy, in a 
desperate search to find security, and last, by those in the humanities and the 
social sciences in an effort to explain all of this. The efforts of capital can be 
seen in a combination of 1) ReaganismTThatcherism or neo-liberalism that has 
sought, and to a remarkable degree achieved, the dismantling of the welfare 
state, including any restrictions on the search for profit at home, and 2) 
globalization, which seeks the elimination of any restrictions on the search for 
profit overseas, especially in the Third World. The efforts of workers can be 
seen in the migratory flows from the countryside into the cities and into the 
advanced capitalist from the underdeveloped countries, but also between and 
among the cities of those developed countries. There is nothing new about all of 
these sorts of migration, which is simply to attest to the fact that people have 
responded to their dissatisfaction and insecurity, both before and during the rise 
of capitalism. What is not so much appreciated, or at least stressed, are the 
human costs of migration. Migrants are uprooted and their families and 
communities disrupted as a necessary by-product of their actions. Migrants are 
always 'homeless', even when not necessarily ‘houseless’, and their 
estrangement is often visited upon their children and grandchildren, especially if 
their skin color identifies them as an ‘other’.
The efforts of philosophers, artists, historians, linguists, social scientists, etc., to 
explain all of this is broadly encompassed by the term postmodernism. 
Postmodernism is often representational, as in literature, architecture and the 
arts, with the purpose of creating a sense of vertigo, of uncertainty, as a 
reflection of the all too common experience for people witnessing the 
destructiveness of modernist capitalism. This sort of art is not very useful when 
it simply leaves its audience with a sense of helplessness and powerlessness. 
Philosophy and social science may use some of these same techniques, by 
writing into its 'explanations' the same linguistic uncertainty, but many efforts are
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also marked by an effort to understand these phenomena and to explore the 
many dimensions of postmodernism outside of language itself.
In the future, postmodern planning theory, characterized mainly by the 
phenomenological turn as described above, will need to reinforce its structural 
analysis in order to avoid some of the same problems it has criticized in 
modernist theory (Lauria and Whelan 1995). This will entail a study of how 
capitalism is likely to evolve within the coming decades, so that planning as 
activity and theory can be located within that evolutionary path, which in turn will 
require that planners write a new 'story' about society and their role within it. This 
is a project which is well underway with the effort over the past two decades to 
recast planning in its postmodern role. In this new story the planning 'actor' is 
given new purpose, new agency and new action. What remains is to fill out the 
scene, to incorporate other powerful actors with their purposes and agencies 
and acts, insofar as they have a bearing upon the role of the planner. Thus, it is 
not only knowing how to act that is important to planners, a subject which has 
been examined extensively under the recent phenomenological approach to 
planning theory, but it is also knowing theoretically the context or structure of the 
political economic system within which planning must operate. This means 
knowing the forces (i.e. the actors, purposes, agencies and acts) that are at 
work beyond the obvious exercise of power in the political arena. It means 
knowing how actors (i.e. capitalists) in a capitalist system are working within and 
through the institutions of the state and society to accomplish their single- 
minded profit-seeking goal (purpose).
Structural analysis, or the radical political economy model, has served to expose 
the sometimes confused role that planning actually plays in the capitalist 
system. While planners have believed that they were acting in the public 
interest, the unintended consequences of their actions were to actually serve the 
interests of capital. Planners did this, on the one hand, by providing the goods 
and services that the 'market' could and would not supply, because either they 
were unprofitable when supplied to everyone or inadequate when supplied only 
to those who could pay. This is the abiding problem of privatization, one which is 
simply ignored under current neo-liberal theory and practice. On the other hand, 
planning, as Harvey (1985) has shown, helps to resolve contradictions among 
the various circuits of capital that individual capitalists cannot accomplish. The 
latter include resolving conflicts among the different branches of capital, as well 
as those between capital and the larger social system, through negotiation, 
legislation, mediation, and, where necessary, repression. Sandercock (1998, 
pp.91-2) reduces this analysis to an exposition of the class struggle, which in the 
final analysis it certainly is. It is, however, at the same time, a good deal more. 
Structural analysis serves to demonstrate the ultimate /'/rationality of a totality, a 
system, which is generated by individual actors acting in a perfectly rational 
manner, (i.e. a victory of instrumental over substantive rationality). Besides 
being a blow to instrumental rationality, it also destroys the 'myth' that an
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'unseen hand1 will ensure the ‘best common good', the cornerstone of neo­
classical economics and of its mathematization of all things. As Harvey (1973, 
p.190) says in a revealing passage about the operation of capital in urban 
space:
In capitalist economies rent arises in monopoly, differential and absolute 
forms. Once it has arisen, rent serves to allocate land to uses. When use 
determines value a case can be made for the social rationality of rent as an 
alternative device that leads to efficient capitalist [spatial] production patterns 
(although the aggregate quantity of rent paid seems an extraordinarily high 
price for society to pay for such an allocative mechanism). But when value 
determines use, the allocation takes place under the auspices of rampant 
speculation, artificially induced scarcities, and the like, and it loses any 
pretence of having anything to do with the efficient [spatial] organization of 
production and distribution.
There are a myriad of other ways in which the process of planning, at whatever 
level or locale, are influenced, i.e., enabled or restricted, by the structure of 
capitalism: how surplus is extracted and invested, how the contradictions among 
production, consumption, and the realization of profit are worked out in any 
given time or place, etc. It is not so much that planners will be instructed by 
structural analysis as to how they should act in any given time and place, as it is 
that they must understand the context (the scene) within which they are acting, if 
they are to act with wisdom (phronesis). Structural analyses, including Marxist 
ones, don't in themselves allow or deny planning a course of action with respect 
especially to social transformation, nor need they necessarily have a 'paralyzing 
effect on policy debates' (Sandercock 1998, p.92). Structural analyses are 
paralyzing only if they are presented in a determinist way. Marx's structural 
analyses may appear to be deterministic, but only if they are taken out of the 
context of his entire work. A dialectic structuralism is not paralyzing because it 
has ever in mind the human origins of structures; structures are constructed 
(and they can be deconstructed). There may even be a masculine-feminine 
divide here, male structuralism falling on the deterministic side and female on 
the dialectic side.
Structural analyses provide a context (scene) within which planners (and 
everyone else in society) acts. They do not prescribe courses of action, any 
more than most new insights do. Knowing that there are gender and racial 
biases in technocratic (positivist) planning theory does not 'instruct' planning 
activity. Such activity will always be processed through a judging mind. One 
hopes that better, more informed, judgements will result from better knowledge, 
even if the scope of the problem is enormous; does anyone think that 
overcoming sexism or racism is going to be any easier than 'overcoming' 
capitalism?
The 'power' of planning, once the engineering model has been placed in proper 
perspective, is the power of judgement. Revealing contradictions is not to be
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taken lightly in such a context, especially if the contradiction is between what 
actors, e.g., planners, think they are doing and what they are actually doing (as 
revealed either by the technical, political or bureaucratic knowledge that 
planners share with clients, or as revealed by a careful structural analysis of the 
larger context or scene within which they are all working).
What is the postmodern scene of today and towards which tomorrow seems to 
be heading? It is a scene dominated by flexible accumulation, or flexism in 
short,
a pattern of econo-cultural production and consumption characterized by near 
instantaneous delivery and rapid redirectability of resource flows. Flexism's 
fluidity results from cheaper and faster systems of transportation and 
telecommunications, globalization of capital markets, and concomitant 
flexibility - specialized just-in-time production processes enabling short 
productive and production cycles. These result in highly mobile capital and 
commodity flows able to out-maneuver geographically-fixed labor markets, 
communities, and bounded nations/states. Globalization and rapidity permit 
capital to evade long term commitment to place-based socio-economies, thus 
enabling a crucial social dynamic of flexism .... (Dear 2000, p. 152; see also 
Harvey, 1989).
This dynamic has produced the much celebrated 'vertigo of uncertainty1 (Moretti 
1987) that characterizes postmodern culture. It has also produced a growing 
income gap between the rich and the poor (people and nations), a separation 
between 'absentee' capitalists and the dispersed labor force that is subject to it, 
an explosion in corruption, violence, crime, drug-trafficking, arms dealing, white 
slavery, and so forth, that characterizes the contemporary world scene. Its urban 
spatial form, with Los Angeles as its prototype, is a disjointed disconnected 
(except by automobile), widely scattered set of household (real consumer) units 
which are joined solely by an electronic 'disinformation' highway (Dear, 2000, 
p.159).
All of this has now been much explored and exhibited in academia, as well as in 
the theater of the big and little screens, in painting, in architecture, and so on. 
But where is it all headed? Will capitalism "run into the wall", will it implode, will it 
blow itself up, (both literally and metaphorically)? Will it make the planet 
uninhabitable for homo sapiens and other species and simply dissipate itself? 
There are those who believe that we will simply 'live happily ever after', enjoying 
the 'end of history', or that any disturbances in our technological utopia will be 
easily re-addressed by new increments in science and engineering.
Ray and Anderson (2000, p.37-40) suggest three possible scenarios out of the 
not-so-blissful present into the unknown future: Scenario one they label "Falling 
Apart". All of the dire predictions about ecology, poverty, overpopulation, 
nuclear, chemical or biological war will result in the 'disintegration of civilization' 
as we know it into chaos. Nobody likes to think about this possibilty because it is 
too depressing, though it is a real possibility, in fact the more likely the less
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people want to think about it. The second Scenario they label "The Highly 
Adaptive World". In this scenario a sufficient number of 'important' people do 
reflect seriously about Scenario One, and they do act upon this reflection so as 
to move the world towards a more sustainable future, before the social and 
ecological problems become insurmountable. This, Ray and Anderson believe, 
would require a rapid adjustment in consciousness and intention at a rate 
something like the rate of increase in Internet users over the past five years. 
Scenario Three they label "Muddling Our Way to Transformation". Here that 
minority population they identify as 'cultural creatives' gradually increase in 
number, solving problems as they increase, but not probably fast enough to 
avoid several disastrous social and/or environmental 'episodes' that are in 
danger of carrying humanity over the brink into chaos. Postmodern planners 
and scientists, i.e., those informed by the phenomenology of science and 
planning, as well as by a structural understanding of society, could well be in the 
vanguard of the cultural creatives, offering their technical and communicative 
skills in an effort at collective survival. Structural analysis in this respect would 
not lead so much to a change in agency, in what planners actually do, as to a 
change in purpose, i.e., to what they turn their considerable knowledge and 
skills.
If we are in a transitional period, as many believe, then how can we best 
understand this process and therefore plan for a better future? Many turn to 
complexity studies and chaos theory as suggestive metaphors for what 
confronts us as a social system. System shifts and transition periods are 
accompanied by seeming chaotic behavior as the system moves away from a 
period of equilibrium to some future more 'steady state'. This process has been 
labeled 'hunting',
where a system seeks a new equilibrium at a different level in its evolutionary 
path, one which will resolve the contradictions in the old equilibrium, much 
like Kuhn's new paradigms resolve anomalies in older ones. (Ray and 
Anderson 2000, p.249).
Hunting may also produce crises in the form of problems that cannot be 
resolved under the old equilibrium, and may, indeed, even lead to the extinction 
of some living species (Wilson 2002). Human systems have a considerable 
evolutionary advantage over other systems, of course; their 'hunting expeditions' 
may be informed by knowledge. This knowledge gives a structure to human 
existence in its sociodramatic form. The rebellion of the 1960’s could not be a 
revolution 11. . . because you can't just stop being in a story, you have to have 
another story to be in . . . and you can't start wanting something till you know it 
exists" (Quinn 1995, p.264, as quoted in Ray and Anderson 2000, p.254). Thus, 
the 'hunt' for a new 'steady-state' in human systems will also be a 'hunt' for new 
structures of knowledge, given that knowledge is inexorably tied to social 
structures in a socially constructed reality.
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Wallerstein (1999) addresses this issue directly in his book, The End of the 
World as We Know It, where he divides his discussion into two parts: "the World 
of Capitalism" and the "World of Knowledge". The world of capitalism, he 
argues, will change profoundly over the next half century, to be eclipsed by 
some as yet unknown future system, and after an undoubtedly painful and 
destructive transition. Capitalism will have to change primarily because the 
environment, the biosphere, will no longer be able to support human life at the 
current rate of its alteration.3 Wall Street demands and will dismiss any 
executives that do not increase profits more than 10 per cent per year, "But 
nothing in the physical world can match such growth rates for long - they simply 
cannot be sustained" (Ray and Anderson 2000, p.317). What Ray and Anderson 
refer to here is the 10 per cent increase in the demands on the ecosystem that 
such corporate growth rates entail. The capitalist system is in a bind because 
there is no known solution to this problem within the current structure of 
capitalism as a system.
There are three possible solutions to this problem, according to Wallerstein 
(1999 p.81): 1) make the corporations pay, i.e. internalize the costs of
environmental pollution. If the total externalized (public) costs, not including tax 
breaks and direct subsidies, of subsidizing capitalism as a system in the U.S. 
were $2.6 trillion a year in 1994, and the total corporate profits for that year were 
only $530 billion, one can easily see that even a zero rate of profit would only 
cover 20 per cent of these costs (Korten 1999, p.48). 2) Government pays for 
these costs via taxation. If the government were to actually pay for these costs, 
it would have to raise taxes to such an extent that a) it would still squeeze profits 
on business enterprises, or b) it would so reduce income for everyone else that 
they would no longer be viable consumers, leading to a crisis of realization of 
capital, assuming that citizens would not revolt against such tax increases in the 
first place. 3) Do nothing. Aside from some token efforts by governments, the 
last alternative has been in force since the environmental 'crisis' was discovered 
half a century ago, except that the ecological burden has been shifted out of the 
advanced to the lesser developed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America by 
moving heavy industry to these countries and/or actually shipping waste 
products to them; ‘We’ll let the other side of the ship sink ‘, as Eugene McCarthy 
used to say, ironically.
Other factors leading to the eclipse of capitalism, according to Wallerstein 
(1999, p.130-131), include the 'deruralization' of the population, which leads to a 
loss of desperate workers who could offer themselves as victims to 
'superexploitation', defined by the 'dependistas' as receiving such a low income 
that they cannot 'reproduce themselves' as a labor force. As long as there were
3 I use the term 'alteration' rather than destruction to suggest that it is no more proper to 
impose social metaphors on nature than material ones on society. Nature cannot be 
destroyed', only altered. Whether humans can survive in this altered nature is of no concern to 
nature; it will continue to exist in its altered form.
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other desperately poor rural workers to take their place, capital did not have to 
worry about the reproduction of existing labor. Urbanization, however, leads to a 
rise in awareness reflected in union organizing, etc., and a demand for 
(relatively) higher wages, so that the loss of rural workers will in time squeeze 
corporate profits. In addition, the movement for democracy which began in the 
1960’s has reached a critical threshold in the advanced countries. In time it 
should tip the balance in favor of the people in opposition to capital, though the 
road will be long and painful,
The rise of democracy should not only tip the balance of the people against 
corporations, it should also tip the balance against technocratic planning and 
instrumental rationality generally. The struggle of the democratic movement can 
be observed (even measured) by the worldwide increase in "educational 
facilities, health facilities and a higher income base" (Wallerstein 1999, p.99). It 
can also be seen in the rise of multiculturalism, as seen in the 
phenomenological turn in the planning literature. An improved standard of 
education and of living would in itself account for the movement for greater 
democracy, as people have the wherewithal to demand more participation in 
making the 'socially constructed rules' that govern their lives.
In the world of knowledge, Wallerstein sees an erosion of the structures that 
have dominated science since the enlightenment. It is quite natural for 
knowledge to change if capitalism itself is to change. Science is the child of 
capitalism, locked in a dialectical relationship with it. By accepting the Cartesian 
separation, science, including social science, has been able to ignore the 
'discontent' of complexity studies and the 'arrow of time', the idea that nature is 
not a fixed, timeless mechanism, but that it too is evolving and its laws are no 
longer reversible. As a result of this, natural science is looking more to social 
science, rejecting determinism and trying to understand nature and natural 
science as part of the same 'socially constructed reality'. In this sense the study 
of a possible, even a better possible, future, is quite within the role of science. 
Planning a better possible future can only occur "when we have mastered the 
structures, yes have invented 'master narratives' that are plausible, relevant, and 
provisionally valid, that we can begin to exercise the kind of judgements that is 
implied by the concept of agency [planning]" (Wallerstein 1999, p.218). Then will 
we be able to see, as best we can at any given moment, how any given planning 
action will relate to all the other actors and their purposes and agencies who 
compose the complexity of the social reality in which we work, and have some 
sense of what we are accomplishing as the intended and sometimes unintended 
consequences of our actions.
178
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
CHAPTER 9
PLANNING A BETTER POSSIBLE FUTURE: THE SOCIODRAMATIC 
DIMENSION OF PLANNING1
Introduction
Revising planning theory would require attention to aspects of the social world 
otherwise neglected in current social theory with its heavy bias toward the 
physical and mechanistic. One of these neglected aspects, as seen in Chapters 
2 and 5, is found in phenomenology, and among those who strive for ‘inside’ or 
‘intersubjective’ understanding of the social world. This perspective defines 
society through its shared meanings and images, not through forces or vectors. 
It sees individuals as acting purposefully together through accepted beliefs and 
expectations and explains the dynamics of society as efforts to create and 
maintain or legitimate these beliefs.
This aspect is complemented by a socio-linguistic and socio-dramatic 
perspective that explains why statements, including scientific ones, about the 
present and future social order are inescapably moral. This morality derives 
from the fact that humans alone in nature create and experience their world 
linguistically, representing and communicating about nearly all things 
symbolically. Insofar as these socio-linguistic symbols constitute reality they are 
always subject to interpretation and critical judgment.
Planners along with most social scientists have fallen enthusiastically into the 
trap of scientistic (positivist) mysticism with its price-based, benefit-cost 
perspective on the social order. The result is a noticeable deficiency in social or 
public planning and a failure of the profession to satisfy either itself or its clients 
in this respect. Moreover, the very legitimacy of planning (and many other 
professions) has been threatened by movements such as advocacy planning, 
civil rights, minority pressures, ‘post-autistic economics’, or simply the 
‘generation gap’, and so forth. The basis for understanding this dilemma must 
be found within a social and planning theory that would account for this 
dissatisfaction. Such a theory must be humanistic, for these are human 
problems, and it must not so readily discard the accumulated wisdom of 
philosophy and art. Unlike scientific theory, it must develop a capacity to openly 
confront ambiguity and morality and accept them as necessary dimensions of 
any social reality. It must further develop principles of communication that will 
speak to the symbolic basis of the social order so that significant changes, when 
necessary, can be imagined and carried through.
1 Revised edition of Gerald Gutenschwager “Planning a Better Possible Future: Towards a 
Humanistic Theory of Planning, Paper presented at “Confer-ln", Conference of The American 
Institute of Planners, Boston, MA, October 7-11, 1972
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Much of current planning, like the social theory that inspires it, evades these 
issues through the myth of objectivity, with the result that it constitutes little more 
than an elaborate apology for the status quo. Insofar as the status quo has 
proven incapable of solving the pressing urban and social problems in the West 
-- indeed, it is now busily exporting them to other countries around the world 
under the guise of globalization -- one must question the adequacy of this 
‘apologetic’ theory, and seek where possible to improve and change it. The 
effort in this chapter will be to review these issues and suggest a direction for 
such improvement and change.
The Many Faces of Planning
Definitions of planning have varied over the past fifty years depending on the 
perspective and training of the definer, the pressing issues of the times, the 
audience appealed to, the technology of calculation, etc. Looking back, for 
example, we see that planning was at one time almost synonymous with 
mapping or design: as for some it remains today. The future is graphically 
portrayed as a blueprint, and the various social, economic and political 
organizational forms are subsumed under the spatial form.
As a more dynamic perspective developed and the co-ordinative difficulties 
became more apparent, planning was forced to include the time dimension and 
became more synonymous with programming. This dimension of planning has 
developed steadily throughout the New Deal, the Second World War, and the 
post-war effort at national development, and has been aided immensely by the 
rapid improvement in computer technology over the past decade or two. After 
some rough treatment at the hands of laissez-faire economists during the ‘30’s 
and ’40’s, because of an uncomfortable association with totalitarianism, 
programmatic planning was elaborated into the high status social science 
‘systems design’, and is now actively employed by the military and large scale 
business concerns as the appropriate definition of planning for their purposes. 
Some academics have also urged this definition of planning on the profession, 
though there doesn’t appear to be widespread application in city planning, 
except perhaps in primitive forms such as capital budgeting, etc.
The combined effects of recalcitrance in the face of programmatic authority and 
the success of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) in elaborating a 
mathematical theory of games, has suggested another definition of planning as 
a form of strategy. Strategic planning directs attention to conflict and conflict 
resolution (under the strict logic of game theory, of course). With a continuous 
rise in levels of social conflict during the civil rights and Vietnam war protests in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and with the planner often in the middle of this conflict, 
‘strategy’ superceded ‘program’ as the preferred metaphor for organizing
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planning thought for several decades. However, as there are dangers inherent in 
following the systems metaphor too literally (Boguslaw, 1981; McDermott, 1969), 
so also are there dangers in following the gaming metaphor to its extremes 
(Louch, 1966, p.209): human behaviour can be deterministically defined only to 
the extent that the humans involved don’t take note.
The attention given to participation is related to this question about determinism, 
which leads to a possible fourth in planning definition of planning as dramatic art 
in the broadest sense of the word. From time to time persons have offered the 
suggestion that planning be defined as dramatic art, though it appears that no 
one has taken this definition seriously, or at least seriously enough to explore 
the implications for planning theory and methodology. This is unfortunate, I 
think, because there are important philosophical and theoretical reasons for 
looking more closely at planning as dramatic art, and it is to this definition that 
the following discussion will be directed.
Planning is, In Effect, a Concern for the Future
To say that planning is, in effect, a concern for the future is, of course, to repeat 
a truism. Yet it is at this basic level that one must begin to develop a more 
humanistic definition of planning. Most planners will accept the qualification on 
the future described in their plans as one of the many possible, although this 
varies according to how early in the planning process and in what way ambiguity 
is eliminated to accommodate various demands for precision. But planners do 
speak about possible futures, about hypothetical pictures or images referring to 
certain goals or states in the human condition after the passage of time. They 
furthermore include plans on how to arrive at those possible futures, plans which 
include or account for system statements or statements of relationship and 
implied or explicit directives for action, all of which are generally deemed 
necessary to planning of any kind.
What is also necessary, though likely for various reasons to remain implicit, is 
the assumption that the possible futures outlined in plans are ‘good’ futures, 
futures ‘better than the present’. Quite apart from the criteria used to establish 
the goodness or ‘better-ness’ of a future, this moral component is inescapable, 
being built into language, like gender or tense or any of the many aspects of 
linguistic form.
To understand how this is true one must understand that all images of the 
present, past and future are learned with their moral connotations. It is in the 
nature of humans to learn about (especially social) reality through the symbols 
used to describe it. That portion of reality learned through direct experience is 
extremely limited, and even then is subject to linguistic interpretation. Our first 
exposure to the world around, a world presented to us by our early socializers,
181
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
usually our parents, has a crushing authority, deriving from our total dependence 
upon those primary socializers. That reality is objectively true and proper 
because it is the first and only reality presented to us at that time (Chapter 2). 
All subsequent interpretations of the world must grapple with the eminence of 
that set of images, modifying, elaborating, changing where possible, but always 
within a moral context; new images, new interpretations must be established as 
better, more appropriate, for whatever reason, than prior definitions of reality. All 
education in this sense is the establishment or re-establishment of the 
appropriateness of a way, however simple or complex, of perceiving, defining, 
and judging reality. The process is not unlike that described by Kuhn (1970) 
whereby new paradigms are added to the repertoire of science, sometimes after 
a hassle that shakes the intellectual and social structure of the scientific 
community itself. Plans of the future, especially those that deviate very much 
from the present, pose exactly this kind of dilemma for their readers and 
implementers.
The present, however inadequate, inefficient, unjust and possibly unloved, 
carries all the weight of past legitimation in its mere existence. Even though 
seriously eroded, the seeming appropriateness of the distribution of authority 
and the ability of those who use that authority to sustain the status quo are 
usually enough to inhibit radical change. Thus is the continuity and integrity of 
societies maintained. When injustice, inefficiency, and inadequacy grow (usually 
as a result of excessive exploitation of the ‘system’ by those in positions of 
authority) and the advantages to some outweigh their legitimate ‘rewards’, new, 
more radical plans for the future are tolerated. But it is the erosion and/or 
rejuvenation of the legitimacy of the present through which judgement is 
expressed, not the inadequacy, or injustice, or inefficiency per se.
This process of judgement is continuous, as individuals and groups decide 
whether the present is as they know it to be (or not to be) and hence whether it 
is as it ought (or ought not) to be. Perception is never free from judgement 
because reality can always potentially be not what it ought to be. Thus are plans 
formulated to bring the future into harmony with what we feel the present ought 
to be. Thus are all plans moral statements about the present (and future).
The moral dimension of planning, because of its symbolic or linguistic origins, 
serves to emphasize the importance of communication in planning. In fact, 
planning may be (re) defined as ‘communication about better possible futures’. 
The ‘s’ on futures is not incidental; it accompanies ‘possible’, and is necessitated 
by the ambiguity of symbolically created realities, and the ‘better’ is, as seen 
above, an inescapable part of all human communication about the past, present 
or future.
The conventional medium of planners is the ‘plan’, a statement in graphic, 
programmatic or strategic form of purpose or intention relating to the future.
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Other actors speak about the future through other media, through curriculum, 
through ritual, through spectacle, through art, etc. All statements about the 
future must have their socio-linguistic referents, however, if they are to be 
understood and acted upon in a social manner. And these socio-linguistic 
referents are bound to the communication groups who create and sustain them 
as meaningful in their social context.
Some would contend that positive science transcends these socio-linguistic 
constraints by virtue of having created a language of its own. But in fact 
scientists become part of a separate reference group, linguistically speaking, 
whose definitions of reality are no less symbolic and no less socially learned, for 
all their claims to ‘a-sociality’ or objectivity. Their world-view and paradigms are 
essentially mechanistic though hedged by deference to probability (which is the 
scientific metaphor for ambiguity), and their moral values are generally 
reducible, following Bentham, to some version of price (Burke, 1965, p.194). In 
any case, all plans constitute socio-linguistic communication about the future.
The moral dimension of communication about futures derives from perspectives 
on the present. These perspectives emphasise either acceptance or rejection 
(Burke, 1959), and plans are designed either to perpetuate (accept) or change 
(reject) the present. Futures are thus seen in communications about the 
present, communications that are either positive or critical; as with Burke, it is 
important to recognize that we are all poets, framing our analyses and plans in 
these poetic categories of acceptance or rejection.
Planners are ‘Inside’ the Present
The strange sounding statement, ‘Planners are inside the present’, refers to the 
fact that planners are social actors and insofar as planning is a social 
phenomenon it is this ‘inside-ness’ that is most important (Benveniste, 1972). 
Objectivity or outside-ness is important for understanding, of course, although 
even here there is an aspect rarely considered in the education and practice of 
planners: little attention is given to subjective analysis, to the interpretation of 
events and their aggregation in the course of planning. During professional 
training much time is devoted to the learning and application of appropriate 
models. These models constitute higher order metaphors used to understand 
and explain social, economic, political and spatial relationships, and often 
provide the basis for operational planning for the future. Most of these models or 
metaphors are heavily biased to the mechanistic, drawing as they do upon a 
long tradition of success (with nature) among the physical sciences. The 
emulation by planners and social scientists of physical science is both 
instrumental and social; the mechanistic metaphors are suggestive, particularly 
in highly aggregated social situations, and they do largely account for the
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success of physical science and the resulting high status of their users in the 
social and academic hierarchy within the modern(ist) world.
Nevertheless the social world for which and in which planners perform their 
professional tasks is composed of human actors whose perceptions and 
intentions do, after all, produce that social world. If their actions were fully 
determined by the physical forces posed in the mechanistic models there would 
be no explanation for social change; indeed, this aspect of social science is one 
of the least developed (see Chapter 5).
Understanding how the social world is a product of human perception and 
intention, and how it changes (or does not change) as a result of these 
perceptions and intentions, requires a further elaboration on objectivity or 
outside-ness as empathy2, a knowing or understanding (verstehen) of how 
others perceive and act in relation to the present (hence future). The lack of 
empathy, and of training in this form of ‘objective’ analysis, which could lead to a 
better understanding of ‘intersubjectivity’, has often handicapped planners by 
separating them from their clients; hence the accusation of a ‘middle-class’ bias, 
for example. But this lack also separates planners from their ‘employers’, the 
policy-makers, often resulting in a failure to implement planned solutions when it 
would seem otherwise (socially) rational to do so.
With a growing interest in participatory democracy and advocacy planning in the 
planning profession, there is a critical need for developing skills of the kind 
necessary for empathetic understanding. While verstehen, as a form of this 
understanding, was first sought as a methodological goal by Max Weber, it is 
equally to the phenomenologists and particularly Alfred Schutz (1970) that we 
owe much for detailing the type of analysis and modelling necessary for 
understanding our fellow humans in their social setting (See Chapters 2 and 5). 
Planners concerned with effectiveness would seem to have no alternative but to 
ground themselves in the phenomenology of every day life and in the theory and 
research necessary to develop an understanding of this phenomenology for the 
social situations in which they have and will find themselves. For, while planning, 
as communication is only possible from ‘inside’ the present, this ‘inside-ness’ 
must be informed by a careful ‘outside’ analysis of the kind that allows 
intersubjective communication to be understood in the first place.
This ‘inside-outside-ness’ is perhaps best illustrated by what social science has 
labelled ‘participant-observation’. Planners must become participant-observers 
in the present. They must recognise that they are inescapably a part of the 
present, that their actions and communications are one of many contributions to 
the future, but that a certain detachment of the kind found in the educated but 
concerned observer should enhance this participation. Learning to become an
2 Actually, the term ‘empathy’, has long been mistranslated from the Greek, where it means exactly 
the opposite, as hatred or animosity!
184
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
educated and concerned observer requires as much special training and at least 
as much difficult abstract thought as is required to master the physical models 
so popular in the positive sciences. Hopefully, the image of ‘untroubled’ social 
scientists applying their ‘methods’ to social analysis will become a thing of the 
past, as succeeding generations of academics and professionals force the issue 
of ‘praxis’ beyond the rhetoric of the classroom, although the very real issue of 
how one is to act, even symbolically, through communication is still for the most 
part only intuitively understood.
One thing, however, is clear: the value-free image of planners ‘inside’ the 
present is a paradox, if they are seeking something like a ‘better possible future’. 
A critical perspective and hence critical communication is simply denied the 
planner under this rubric, which is why the ‘better futures’ portrayed in so many 
plans are but empty rhetoric: no one takes them seriously and the plan ‘stays on 
the shelf. In effect, if planners are ‘value-free’ professionals, they are morally 
disarmed even before they begin to communicate. Of course, moralizing 
scientific planners would be in an equally paradoxical situation in their social 
setting, where they are expected to act as value-free technicians, and where a 
critical approach would be likely to threaten their professional status. But this is 
a social paradox, whereas the former effort to indoctrinate planners into a value- 
free self-image has created a psychological paradox. Morally concerned 
professionals, who know that it is philosophically correct, indeed inevitable, that 
they take a critical perspective on the present, are able to manage their critical 
communication to accommodate the expectations of those who employ them. 
When they have been socialized to believe that a critical or value-laden 
perspective is evil in itself, then they are faced with a far more difficult dilemma.
One of the results of this condition has been the generally conservative nature of 
social science, at least in the Anglo-American world (Gouldner, 1970). Value- 
free or amoral objectivity is so deeply rooted in this worldview as to take on the 
character of a myth (Roszak, 1968). Positive social scientists and planners have 
been effectively alienated from society by imposing a barrier of technique 
between themselves and reality. One result of this has been an almost total 
orientation to the existing, and an explicit distaste for working with the possible. 
Pragmatism and empiricism serve to provide the philosophical base for this 
conservative positivism because of their supportive perspective on the present 
(Horkheimer, 1947). Empirical truth can only be grounded in the existing, not in 
the possible, and the pragmatic attitude assigns moral goodness (along with 
utility) only to that which has worked.
Thus, one of the problems facing social scientists and their related professionals 
is to re-establish themselves ‘inside’ the present, and to explore the nature and 
implications of their roles as actors on the social scene. The higher order 
metaphors that have been developed to explain social reality are thought 
provoking in their perspective on the present, in spite of their generally
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mechanistic properties, but the search for better futures must lead beyond this 
to encompass the phenomenology of acting and communicating in everyday life.
Planners Must Understand How ‘Presents’ and ‘Futures’ Are Created and 
Maintained
A ‘present’ social order or social reality is a hierarchy closely related to the 
distribution of property or wealth (Burke, 1965). Power to control others by 
manipulating rewards and punishments is generally consistent with this 
hierarchy, i.e., it rests disproportionately with those higher up. Other functional 
and organizational dimensions of the social order are also subordinate to this 
hierarchy, any disclaimer about pluralism notwithstanding, which suggests that 
social change must ultimately be judged in relation to this hierarchy. Power and 
property determine the ‘nature of things’ during any period of social history, but 
the ‘order’ that sustains them derives from their general acceptance by society 
as a whole. The hierarchy is deemed appropriate or legitimate for the times, and 
those who benefit most, of course, attend closely to the maintenance of this 
legitimacy (Chapter 2).
Various forms of technological change may or may not affect this hierarchy, 
quite apart from the ways in which everyday life is changed. Technological and 
organizational changes may simply serve to enhance the legitimate power of 
those at the top of the hierarchy, particularly when consistent with the prevailing 
myths about the meaning and quality of life (Carey and Quirk, 1971). In this 
sense nothing in the history of the past two hundred years would seem to have 
threatened the basic social premises of efficiency, mechanism and control, at 
least until recently, or to have eroded the hierarchical position of those most 
successful in accommodating themselves to these premises. It is hard to accept 
the claims about rapid social change in this light or to see that any significant 
critical planning has ever been carried out.
The apparent inertia of any social hierarchy is not only a product of control; or, at 
least, the notion of control is a far more complex one than is supposed at this 
level of societal scale. Control is not only a matter of manipulating material 
rewards and punishments, which is a necessary but not sufficient means for 
maintaining the present, but is also a product of sociodramatic techniques used 
to maintain the legitimacy of the hierarchy and the type and distribution of 
rewards that prevail in that social order.
Sociodrama refers to the social paradigm most common to the arts and most 
completely developed into a perspective on social theory by Kenneth Burke and 
Hugh Duncan (See Chapter 3). It draws a critical distinction between society and 
nature, emphasising the difference between ‘things moving’ and ‘humans 
acting’. The sociodramatic paradigm likens social reality to theater in contrast to
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mechanism, and derives theoretical explanation from the artistic rather than 
scientific likeness of humans. This is not to say that humans are not rational, but 
rather that human rationality seeks perfection in the symbolic of which science is 
but one, albeit persuasive, version. Thus, the search for fulfillment is grounded 
in that which is deemed important, and social goals are a product of this.
Science is the most powerful symbolic system motivating western society today, 
although it usually claims only instrumental value. Mechanism, efficiency and 
control, as stated above, are among the basic premises of this system and they 
permeate social relationships down to and including the most intimate. But they 
are established social premises, not solely because of their utility, but also 
because of the sociodramatic techniques that persuade of their 
appropriateness.
Burke (1965) defines the sociodramatic ritual of maintaining legitimacy as 
consisting of two complementary efforts: mystification and victimage. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, mystification arises from social distance, especially 
between classes and across the division of labor in society, and is grounded in 
claims about the ‘naturalness' of the social order. Certain ‘rights’, while actually 
socio-linguistically created and maintained, are claimed (especially by those who 
benefit) as ‘natural’, or as divinely given. Examples include the ‘right’ to royal 
status in medieval society or the ‘right’ to all the private property one can amass 
in our own. Mystification helps us sustain this so-called natural order through the 
trappings of class, status and rank. We are ‘embarrassed’ (to use Burke’s term) 
by our inability to understand even the ‘mysterious’ language of our status 
equals, or to understand the basis of an authority that is socially equal to our 
own. The ‘embarrassment’ up and down the social hierarchy must, therefore, be 
even more profound. It is in this sense that Burke likens it to absolute guilt of the 
sort arising from ‘Original Sin’ and finds it, along with victimage and its rituals for 
catharsis and redemption, seemingly indispensable to the maintenance of the 
social order.
In victimage public ‘villains’ are sought out and sacrificed, as in scapegoating, 
often by public ‘heroes’. This serves as both a warning to, as well as a cleansing 
of guilt about those villainous thoughts in all of us that would question the 
appropriateness of the existing social hierarchy. In this way the social order is 
maintained by those who command the symbols of authority. One might refer to 
these sociodramatic techniques as special forms of reward and punishment, 
forms deriving from the peculiar social character of existence. We all engage in 
and witness mystification, observing symbols of dress, manner and language 
designed to separate rather than unite. We know the bureaucratic tricks that are 
used to protect status and office. And we are all conscious of the various forms 
of victimage exercised by those in power, from teacher to national leader, and 
from the symbolic cowboy-and-lndian versions of Hollywood to the all too real
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versions of Dachau and Vietnam (to say nothing of Iraq, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan in recent years).
Yet we also know that mystification and victimage cannot sustain indefinitely a 
social order whose legitimacy has been seriously questioned. If nothing else, our 
experience with history should teach us that. Nor are humans likely to stop 
questioning their social order, nor stop communicating their thoughts about it. 
What is important here is the choice of form for communication about the 
present social order, particularly when that communication is critical. And if 
planning is ‘communication about better possible futures’, it too must explore 
this question of form.
The problem of form returns to the original question of how ‘presents’ and 
‘futures’ are created and maintained. The excesses of mystification and 
victimage would seem to argue against dependence on these particular forms of 
communication to establish (or break down) legitimacy. They have in fact been 
responsible for some of the least acceptable moments in human history. The 
alternative would seem to be a more careful search for less destructive forms 
available to sociodramatic communication about ‘presents’ and ‘futures’. This 
leads to the (until recently) unusual suggestion that planners ought to be more 
familiar with poetry and poetic categories.
Poetry is broadly used here and by Burke (1959) to refer to all linguistic 
syntheses or statements about the present or future. Since we are not likely to 
think of the poet nor artist, and hence their categories, as appropriate in a 
discussion about planning, it might be well to remind that the poet, too, is 
engaging in communication about the present and possible futures. (The 
importance given during the Cold War in the American media to the Russian 
preoccupation with what their poets were communicating ought to suggest that 
art is not socially and politically separated from the material and instrumental in 
either Russian or American society, though it has been effectively ‘victimized’ 
under the crushing authority of science and technology in both.)
Thus referring to poetic categories in a critical book about scientific planning 
should not (after some thought, perhaps) be so strange after all. As Duncan 
would say (1969, p.287-8):
Among all Institutions in society, art alone sustains a wide, constant and 
searching criticism . . . Even the American university, supposedly dedicated 
to free inquiry, seems unable to create and sustain free criticism of its own 
work.
Perhaps the inspiration from art can suggest possible futures ‘better’ than those 
offered to date by science.
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Returning to the contention that communication about the present or future is 
inescapably moral, we recall that acceptance or rejection is inherent in all such 
communication. Added to this is the transitional or ‘maybe’ category which 
rounds out the possible perspectives on the social order. Burke, as indicated in 
Chapter 3, places tragedy, comedy and epic, in the supportive category, satire, 
burlesque and elegy in the negative, and the grotesque and didactic in the 
transitional. After studying each category for its ultimate historic implications, 
Burke concludes that the comic frame is the most humane, resting delicately as 
it does between tragedy and the negative categories of satire and burlesque and 
thus preserving the ambiguity necessary to inhibit the excessive uses of 
mystification and victimage.
The comic frame is a quasi-conservative one, suggesting that no political 
system is free from the human weaknesses that ultimately encourage the uses 
of mystification and victimage. Every system brings advantages to some over 
others and with it the temptation to exploit that advantage for selfish gain. Even 
some of those who followed and supported the profound social reforms 
implemented through the communist revolution must have recognized that those 
systems did not escape these temptations. Unlike the degradation inherent in 
satire and burlesque and the too heavy burden of guilt intrinsic to tragedy, the 
comic frame
. . . should enable people to be observers of themselves while acting. Its 
ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would 
transcend himself by noting his foibles. He would provide a rationale for 
locating the irrational and the non-rational. (Burke, 1959, p.171, author’s 
emphasis)
Burke goes on to explain that the ‘non-rational’ is a neglected quality in the 
vocabulary of our overly rational scientific world view, which dichotomizes the 
world into rational and irrational, and ignores the important possibility of non- 
rational experience totally outside this dichotomy.
But the comic frame is also critical, pointing up the mistakes that must be 
corrected to keep the social order viable. And it is in this sense that planning 
communication can stand to gain in poetic insight, for the mechanistic approach 
to planning can never be comic, or even poetic; it treats humans as integers not 
actors. It does not address itself at all to critical insight but assumes the 
appropriateness of the present in combination with whatever physical models 
are employed to carry that present into the future. Nevertheless, plans are social 
artifacts, and in their social context are used primarily as didactive techniques, 
or tend to be used communicatively as such, particularly when rewards and 
punishments are scheduled to be consistent with them. But planners have 
limited control over rewards and punishments; these tend, as stated above, to 
rest disproportionately with those higher up in the social hierarchy. As long as 
planners pay no attention to questions of legitimacy, and give no attention to the
189
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
sociodrama that sustains legitimacy, they are not likely to effect any critical 
changes in the real world.
What this suggests is that a new planning methodology as communication 
would have to follow from a broadened theory and image of the professional 
role, a role which would use the full range of communication techniques and 
poetic categories. Planning theory would have to encompass much more than 
the purely technical and conventional wisdom about mapping, programming and 
strategy. Taking seriously the definition of planning, as dramatic art would 
require an understanding of the planner as a social actor joining with others in a 
constantly evolving sociodrama in which the present is critically observed and 
out of which the future is created. This sociodrama mixes the deterministic with 
the humanistic - ‘forces’ with ‘interests’ - in a synthesis of social form. To the 
planners ‘tool kit’ would be added (or perhaps only edited) new communication 
techniques; games, public events, videos, formal drama, displays, adult 
education, devised theater, etc. Advocacy and community planning had already 
moved in this direction by attempting to break down the technical mystifications 
of planning, often working with prior ‘victims’ of planning, and placing planners at 
the service of their clients in dramatically different ways. The emphasis on 
‘participation’ is a further example of this phenomenon and Lisa Peattie (1970), 
in an article on community drama, suggested that the ‘disadvantaged’, too, were 
finding their own sociodramatic techniques for planning better possible futures 
(Rap Brown claimed during the turbulent 1960’s in the U.S., “Every riot brings a 
new poverty program!”).
One final dimension in this humanistic perspective or planning theory has to do 
with the basis for change in a democratic society. One of the primary efforts of 
democracy is to vest authority in rules rather than status, the effect of which is to 
counter some of the tendencies to mystification and victimage. A cardinal 
premise, however, is that all must participate in making those rules. Needless to 
say, if the ‘rules’ that govern social theory are derived from physical models, 
there is little social recourse to those rules. Their legitimacy has been 
established outside of society. Their success derives from their ability to explain 
the natural world; who would ever think of changing the laws that govern the 
gravity model, for example! Yet a democratic society should change in precisely 
this way: through a change in the rules. Planning a better possible future in a 
democratic society is thus not a task of bringing society closer to an ideal state 
of equilibrium, for example, but is rather one of opening discussion about the 
rules and broadening the participation in their formulation to the greatest 
possible extent. Critical discussions about zoning, for example, ought to touch 
upon its use as a social segregative device, in addition to its seeming explicit 
purpose of separating incompatible uses; discussions on urban renewal should 
(as they already have) speak to the enormous profits accruing to developers 
while claiming that slums were being cleared; etc.
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Since the 1960’s some planning professionals have been responding to 
‘sociodramatic’ communication from those who wished for more democratic 
participation in making the rules. It appears that planning theory is now 
broadening to incorporate those significant moments in the social and 
professional world. For it is one thing to say that a democratic social order 
should maintain an open discussion on the rules in which all would participate, 
and quite another thing to find the means for allowing this to happen, it appears 
that as these become more significant professional planning goals, planning 
theory will necessarily have to become more humanistic, looking beyond 
traditional social science concerns to a more philosophical perspective on 
society. The classic works of social thinkers and humanists that could help in 
this effort have been neglected in professional education and, even more 
distressingly, in most of the educational experiences that precede this level as 
well. Establishing the importance of wisdom beyond mere technocratic 
technique would seem to be one of the most important challenges facing the 
planning profession at this time. Hopefully, this book will contribute to such an 
effort. Meanwhile, we need to look more closely in the following chapter at what 
planning could ultimately seek to accomplish at the human level.
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CHAPTER 10
BEYOND MONETARY VALUES: PLANNING FOR HUMAN NEEDS1
Introduction
Among the many legacies of the 1960's has been a profound questioning of the 
mechanistic assumptions inherent in western social theory up to that time. 
Growing out of this has been a series of critiques on planning and development 
theory ranging from Schumacher's (1975) Small Is Beautiful, to dependency 
theory, the North-South debate, and more recently, Norgaard’s (1994), 
Development Betrayed. One important contribution to this discussion was the 
work of Paul Streeten (1981) and his associates, who observed that not only 
had post-war economic growth not guaranteed basic subsistence needs for the 
mass of people in the developing societies, but, by implication, that development 
theory itself was remiss in not addressing this apparent contradiction. In other 
words, the economistic categories of growth in GNP, GDP, etc., or even per 
capita income, did not necessarily give evidence to the abiding inequalities in 
those developing societies and their apparent inability to satisfy the most basic 
needs for substantial portions, if not the majority, of their populations. The same 
issues are now being raised within the discipline of economics, itself, especially 
by the graduate students in Western Europe, as evidenced by the movement for 
a post-autistic economics (pae_news, paecon). The term refers to the 
endoscopic nature of neo-classic economics, especially in its highly 
mathematical forms, and a lack of attention to the real socio-economic problems 
of ‘actually existing’ capitalism.
Streeten called attention to the need to consider these problems and to address 
the political-economic prerequisites for dealing with them. For example, 
development planners, as well as political leaders, would have to foster changes 
in the ownership patterns of physical assets (or means of production), especially 
land; resource allocation priorities would have to change; there would need to be 
changes in the balance of political power, usually involving some 
decentralization of decision making; and so forth.
This issue of basic needs has been widely discussed and the discussion may 
even have had some effect on the fate of populations in the Third World. Also, 
thanks to the untiring efforts of Mahbub ul Haq (1999), there is now a Human 
Development Report published annually by the United Nations Development 
Program, which addresses these issues in a formal way. But the theoretical
1 Revised edition of “Social Theory in Development Planning: The Elusive Needs Hierarchy”, Paper 
presented at the 20th World Conference of the Society for International Development, Amsterdam, , 
6-9 May 1991
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issue has not been developed much beyond an obvious agreement about the 
importance of these subsistence needs. In particular the question of defining 
needs in a more comprehensive way has not been addressed at this level, 
especially in relation to the broader issues of planning and development theory. 
Needs in relation to consumption is an important problem in planning and 
development at all levels of affluence, and two contemporary factors would 
seem to accentuate this point. One is the obvious ecological limitation to ever- 
expanding levels of consumption: if the entire world consumed energy and
polluted the environment at the rate of the developed countries, we would 
probably have already exceeded the capacity of the earth's biosphere to support 
human existence. Obviously, the current forms of production and consumption, 
which represent the ‘ideal’ direction of development in the world today, cannot 
be sustained, either theoretically or practically (Wilson 1980, Durning 1992). 
The issue of what is to be produced, and how, must be related to the question of 
what should be consumed and why. Hence, theories of consumption beyond 
the simple ‘rational man’ concept must gradually complement if not replace the 
production-oriented economic theories that have dominated planning and 
development thinking up till now.
The second factor is the apparent failure of the socialist systems to transcend 
the consumerist mentality that characterizes the capitalist mode of development. 
In other words, need satisfaction has been an overt goal of socialist theory and 
policy since the inception of socialism in the early 20th century. In spite of this, 
or perhaps because of it, widespread consumer dissatisfaction appears to be 
one factor that contributed to the abandonment of socialism in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, and its replacement by a ‘free market system’, as a 
hopeful panacea to these problems. Hidden behind the issue of freedom are 
important theoretical issues related to human needs and the appropriate 
political-economic means for satisfying them, for neither liberal-bourgeois nor 
Marxist theory has adequately addressed these issues at the social 
psychological level (Preteceille and Terrail 1985).
Maslow's Developmental Need Hierarchy -- Its Use and Abuse
Abraham Maslow's (1970) need hierarchy is a possible starting point for 
elaborating the full range of human needs in a dynamic framework. 
Unfortunately, Maslow has had mixed (often negative) reviews, since empirical 
research has been unable to establish a basis for accepting his theory 
(Fitzgerald 1977, Lederer 1980). This is partly a product of the complexity of the 
theory, which proceeds on the basis of the following hierarchy:
1. Physiological needs - hunger, thirst, sex, temperature control, etc.
2. Safety needs - security, stability, dependency, protection, freedom 
from fear, anxiety and chaos, need for structure, order, law, limits, 
strength in the protector, etc.
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3. Belongingness and love needs (need for affiliation) - need for 
affectionate relationships with friends, spouse, children and
community.
4. Esteem needs - two types
a. Self esteem - strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery, 
competence, confidence, independence and freedom
b. Social esteem - reputation, status, fame and glory, dominance, 
recognition, attention, importance, dignity or appreciation
5. Self-actualization - need to become more and more, 
idiosyncratically, everything that one is capable of becoming, from 
ideal mother or father, to athlete, musician, carpenter, or whatever
The first four levels are often referred to as deficiency needs (without the 
satisfaction of which an individual may be considered psychologically deficient or 
less than fully human, etc.) and the fifth level as the ‘being’ or growth need (or 
the ultimate basis for realizing oneself as a human being). To this hierarchy 
Maslow adds another two (non-hierarchical) needs:
1. Cognitive needs - the need to know and understand
2. Aesthetic needs, which are found in all cultures at all times
According to Maslow the hierarchical needs must be seen in their entirety as an 
interrelated system in which the drives overlap and interact, but within a 
framework in which lower needs must be generally satisfied before higher needs 
come into play. The latter is summarized in the concept of prepotency and is 
one of the most controversial aspects of Maslow's theory of needs. The idea of 
prepotency is difficult to operationalize for research purposes and is often 
misunderstood. For example, the idea that needs at one level must be more or 
less satisfied before those at the next higher level are felt or recognized as 
unsatisfied by the subject, leaves open at least two empirical questions. First, 
should an unrecognized need be counted as unsatisfied, and, second, should 
the researcher or the subject(s) identify needs and/or their satisfaction. Various 
attempts to verify Maslow's theory have used differing, often implicit, 
interpretations of these questions, with varying, sometimes conflicting, results. 
Furthermore, while Maslow is quite explicit in maintaining that prepotency is only 
a general rule with many well-known exceptions (by usually exceptional people), 
many critics use these exceptions as a refutation of the theory (Antsyferova, 
1974).
A second, more serious misunderstanding of Maslow's theory, one that 
invalidates much of the empirical research attempting to verify it, is related to 
the fact that, according to Maslow, needs are developed and the level in the 
hierarchy established throughout the childhood, adolescence and early 
adulthood of the average individual. Quoting from Maslow,
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... in the fortunate life history the safety needs are salient and satisfied 
during childhood, the affiliation needs during adolescence, and the esteem 
needs during early adulthood. Only as a person nears his 50's, generally, will 
self-actualization needs become strongly salient (Hall and Nougairn, 1968,
P-32).
In other words, to test Maslow’s theory adequately, complex longitudinal studies 
would be required. Cross-sectional analyses that attempt to relate need and/or 
satisfaction to a position in an organizational hierarchy in the workplace, for 
example, would have to be very carefully designed to identify this dynamic of 
psychological developmental; great care would be required in identifying the 
independent versus dependent variables in such cases.
Finally, much of the more rhetorical criticism of Maslow focuses on the issue of 
self-actualization, ignoring or glossing over the prior levels and the prepotent 
character of the hierarchy. Critics on the left accuse him of ignoring the extent 
to which need satisfaction, generally, is a social rather than psychological 
(individual) problem (Antysverova 1974, Lethbridge 1986, 1989, Nord 1977), 
whereas critics on the right accuse him of being a socialist (Mclnnes, 1977) or 
Marxist (Springborg, 1981, p. 276). Although Maslow did not develop a 
comprehensive social theory, he was certainly sensitive to social (psychological) 
issues. He emphasized, for example, the fact that the social and cultural 
conditions for realizing need satisfaction were as important as the needs 
themselves. In any case, it is fairly obvious that all need satisfaction is socially 
contingent. Maslow recognized this, though he did not attempt to spell out what 
the social organization for need satisfaction should be, which is a quite different 
issue in any case.
It is true that self-actualization appears as the most personal and individual 
need, but it is actually the last stage in the hierarchy. Unfortunately, according to 
Maslow, few people reach this level, mainly because the social conditions do not 
permit it. Individuals reach this level generally in their 50's and they must, 
according to the theory, have more or less satisfied all the needs at the other 
(apparently more) socially contingent levels before embarking on self- 
actualization. The emphasis on this top level of the hierarchy and lack of 
attention to the other levels and to the important contingency of the prepotent or 
hierarchical nature of all needs leads to a misrepresentation of Maslow's theory 
(Smith, 1973). This is to say nothing of the greater danger of abusing the notion 
of self-actualization by using it to justify self-indulgent behavior at any age. A 
possible example of the latter is described by Adrianne Aron (1977) in her 
discussion of the hippies of the 1960's. Even though her research did not 
uncover any evidence that the hippies knew anything about Maslow, she 
suggests that
Since the hippie experience is above all a quest for the kinds of peak 
experiences that Maslow describes, and since every person who aspires to 
or achieves the sort of thing that Maslow terms self-actualization moves
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wittingly or unwittingly onto Maslow's turf, the hippies, whether they know it 
or like it, must be considered Maslowians (p.11)
However, the issue here is: Who is to be criticized for this distortion, Maslow or 
the hippies? Aron admits that Maslow warned against this danger and the need 
to distinguish between a . psychologically healthy self-actualizer" and a "... 
selfish person, seeking his own personal, salvation ..." (Aron, p.10), but this 
does point to a deeper tension in Maslow's theory relating to the abiding 
unresolved dialectic in social theory (and its applications): the individual versus 
the social. Here Maslow's theory is certainly incomplete if not inadequate.
In fact, if Maslow’s theory is reframed in terms of the classic duality between the 
individual and the social, we can see that his need hierarchy is set directly within 
this context. Unfortunately, Maslow focused upon emotional development and 
gave little attention to cognitive development, which he referred to as existing 
outside the needs hierarchy. Yet self-actualization, the ultimate need, must 
depend as much upon cognitive as it does upon emotional development. In this 
sense, cognitive and emotional self-actualization or self-realization is the life 
force expressed from the first moment of life. It is this striving to realize oneself 
from infancy on that characterizes the human individual. It is a striving that 
involves the development of one’s emotional and intellectual self, a development 
that requires the mastery of the symbols (Gardner 1993, p. 242, Torff & Gardner 
1999, p. 142-3) that represent the collective and social intelligence that 
characterizes human existence (Stonier 1992). Collective intelligence, 
according to Stonier, is something we share with other species and relates to 
our ability to work together as a system, to take information, as a collectivity, 
from the environment, and to organize our behavior in response to this 
information. Collective intelligence enhances our ability to survive and to 
reproduce, i.e., to survive as a species. Collective intelligence characterizes a 
whole range of species from ants, bees and dolphins to humans. Social 
intelligence, characteristic of humans and some higher primates, is “ ... an 
advanced form of intelligence which allows an animal ... to analyze and 
respond correctly (intelligently) to possible behavioral responses of other 
members of the group” (Stonier 1992, p. 72).
What is critical here is the importance of the group, the collectivity for human 
development. Maslow’s identification of needs for safety, affiliation and esteem 
at critical points in the childhood, adolescence and early adulthood of the 
individual is also an identification of those important moments when individuals 
strike out, cognitively, on their own, and when they are most in need of structure 
and emotional support from the social environment. In the first instance the 
child discovers its being apart from the mother. Here it needs a behavioral 
structure to begin replacing and enhancing its genetically defined biological 
structure. This period Maslow defines according to the need for safety, security, 
stability, dependency, protection, etc., needs that are normally satisfied by the 
family or its surrogates. Samuels (1984, pp. 91-2) defines these as ‘first order
197
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
08/12/2017 04:40:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
needs’, whether physical (food, warmth, etc.), emotional (security, self-esteem, 
etc.), or cognitive (knowing, understanding, etc.), because they “ . . . originate 
with the individual”.
Needs for social support during adolescence are more complex and 
differentiated. Individuals confront puberty, demands for more sophisticated 
cognitive skills, and the need to define an identity apart from the family. The 
social location of these processes is usually a group of age peers, i.e., of other 
individuals confronting the same psychological challenges. Here Maslow 
identifies the support needs as those for belongingness, for affiliation, for love, 
etc., needs that must be satisfied to large degree in a group larger than the 
family but smaller than the whole society. Samuels (1984, pp. 92-95) refers to 
these as ‘second order needs’ because they arise “ . . . precisely in social 
interaction” and “ . . . exist because there is a group” [author’s emphasis].
Their satisfaction is necessary to the group so that it may function socially, and 
they are realized at that level through the establishment of rules or norms, which 
structure behavior within the group. Satisfaction of affiliation needs is thus 
necessary to both the group and the individual, which further serves to 
emphasize the dialectical nature of human existence.
Finally, esteem needs characterize early adulthood and are related cognitively 
and emotionally to one’s social and/or occupational role. One needs support 
from one’s professional peers, support in the form of recognition, attention, 
importance, reputation, status, etc. This social psychological support is different 
from that earlier in life; the collectivity acts in a more impersonal and functional 
way to ensure that the highest levels of collective intelligence will be attained. 
Samuels (1984, pp. 95-97) refers to these, as ‘third order needs’, satisfaction of 
which is necessary to the functioning of the whole society or culture. As such, 
they are more time and place specific, and are subject to change. For the 
individual, second and third order emotional needs recall the dependent state of 
human existence during infancy, where need satisfaction is emotionally framed. 
This emotional framework is carried over into adulthood, where it serves both to 
motivate the individual and to facilitate the operation of collective and social 
intelligence. One unfortunate by-product of the human need to belong is the 
formation of an identity, which often excludes other groups, other religions, other 
cultures and other races. The security and recognition that one’s own group 
provides often leads to the denigration of other groups and their assignment to 
an inferior ontological status, which permits forms of inhumanity that can reach 
extreme proportions. This emotional ‘well’ has been repeatedly tapped by 
everyone from gang leaders to political leaders, who seek their own geo-political 
goals by exploiting the need to belong. The challenge of this century will be to 
enhance the ability of all humans to extend their need to belong, their identity, to 
the entire species of Homo sapiens, indeed, to the entire ecosystem. Our 
collective intelligence will need to expand to include the entire universe if we are 
to survive what Carl Sagan has called our ‘technological adolescence’.
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Only later in life, according to Maslow, will individuals be free to seek true self- 
actualization, after they have attained self-esteem and confidence in their 
abilities as social beings. At that time will they be able to explore their own 
capacities to their fullest, but even then always within a social context. 
Meanwhile, it is important to re-emphasize the extent to which emotional and 
cognitive intelligence develop simultaneously within the individual. One might 
visualize the two strands of the DNA as a metaphor for the way in which 
cognitive and emotional development reinforce each other (Gardner 1993, 
p.254). Humans are always trying to realize, to actualize themselves 
emotionally, but they must conquer the cognitive world and enter the 
symbolically constructed reality of their collectivity to do so.
Failure to mature at any given stage in a child’s life may leave residual emotional 
and/or cognitive needs in adulthood. Thus, it is important to distinguish between 
objective adult needs for subsistence, for safety, affiliation and esteem, which do 
not exist in any sort of hierarchy of prepotency, and residual subjective adult 
needs of the same sort, which do. For example, objective needs for security can 
be met by already known programs in social welfare, the social safety net, etc. 
The problems here are associated with the erosion of this net by the globalized 
attack on human welfare under the neo-liberal policies in effect since the early 
1980’s, though one must also be sensitive to the problems associated with too 
much security and the corresponding lack of incentive to work, or even act, at 
all, in this respect. The issue here is to find a proper balance, however difficult 
this may be. Subjective needs for security, on the other hand as a residuel from 
inappropriate or missing childhood conditions for meeting security needs at that 
time, could not be met by increasing the objective conditions of security, 
according to Maslow’s theory. Here adult education and counseling would be 
required, the effort being to help adults understand the origins of their feelings of 
insecurity as a psychological insight into these emotions.
The same strategy would need to be followed for adult affiliation needs, 
differentiating them from ‘manufactured’ needs spawned by modern urban 
society, whose alienating and fragmenting effects have been documented for 
well over a century by artists and social scientists alike. The satisfaction of 
these needs could be met by more humanistic urban planning and design of the 
physical environment, taking it out of the hands of contractors, land speculators 
and banks, on the one hand, and by planning efforts to create the social 
conditions for human contact to replace that which has been lost from the former 
small scale society, on the other. The point here is not to romanticize the 
village, as has often been the response to this problem in the past, but to create 
an urban system with both the time and the accessibility that would allow these 
personal contacts to take place.
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Residual subjective needs for affiliation that are the result of an inappropriate 
social environment during adolescence could be satisfied in the same manner 
as residual safety needs, through adult education and counseling. Ironically, this 
is already being done within corporations, not only for safety and affiliation 
needs, but also for esteem needs, to the extent that these corporations are 
sensitive to emotional needs as a strategy for increasing productivity. Here the 
full range of needs may be addressed in an effort to create emotional 
intelligence, at least among management staff, though there is every reason to 
believe that the insights could filter throughout the corporation’s working force, 
with positive effects on the entire organization. I would say ‘ironically’, because 
the ultimate purpose of the corporation is to out-compete its rivals, often leading 
to their destruction and absorption through mergers and takeovers, hardly a 
formula for creating an overall socio-economic environment in which human 
needs could be satisfied, either objectively or subjectively. This contradiction 
relates to the neo-classical belief in individual rationality, the corporation being 
treated in a perverted way as an individual, with a resulting social rationality 
theoretically to be provided by some sort of equilibrium-providing ‘unseen hand’. 
This economic ‘fundamentalism’ is the root cause for the inability to meet human 
needs adequately wherever globalization holds sway. Any ‘residual’ emotional 
problems are neatly rationalized away by assuming that
Failures in human social behavior - violence, alienation and injustice are . . . 
a burden from our animal origins that civilized society is still learning to cope 
with, through education, bribery or coercion. With but a few exceptions, 
writers argue that humankind has yet to invent the social institutions that will 
conquer, once and for all, this shady side of our evolutionary past. Almost 
never is the problem cast in terms of a failure of the institution of civilized 
society to meet intrinsic needs of the human organism (Clark 1990, p. 37).
In the hard-nosed world of economic rationality, on which most of scientific 
planning is based, this discussion of human emotions and human psychological 
needs would likely engender skepticism, if not down right derision. How can one 
measure need satisfaction? How can you operationalize these emotional 
concepts? Are these concepts universal? Are there ‘hard’ science bases for 
emotions? For needs? Etc. Actually, there is a good deal of effort to answer 
just these questions. For example, the four basic emotions, fear (anxiety), 
anger, depression, and satisfaction, have each been consistently identified by 
facial expressions in cross-cultural research (Ekman and Friesen 1975, cited in 
Goleman 1995, p. 290), and have also been associated with hormonal 
discharges. Kemper (1987, p. 272 and 1978, cited in Sites 1990, p.8) records 
fear to be associated with epinephrine, anger with norepinephrine, both 
originating in the sympathetic nervous system, while depression and satisfaction 
depend upon the parasympathetic nervous system and are associated with the 
varied activation of acetylcholine. Goleman cites research linking these 
emotional discharges with specific medical effects via the immune system. 
Excessive and recurrent anger is associated with heart disease, fear or anxiety, 
which is produced by stress, is a well-known risk factor for a host of diseases,
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and depression has been found to exacerbate and delay recovery from most 
physical diseases, with satisfaction or positive feelings generally having no 
deleterious medical effects and, in fact, seen to assist in the recovery from other 
diseases (Goleman 1995, pp. 168-185). The inference here is that unsatisfied 
needs will trigger negative emotions, chiefly fear, anger or depression, 
depending on the psycho-synthesis of the individual, as well as on the accepted 
manner in which such emotions may be expressed in any given socio-cultural 
setting.
Meanwhile, the overall social importance of need satisfaction and emotional 
health is becoming increasingly well understood as a result of Goleman’s book 
on Emotional Intelligence (1995). Applications are now being studied in 
education (Salovey and Sluyter 1997), in management science (Cherniss and 
Goleman 2001) and generally throughout society (Bar-on and Parker 2000). 
Emotional Intelligence refers to the ability of individuals and groups to manage 
their emotions effectively, so as to avoid dysfunctional behavior. This research 
is matched by, and somewhat overlaps, research on cognitive intelligence. Early 
understandings represented by the concept of IQ (Binet and Simon 1905, 1980), 
and subsequently the much more theoretically and developmental^ elaborated 
work of Piaget (1950, Mussen 1970), is now being augmented by work such as 
that on ‘multiple intelligences’. Gardner (1993) has argued that there are seven 
intelligences. In addition to the linguistic and logico-mathematical intelligences 
that are measured by IQ and most achievement tests, and which constitute the 
subject matter of most formal schooling, Gardner (1993, p. xi) also identifies “. . 
. musical intelligence, spatial intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, and two 
forms of personal intelligence, one directed toward other persons, one directed 
toward oneself”. Musical, spatial and bodily-kinesthetic intelligences are well 
known, are often referred to as ‘talents’ rather that intelligences, and are 
associated with music performance and composition, architecture and the visual 
arts, and dance and athletics, respectively, etc. They are not generally seen to 
be of primary importance in formal education, so that they are developed in 
special programs and only in those individuals who are outstanding, and/or in 
families or communities where these intelligences may be especially valued. 
The last two, personal or interpersonal intelligences, are closely related to 
emotional intelligence, as well as to Maslow’s need hierarchy. For Gardner, 
these intelligences are of vital importance and, like emotional intelligence, are 
largely ignored in formal educational settings. Yet he feels that they may be the 
best predictors of ultimate success in life, better than IQ or general intelligence, 
as defined in the western world.
In any case, Gardner’s main point is that different intelligences require different 
learning environments and different interactions between innate individual 
abilities and the social constraints under which they will be realized and formed. 
Furthermore, the earliest environment of the child may the most critical in this
respect:
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‘Constraints' research has revealed that, by the end of early childhood, 
youngsters have developed powerful and already entrenched theories about 
their immediate worlds: the world of physical objects and forces, the world of 
living entities, the world of human beings, including their minds. Surprisingly, 
and in contradiction to the claims of Jean Piaget (Mussen and Kessen 1983), 
these naive ‘conceptions’ and ‘theories' prove difficult to alter, despite years 
of schooling. And so it often happens that the mind of the five-year-old ends 
up unaffected by the experience of school (Gardner 1993, p. xviii).
To emphasize this point, Gardner (1993, p. 379) cites the book, Kindergarten Is 
Too Late by Masuru Ibuka, the founder of SONY, as an example of how 
important the Japanese feel are the first five years of (pre-school) life.
All of this serves to illustrate that human emotional and cognitive need 
satisfaction is most importantly a developmental problem, beginning with the 
moment of birth, and to show how inadequate any quantitative measure of years 
of schooling or monies spent on education, or whatever, will be in capturing the 
essence of this process. Measures of basic subsistence need satisfaction - 
food, clothing, shelter, etc. - are always important, of course, and their 
inadequate satisfaction in so many parts of the world after so many years of 
‘development’ planning is merely a testament to the colossal inadequacies of 
current political-economic system to meet even these most elementary needs. 
But once such subsistence needs are met, the full force of the developmental 
character of need satisfaction must be faced. Neither adult education nor social 
welfare theory seems to be sufficiently attuned to this understanding (Galtung 
1980. Gough 2000), or at least they seem to minimize it in their search for a 
theory of adult needs and their satisfaction. But if this is true, there would seem 
to be no point in mentioning Maslow in this respect, since his theory is focused 
almost exclusively on the developmental aspects of need formation and 
satisfaction. Furthermore, even an exclusive focus on adult needs would have 
to make reference to the role that adults play in the satisfaction of the 
developmental needs of children; this dimension would appear to be an 
inescapable aspect of any discussion of human needs, in any case.
Empirical Research on the Needs Hierarchy
What is surprising about most of the discussion of Maslow’s hierarchy is the 
general lack of empirical research. Ross Fitzgerald (1977), who pretty much 
dismisses Maslow’s hierarchical concept as unscientific (in a positivist sense), 
states that, “Predictably, there has been no sustained effort, on the part of 
academic psychologists, to follow up and develop Maslow’s theoretical leads” 
(p.42), and, “Certainly there has been little serious study of hierarchies of needs 
as elaborated by Maslow . . . “ (p. 43), and, “As we have seen, needs lying 
above the safety ones have seldom been studied” (p.45), though he does go on 
to state that, “The stunting of emotional growth when human beings are denied 
warmth and contact during their formative years has been well documented”
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(pp. 45-46). The emphasis was added to illustrate how the developmental 
aspect can be fairly obvious to one who is looking for it, but quite invisible to one 
who is not.
Gerard Huizinga (1970) was not necessarily looking for this dimension when he 
embarked upon a study of the workplace in the Netherlands. Huizinga was very 
sensitive to the dynamic nature of the need hierarchy and to the importance of 
realizing that satisfaction at one level is a prerequisite to need development at a 
higher level, but he came to appreciate more fully the developmental aspect of 
the hierarchy and the prepotency concept as his study unfolded. Since only 
when fulfilled does a need level tend to be forgotten, psychological health as 
self-actualization or growth assumes that deficiency needs are fulfilled. 
Furthermore, it became clear to him that few people reach the growth potential 
for self-actualization. Growth is usually blocked by unfavorable conditions during 
childhood, such that one or more deficiency needs remains chronically 
unfulfilled, with the result that some adults may actually regress as they age, 
even to the lowest levels. Huizinga identified many problems in the modern 
family, such as divorce, frequent moving, absent parents, etc., as well as 
spoiling and permissiveness, as often overlooked and special kinds of need 
frustration. Without stability, as well as consistent and clear rules needed to 
structure behavior, basic security needs are frustrated. Need for immediate 
gratification leads to irresponsibility, inability to cope with disappointment, and a 
persistent tendency to perceive others as means-to-ends, etc. This syndrome 
often constitutes a special problem for two-career families; parents don't have 
the time (or energy) to create structure. Thus, according to Huizinga, it is not 
uncommon for individuals, even in affluent societies, to fail to grow out of 
deficiency needs. They often lack courage, with the result that the need for 
security outweighs the anxiety associated with growth; growth needs are less 
prepotent and therefore more dispensable.
Turning to Huizinga's empirical results, we see that he found, as have other 
organizational researchers, a relationship between level in the occupational 
hierarchy and level in the need hierarchy. However, his research indicated that 
". . . most psychological growth through the deficiency needs [author's 
emphasis] is accomplished by the time biological maturity has been reached" 
(Huizinga 1970, p. 153). In other words, psychological growth may be an age- 
related phenomenon, but for childhood and adolescence only, which serves to 
confirm Maslow's contention to the same effect cited above. Further tests 
showed that ". . . all psychological growth (and not merely growth through the 
deficiency needs) is ended by the time the lowest age bracket which occur[ed] in 
[his] sample is reached" (p. 153). In his adult sample there was no change in 
growth level by age; in fact". .. more people seemed to regress with age than to 
grow in this sense", which is ". . .in good accord with Maslow's finding that real 
self-actualization is so rarely encountered." (p. 153).
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What Huizinga concluded from these findings was that occupational level was 
probably the dependent variable caused by level of attainment in the need 
hierarchy rather than the other way around. What this implied was that changes 
in the work environment would not necessarily change the level of need 
achievement for the workers. Childhood development would appear to 
predispose individuals to certain levels. Changes in the work environment would 
tend to be interpreted (or misinterpreted) according to one's pre-existing level of 
psychological growth, (though, one would hope that individual counseling and 
education could alter this in many cases). More specifically, Huizinga found that 
among Dutch workers greater job satisfaction was correlated with higher level 
needs. If higher needs were prepotent, this would mean that lower needs had 
been satisfied and were no longer important as a result, which is not surprising 
given that Dutch workers exist under general conditions of affluence, with the 
exception noted that specific childhood experiences could cause considerable 
variation among even affluent populations.
What was unexpected in Huizinga's results was the finding that workers at all 
levels were frustrated in their higher needs. This has been generally 
emphasized by management theorists for lower occupational levels but it 
appears to be true, surprisingly, for higher occupational levels as well. Job 
enrichment, including more planning and control functions, would thus appear to 
be important for all levels in the occupational hierarchy. To the extent that lower 
needs were stronger at lower occupational levels would suggest that they had 
been fulfilled to a lesser extent. Thus, material incentives may be more 
important for lower occupational levels; and, as Huizinga suggests, for the lower 
occupational levels not included in the study even greater emphasis would need 
to be placed upon lower need satisfaction.
Another more age-sensititive attempt to research needs empirically is 
represented by the work of Frederick Samuels (1984, Chapters 7 and 8). In the 
1970’s and early 1980’s he sampled populations in the U.S., in New Hampshire 
- ranging in age from seven to ‘probably one hundred’, and in a more age- 
restricted sample from Hawaii. His New Hampshire data showed that, except 
for early adolescence where physiological needs were strongest (perhaps some 
combination of puberty, peer pressure expressed in dress codes, or even food 
as a sublimated expression of a need for belonging), in all other age groups 
belongingness and love was the dominant need, and this was true at all age 
groups in his sample. It appears that little has changed in the U.S. since the 
1960’s (See below). The same was true of the Hawaiian sample of college 
students, but not of adults living in Honolulu, where safety needs were rated as 
highest. These data would seem to support both Maslow’s and Huizinga’s 
contention that most adults are burdened with unresolved or residual lower order 
needs. Esteem needs, for example, even in the adult populations were never 
very high, and almost always less important than belonging, safety and even 
physiological needs. These populations could hardly be characterized as 
mature in Maslow’s terms, or as ‘emotionally intelligent’ in Goleman’s terms.
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Thus, what is suggested by this analysis of Maslow's theory and the empirical 
research relating to it is that it should be seen as focused not so much upon 
adult psychology as upon childhood or developmental psychology. This shifts 
the emphasis from the problem of how to satisfy adult needs in any given 
population to that of understanding how economic, political and socio-cultural 
conditions give rise to a characteristic schedule of needs as a result of childhood 
experiences. The hippies were obviously responding to a lack of satisfaction of 
their need for affiliation salient during childhood or adolescence. The ‘peak 
experiences’ sought by the hippies, and as described by Aron above, were not 
so much a misinformed search for self-actualization as they were an attempt to 
experience the illusion of, and in many cases act out, a different reality where 
need for affiliation could be satisfied; thus was an emphasis placed upon love1 
throughout the 60's. The lower order needs for subsistence and safety had 
obviously been chronically satisfied and were no longer prepotent such that, as 
Maslow would indicate, the hippies were willing to endanger those lower order 
needs even by ‘dropping out’ of the career track much valued by their parents. 
The 1960's were a particular reaction to the general alienation mentioned in the 
earlier part of this chapter, a reaction that has been almost totally abandoned 
since the 1980s (except among the cultural creatives - see Chapter 7), as 
consumerism has again grown into all-time excess. More than ever, shopping is 
now seen to substitute for affiliation and esteem needs, to the extent that for 
some it has become a form of addiction, leading to the formation of special 
organizations in the United States (e.g., ‘Spender Menders’), patterned after 
Alcoholics Anonymous and designed to assist women, in particular, to recover 
from this addiction. Because the hippies were romantics and their actions under 
theorized, and for the most part uninformed, their protest was easily co-opted by 
consumer capitalism; the peace symbol could soon be found on bathroom rugs; 
long(er) hair became stylish (and expensive to maintain); and the blue jeans 
turned from worker attire to $100 Gucci symbols! These remarks are not just an 
interesting aside, for the global village has made the demand for these 
consumer symbols the essence of the aspiration for development the world 
over, including in socialist countries. Judging how this consumerist 
phenomenon relates to human needs and, in particular, to Maslow's hierarchical 
theory, is critical to any understanding of the course that this aspect of 
globalization is likely to take in this century.
Need Satisfaction under Capitalism and Socialism
Both capitalism and socialism have promoted significant levels of development 
in spite of various degrees of distortion fostered by the conflict between them. 
Nevertheless, there has been considerable evidence of dissatisfaction in both 
systems, with all the psychological implications of this term. Under capitalism,
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need satisfaction has been largely reduced to commodity fetishism in a process 
that has been extensively analyzed by Marxist theorists beginning most 
importantly with Marx himself. Based upon this background Kate Soper 
(1981,1985) has developed a thoughtful analysis of the effects upon need 
satisfaction in modern society. Soper argues (with Marx) that the pattern of 
needs in a society arises not only in response to a production system, i.e., we 
need and are able to obtain those commodities that are made available, but also 
in reaction to a production system, i.e., needs displaced by a production system. 
Drawing upon Marx's analysis of alienation, she emphasizes the extent to which 
modernization via capitalism has caused us to abstract on the process of 
realizing ourselves through our objectivations (See Chapter 2). The point can 
be seen by comparison with peasant and pre-industrial societies. There one can 
easily observe the effects of one's labor or effort. The artisans and farmers 
owned the means of production (tools, buildings, etc.), and finished the products 
they started. Since we are what we are because of what we produce, and our 
sense of value (esteem) derives from the valuation of those products 
(objectivations) by ourselves and others, there was little misunderstanding about 
one's position and worth in such a society.
In modern society what we produce for ourselves (and others) is money. The 
means of production are owned by others (capital, the State) and the objects of 
production are not identifiable as our products, let alone owned by us in any 
sense of the word. The only mark of success (esteem) on the production side is 
money (earned) and essentially what that money can buy. We are forced by this 
abstraction to realize ourselves ultimately through consumption, not production 
(Lasch, 1979). Thus, according to Soper, our leisure (non-work) activities take 
on a great significance. Our consumer goods and our leisure activities are our 
chief means of realizing ourselves and of satisfying our esteem needs. It is also 
in this sense that postmodern theorists speak of the image value of consumer 
goods (Ewen 1999), a value existing alongside Marx's classic distinction 
between use value and exchange value.
Capitalism has clearly exploited this alienation and resulting abstraction on 
esteem-need satisfaction to its own advantage as a mode of production. 
Socialism, on the other hand, has sadly ignored its importance -- sadly, because 
capitalist consumer society, for all its successes, is unable to satisfy the basic 
subsistence needs of sizeable minorities in the advanced countries and of the 
majority of those in the underdeveloped countries. Meanwhile, the utopian 
promise of socialism has apparently been forestalled by its neglect of this issue, 
for alienation would appear to be as much a problem at the mass scale of all 
modern society as in its particular capitalist form. Socialist workers have been 
apparently no more able to realize themselves in production than capitalist 
workers, in spite of the attempts to alter theoretically the nature of the 
abstraction, whereby the party would serve as the vanguard of the proletariat 
and the state its surrogate owner of the means of production.
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Capitalism has always promoted insecurity. It is formalized in economic theory, 
glorified in business schools and seen generally as the source of incentive, 
productivity, and labor discipline at all levels of the economic system. Socialist 
countries, on the other hand, addressed the problem of insecurity directly, 
largely eliminating it from their internal economic order, except for the 
dissidents. Of course, older generations in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union still lived with the psychological memories of the past, memories of 
war, hunger and deprivation, while younger generations had experienced the 
abiding, though somewhat abstract military threat from the capitalist West. The 
European socialist systems had also fostered the satisfaction of affiliation 
needs, as workers in these countries probably now fondly recall.
But the external military threat and the concern for national security inhibited 
severely the realization of the full promise of socialism with respect to the whole 
range of needs in Maslow's hierarchy. This threat forced exorbitant human and 
material resources to be wasted in military research and production, with the 
result that productivity increases in civilian industry were never sufficient to 
provide the full range of consumer goods available in the capitalist West. 
Furthermore, technology transfer from the military to civilian sectors was 
severely restricted, for reasons of national security. More importantly, militarism 
and national insecurity forbade the satisfaction of esteem needs, except in the 
form of party privilege, usually expressed as a search for consumer goods, i.e., 
the mark of ‘distorted’ esteem as it known also under capitalism. Creating this 
‘distortion’ was, of course, the cornerstone of western psychological warfare 
theory, and the collapse of socialism can be attributed to the success in the 
application of this theory as much as to anything else.
A further complication to realizing oneself under socialism can be found in the 
tension between altruism and individualism. As Soper points out, (1981, p. 162) 
communism (much like Christianity) calls for sacrifice of self for the good of the 
whole society. This often creates a tension between self-affirmation and self- 
sacrifice, which is as likely to lead to psychological tension under socialism, as it 
does under Christianity. This leads
... to the question regarding the extent to which human happiness requires a 
denial of what one is, in the interests of that which one might become; from 
the question, that is, of the dependency of satisfaction upon the dynamic 
creativity that can only proceed at the cost of the single reproduction of the 
pleasures of sameness (Soper, 1981, p. 161),
which in turn leads to the question of how a society designed to maximize 
human happiness and fulfillment is to accommodate the need for dissatisfaction, 
which as Rousseau, Nietzsche and Freud all observe, is the source of much 
creativity, artistic and other. It is clear that there is a lack of popular interest in 
needs that are already satisfied, happiness having as much to do with ‘lacking
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as with having’, and socialism and development theory generally have not 
confronted this philosophical problem. This paradox could account for the 
insatiability of consumerism in capitalist societies, especially as it seeks to 
become a substitute for other forms of gratification. Also, in light of the types of 
dissatisfaction that contributed to the collapse of socialism, it would suggest a 
belief in those countries as well that ‘commodities’ can gratify all needs. Any 
theory or utopian vision, which fails to confront this tension between having and 
wanting, will fail to grasp the dynamic character of human needs.
Implications for Social Theory and Planning
Maslow's hierarchy may yet offer a way to transcend the seemingly irresolvable 
dilemma of ‘true’ versus ‘false’ needs, but not without some careful attention to 
how his theory (and social theory generally) is to be used. To illustrate I will turn 
to a recent essay by Patricia Springborg, (1981) who, in her analysis of needs, 
offers a forceful corrective to the messianic claims made by critics of capitalist 
need production and manipulation in modern society. She rightly argues that 
capitalist societies
. . .are a haphazard conglomerate of different entities, some of which are a 
product of historical accident, others of human design, but all of which are 
integrated more highly in thought than in reality (p. 217)
In addition, she points out that to the extent to which radical critics succeed in 
persuading their readers that capitalism is highly proficient in manipulating its 
subjects and in creating and exploiting ‘false’ needs, they encourage a sense of 
powerlessness that would inhibit correction through political means (p. 241 - 2). 
Finally, critics of commodity fetishism under capitalism may have placed too 
much hope in the ability of revolution to resolve these issues, or, more 
specifically, in the ability of the proletariat or its vanguard party to correct once 
and for all the human evils of greed and exploitation (pp. 235 - 37).
These points are well taken and serve to caution about the normative 
assumptions that are often hidden behind descriptive and analytical accounts. 
She also claims, however, that
The scientific explanation of behavior in terms of needs is more or less 
doomed to failure because ... [t]o attribute overt behavior to hidden needs for 
security, relatedness, self-actualization, or any of the many needs that have 
actually been postulated, presupposes that there is conclusive evidence to 
establish this link objectively. But, of course, there is not. The processes of 
human motivation are private, and to some degree unconscious processes; 
the only person in a position to have any knowledge of how this behavior 
relates to underlying principles is the subject himself, but according to the 
cannons of scientific objectivity we cannot take his word for it (p. 196)
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Here Springborg is arguing from the position of the Cartesian worldview and its 
positivist applications to social science (Capra, 1982). However, social 
scientists, including especially psychologists, are often, if not always working 
with such 'private' information, supplied, sometimes reliably and sometimes not, 
by the subject. If this is not acceptable scientifically, then there is no such thing 
as social science (at least in the Newtonian sense), to say nothing of society 
itself! (See Chapter 2),
If we attempt, therefore, to validate Maslow's theory in the conventional positivist 
framework of science, we are probably doomed to fail. Indeed, much of the 
empirical research on his theory has proven inconclusive, quite apart from the 
inherent difficulties of framing an empirical test in the developmental and cross- 
cultural form that would be required to do so. This harks back to the question of 
whether social science should be in search of universal laws, i.e., ahistorical and 
transcultural laws, perhaps as implied by Maslow himself, or in search of 
historically contingent heuristic devices (Gillwald 1990). Is Maslow's need 
hierarchy a universal (even biological) law governing human behavior, or is he 
simply offering an historical insight? If it is the former it will probably be 
impossible to verify, even in a probabilistic framework, though this is not an 
argument for abandoning empirical research. If it is the latter - a heuristic device 
- then it should not be
. . .regarded, positively or negatively, as [a] proposition of ‘science’, but 
analyzed as [a] legitimization of a very peculiar and probably highly significant 
construction of reality in modem society. Such analysis, of course, would 
bracket the question of the ‘scientific validity’ of these theories and simply 
look upon them as data for an understanding of the subjective and objective 
reality from which they emerged and which, in turn, they influence (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 188)
Berger and Luckmann (pp. 119 - 20) suggest that social theories are validated 
not by empirical research but by ‘social support’, i.e., they become ‘standard, 
taken-for-granted knowledge in the society in question’. This is a much more 
modest ontological claim for social theory than that made by Springborg, who, 
from her position, rejects Maslow's theorizing as incapable of scientific 
validation.
Thus, postulating a need for security, affection or esteem does not necessarily 
imply a universal depiction of what those satisfactions are or how those needs 
may be satisfied, definitions of which would be culturally contingent in any case. 
More important, the definitions of needs and satisfactions are usually taken for 
granted by the socio-political-economic system within which individuals find 
themselves. For example, neo-classical economics postulates certain utility- 
maximizing behavior as typical, a necessary normative assumption in order for 
the theory itself to proceed. What is important here is not whether such theory 
can be verified, but that policies, programs, and even private decisions inspired 
by this theory establish reward and punishment schedules, including purely
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psychological ones, that return as self-fulfilling prophesies; they may literally 
determine the results of any empirical psychological research seeking to 
establish universal laws about human behavior and human needs. It is not that 
these neo-classical assumptions are universal scientific law; rather they have 
been extremely persuasive, philosophically and politically, and large numbers of 
(important) people act them out as if they were universally true. This is 
consistent with Marx's observation that liberal economists believe and act as if 
utility-maximizing individuals pursuing their own self-interests in a war of all- 
against-all would result in the common good, rather than a general negation. 
This in itself is mildly ironic, but he found greater irony in the fact that “.. .private 
interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can only be 
achieved within conditions established by society and through the means that 
society affords. .." (Marx, 1971)
When social theory is treated as heuristic, it may be viewed as carefully crafted 
metaphor, which would not only serve to guard against the ever-present dangers 
of reification, but would be consistent with newer understandings in the 
philosophy of (natural) science that have resulted from relativity theory, quantum 
theory, and complexity studies. Science in this view would not seek an eternal 
objective truth. Rather it would seek an understanding of what a theory couched 
in the form of a probe, or jetty as Derrida (1990) refers to it, into nature (or 
society) would provide in the way of knowledge. Knowledge would be viewed as 
paradigm-contingent rather than universally true, especially in the case of social 
science where theory, itself, is so inescapably a part of the social reality being 
studied. Needless to say, most discussion about attempts to verify Maslow's 
theory have been conducted in the Newtonian framework and have often failed 
to find conclusive empirical support of the needs hierarchy in that framework, 
though Maslow may have been as guilty of presenting his theory in this way as 
his critics (Galtung, 1980).
Whether or not this violates Maslow's initial intent or the intent of those who 
have pursued an empirical test of his theory, viewing his theory in a holistic, or 
dialectic, or heuristic framework seems a more appropriate path to take, 
although it does not simplify the task for those who seek to use it in that way. 
The theorist in this view should not be seen as bringing Maslow's need theory to 
the planning situation as if it were some sort of engineering device which might 
only require adjustment for local circumstances. Social scientists and planners 
'engaged with', or ‘inside’, the social reality under study, would be seeking not so 
much to apply an ontology of needs as to uncover an ontology of social 
communication. The issue of the relativity of needs would have to be joined in 
the medium where they are established. The theorist would view himself or 
herself not as a prestiged holder of universal knowledge but as a participant in 
the construction of a social reality. The task would be to educate, not mystify, to 
present arguments in a comprehensible manner, and to allow the subjects of 
planning to determine their own needs in an informed way. If advertising is
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secretly manipulative, this manipulation must be exposed. If Maslow's need 
hierarchy appears to have heuristic value, it also must be exposed. The task is 
not to impose a theory but to expose a discourse, a formidable task given the 
language gap between the experts and the populace. But this is the challenge 
of a revised more humanistic planning theory and, in a broader sense, of a 
holistic philosophy of social science. None of this is to argue that empirical 
research should in any way be abandoned; simply it also must be made a part of 
the public discourse in a much more meaningful way than it has been up to now.
How, then, would one proceed to apply Maslow’s theory to a planning situation? 
Apart from the general dissemination of the theoretical ideas, one would have to 
develop operational definitions for the needs and some measure of satisfaction 
appropriate for a given socio-cultural setting. Among other things, this would 
require a transposition and synthesis of the vocabularies used by planning 
experts in the various disciplines. Economists, in particular, who are key 
decision makers but the most removed intellectually and emotionally from the 
human and psychological, would have to be involved in this discourse. Once 
involved, they would hopefully appreciate the value of this set of criteria for 
judging planning success. They should be able to observe, for example, as two 
authors demonstrated for South Korea, that rapid rates of growth in per capita 
income and GNP do not necessarily translate into greater need satisfaction for 
the population. Shin and Snyder (1983) defined and measured need 
satisfaction within Maslow’s framework, grouping physiological and safety needs 
under quality of physical life, affiliation and esteem needs under quality of social 
life , and self-actualization under quality of personal life. Using 50 indicators to 
measure change in quality of life in South Korea from 1963 to 1979, they found 
(paradoxically?) that while the country experienced remarkable rates of growth 
in per capita income and GNP, and substantial improvement in physical life, that 
social quality and personal quality of life actually declined during that period. 
With all the caveats about the signifance of empirical research, these results still 
must cause some reflection on the path if not the meaning of development 
planning in such terms.
As the discourse on need satisfaction as a measure of success unfolds, one 
could imagine substantial research to identify just such contradictions in the 
planning and development process. Research and discussion would focus not 
only on needs and their satisfaction, but ultimately upon the conditions under 
whch needs at various levels in the hierarchy could be satisfied (Samater 1984). 
These conditions would also have to be defined operationally in an ongoing 
effort to plan in a more meaningful and dynamic way. While neither theory nor 
research has been sufficiently articulated in this context to be able to state what 
these definitions would be, certain priorities are suggested from the previous 
discussion of Maslow and his critics. For example, if the growth and satisfaction 
of needs take place almost entirely during childhood, adolescence and early 
adulthood, one would have to focus attention and research on the conditions 
faced by populations during this period in their lives. While it is a truism that
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productive workers are important to a society, and equally true that productive 
workers are a product of psychological development under specific social 
conditions, little work in planning theory addresses this critical issue.
In addition to the above, one could gain a greater understanding of where an 
actual adult population was, psychologically, at any given moment in the 
planning process, and an understanding of the set of needs and expectations 
that would characterize that population as a result of the childhood, adolescent 
and early adulthood experiences that they had already endured. This would 
help to identify appropriate incentives for the adult population, on the one hand, 
and the agenda for public discussion of needs, on the other. Thus, for example, 
if a population or a portion were predominantly concerned about safety because 
this need had been chronically undergratified during childhood, this need would 
be prepotent for this population and would dominate its motivations and 
expectations within the planning context. Their judgement of the success of 
planning would be closely related to the extent to which this need was being 
satisfied; other rewards or incentives in the work or social environment available 
to satisfy other needs would be either ignored or misinterpreted.
What complicates this picture more than anything else, however, is the problem 
that different segments of the population, whether they be social classes, age 
groups, socio-occupational groups, or whatever, could very well be at different 
stages in the need hierarchy at the same time and in the same place and, that 
over periods of time, these combinations could be constantly changing, in part 
because of the success of the planning process itself. This almost inevitably 
would give rise to conflicts of interests, conflicts which might be understood in 
other terms by political scientists, but which greatly complicate the task of 
establishing planning priorities in a dynamic framework. The need hierarchy, 
and theories of cognitive and emotional development could help to illuminate 
and resolve many of these conflicts, but only if made a part of the public and 
planning discourse.
Conclusion
The value of a heuristic theory is that it suggests explanations that would not 
otherwise be thought of. With the help of Marx's theory of alienation it would 
appear that Maslow's theory could offer useful insights on the phenomenon of 
consumerism and the role of commodity fetishism even, perhaps, within a 
socialist structure. In the former socialist countries, for example, some of the 
people were apparently willing to forego guaranteed employment for a chance to 
experience the consumer paradise they believed ‘free market’ societies to be. 
Chronic gratification, as Maslow's theory would predict, had made safety and 
affiliation needs no longer prepotent in these societies, and people were willing 
to endanger them in a search for the satisfaction of esteem needs that, as we
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have seen above, are now realized not at work but in leisure, particularly through 
the image value of consumer goods. Thus, it is no (psychological) accident, that 
for most people, shopping is the great sociodrama of the twentieth century (See 
Chapter 3). On the other hand, the hippies of the 1960's eschewed this form of 
gratification, recognizing, perhaps, the deceptions involved. In any case, they 
were by and large the children of affluent families where physiological and safety 
needs were chronically gratified, while their needs for affection apparently were 
not.
Although there are obviously many other dimensions to the examples mentioned 
here, it is apparent that the heuristic value of Maslow's theory can help to 
improve understanding and help to articulate a whole range of issues associated 
with modern society. Even if it is used only as a checklist, as Galtung (1980, p. 
70) suggests, it could serve to caution against neglecting some needs at the 
expense of others, or the needs of some segments of society at the expense of 
others, with often serious political repercussions. The question posed is how 
development and planning theory can be flexible and dynamic enough to 
accommodate the different needs of different groups. Such theory must also be 
able to adjust over time when these groups and/or succeeding generations 
themselves change as a result of the success of planning and development.
The emphasis on material output in almost all economic theory tends to bias 
attention away from certain categories of need, particularly affiliation and esteem 
needs, because, especially within the very limited psychological vocabulary of 
economics, they are so difficult to measure. Indeed, a shortcoming of both neo­
classical and Marxist economics is their disregard for the changing nature of 
needs over time. Neither theoretical tradition has shown much awareness (at 
least in application) of how to build in, theoretically or practically, the satisfaction 
of higher order non-material needs as a society develops.
Thus, a planning theory that included the need hierarchy would have to foresee 
changing institutional structures over time especially in relation to developmental 
(or child) psychology. It would have to include a theory of institution building and 
transformation that would accommodate changing needs as lower order needs 
were becoming satisfied. A sense of the scope of this problem can be 
appreciated in a quote by Luis Alberto Machado (1980, quoted in Gardner 1993, 
p.370), the then Minister for the Development of Human Intelligence of 
Venezuela:
We [Venezuelans] are going to completely transform our educational system.
We are going to teach how to develop intelligence everyday, from 
kindergarten to college, and we are going to teach parents, especially 
mothers, how to teach their children from the moment of birth, and even 
before, how to develop all their capabilities. In this manner we will be offering 
our people and all the people’s of the world a real new future.
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Humanistic planning would have to include a monitoring system that would 
indicate degrees of need satisfaction at each level and suggest institutional 
transformations designed to satisfy new needs at higher levels as they arose, 
while at the same time not disrupt the production system and the distributive 
mechanisms. This would be a difficult task given the disciplinary boundaries in 
academia and the professions, boundaries that encourage intellectual 
provincialism and inhibit theoretical formulations that incorporate more than the 
accepted lore from the home discipline. This academic provincialism, combined 
with the elitism that characterizes most academics and professionals concerned 
with planning, rightly gives importance to the concern by many critics of Maslow 
about the hidden normative assumptions in his theory. Working within the 
Cartesian -Newtonian framework, which assumes that universal laws concerning 
human behavior can be discovered through empirical research, they refuse to 
endorse any theory in the absence of such proof. Treating social theory as 
heuristic rather than deterministic would go a long way towards resolving this 
dilemma. If all social theories were treated as suggestive metaphors to be used 
in public discourse about collective social goals, there would be no issue of 
imposing normative theories on unsuspecting subjects. Then planning could 
realize its human as well as scientific goals.
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